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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Larry Galizio for the Doctor of Philosophy in Urban
Studies presented June 4, 2009.

Title: The Incorporation of Direct Democracy: Populism and Initiative Practices as
Contested Terrain

What are the democratic implications of the increasing professionalization of
direct democracy?
The dissertation takes a critical approach to the "initiative-industrial complex"
and offers a counter-thesis to prevailing scholarly research on the substantial growth in
the use of political consultants in initiative campaigns. The political economic
analysis approaches direct legislation campaigns and elections as constituent parts of a
system of legitimation for the existing set of social relations.
An historical analysis reveals that the contemporary era of initiative activity
rivals that of its frequent use during the populist and progressive eras; and that in the
early 21 st century direct legislation represents a significant element of the political
landscape of the 24 states permitting its use.
The analysis concentrates specifically on Oregon's initiative system during the
2000 to 2008 election period, with a focus on 4 high-stakes campaigns (2 from the
2000 election and 2 from 2006).
The contemporary era of direct democracy reflects the ascendancy of the
principles of neoliberalism and includes unprecedented financial flows into initiative
campaigns in Oregon and other states with a system of direct legislation. The Oregon

initiative campaigns discussed in the study demonstrate the heightened technification,
industrialization, and "scienticization" (Habermas) of direct democracy campaigns and
elections.
The study found that wealthy organized and elite interests exploit the populist
origins of the initiative process for political and ideological advancement, and that
"crypto-initiatives" are employed to force labor and public sector advocates to expend
valuable financial and human resources in their defense. Moreover, it finds that
technologically-mediated campaigns construct voters as consumers approaching them
in the manner of private exchange relations and therefore have questionable secondary
educational and/or civic benefits.
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Chapter One: Introduction
In his classic study of direct democracy in the United States, Thomas Cronin
describes the tension inherent to a republican form of government with a strong
historical/cultural valuation of individualism and personal liberty. Cronin observes
that "[D]efinitional and political debates over 'consent of the governed' are a constant
of our political culture" (Cronin, 1989, p. 20). A provocative illustration of this
conflict was examined by historian Michael Schudson in an essay critical of a proposal
by 1992 presidential candidate, Ross Perot. Perot's idea was to consider replacing
Congress with nationwide electronic town meetings, using direct plebiscitary decisionmaking. In his critique of Perot's scheme, Schudson quotes nineteenth-century figure
Lord Bryce, who contemplated an era when the will of the majority might "become
ascertainable at all times, and without the need of its passing through a body of
representatives, possibly even without the need of voting machinery at all." Thus, in
Bryce's words, "public opinion would not only reign but govern" (Schudson, 1992).
Although Perot's recommendation ultimately went nowhere, it exemplifies a
powerful strain of populism that runs through American political life, as well as the
surface appeal of empowering voters with a more direct means of crafting public
policy. Indeed, reconciliation of individual rights and personal liberty with effective
governance has been a source of tension in American politics since the nation's
inception (Cronin, 1989; Goebel, 2002). In contemporary American electoral politics
at the state level, debates over "consent of the governed" have been especially
vigorous among advocates and skeptics of direct legislation or the system of the
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initiative, referendum, and recall. Although issues concerning direct legislation are
numerous and complex, for many of the most vocal advocates in support of, or in
opposition to, the system of direct democracy, they ultimately come down to a
philosophical position in support of the voter as sovereign or one favoring a
Madisonian preference for a republican form of government (Broder, 2000; Waters,
2001).
Still, politics and elections are first and foremost about power, and in
approximately half of the states in the union in the early part of the twenty-first
century, the politics of direct legislation constitute an important arena in the struggle
for political and economic power. This, in turn, leads to several questions germane to
this study, including: how does the system of direct democracy help to consolidate or
distribute power among organized interests and the citizenry? Which organized
interests or citizens participate in direct legislation campaigns and elections? Do
initiative campaigns and elections possess distinct features increasing or diminishing
their utility for organized interests seeking to possess or maintain political power? Or,
does the system of direct democracy empower the citizenry to overcome, or at least
subdue, entrenched interests in state capitals in the 24 states permitting its use?
As explored in greater depth in Chapter Three of this study, historical accounts
of the origins of the system of direct legislation in the United States attribute the rise
of the initiative and referendum (I&R) to both the economic populism of the Populist
movement and the governmental reform tenets of the Progressive era (Schmidt, 1989;
Cronin, 1989; Goebel, 2002). Cronin (1989) describes a widely held belief in the
2
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1880s and 1890s that government officials at all levels were controlled by the very
special interests that were perceived as primarily responsible for the devastating
economic conditions confronting farmers, laborers, and merchants during that era.
Likewise, in Thomas Goebel's study of direct democracy from 1890 to 1940 he
observes that:
The call for the initiative and referendum in the 1890s, triggered by the
example of Switzerland, unfolded within a model of political economy that
located the origins of oppressive monopolies, corporations, and trusts in the
special privileges bestowed on private parties by dishonest lawmakers and
legislative assemblies (2002, p. 4).

And if the government was the handmaiden of the powerful railroads, trusts, and
monopolies, then it was necessary to enact change by creation of an alternative
Populist (a.k.a People's) Party and to restructure the political system to ensure that the
true producers of wealth had an opportunity to counteract a corrupted government
(Cronin, 1989; Goebel, 2002).
Since the initiative and referendum in the United States emerged from a
progressive historical era and from a collection of groups with limited economic
wealth and political power, it is controversial whenever vast sums of money are spent
on initiative campaigns or when powerful organized interests themselves are
responsible for, and playing major roles in, direct legislation campaigns. This is
increasingly the case in many state I&R in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Moreover, when economically powerful interests employ the services of the most
sophisticated political campaign tools and personnel, for some, it signifies that a
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system created by and for common citizens to fight the oppressive power of moneyed
interests has been co-opted by those very concerns (Broder, 2000; Schrag, 1998;
Smith, 1998).
The Professionalization Thesis
If the initiative process was created precisely to counteract powerful
entrenched legislative interests, the use and growth of political consultants in direct
legislation gives rise to several issues concerning this citizen-inspired lawmaking
practice (Cronin, 1989; Schultz, 1996; Lee, 1989). As McCuan suggests, the
professionalization (i.e. campaigns employing paid signature gatherers, campaign
consultants, and other paid political professionals) of this supposed amateur process
poses an interesting paradox for scholars of direct legislation (2001). Furthermore, as
McCuan explains "we know relatively little about the process behind how groups
conduct their campaigns, and where the campaigns allocate their money. Moreover,
we know even less about the individuals who are involved with these campaigns
advising interest groups where and how to spend their money" (McCuan, 2001, p. 4).
A more complete discussion of McCuan's arguments regarding the causes and
effects of what is generally referred to as increasing "professionalization" in initiative
campaigns is found in Chapter Two. In brief, McCuan reassesses the cost/benefit
analysis of the contemporary initiative process by considering the critical role of
interest groups. Essentially, he argues that a kind of "spillover effect" takes place, as
the growth of the cadre of political professionals working on candidate races has led to
a greater supply for interest groups to employ for ballot measure campaigns.
4
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Political Campaign Consultants
The scholarly literature on the history and significance of the use of political
consultants in campaigns focuses primarily on candidate-campaigns (McCuan, 2001;
Farrell, 1996; Sabato, 1981; Thurber & Nelson, 2000). Scholarship concerning the
origins of campaign consulting posits that those first consultants were likely
volunteers in the elections of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams (Thurber & Nelson,
2000, p. 1). The availability of commercial techniques and the need to communicate
with voters over a wider range of territory have led to the adoption of such commercial
approaches in the political arena (McCuan, 2001; Newman, 1999). Kamarck observes
that once Calvin Coolidge used radio in 1924, the campaign potential of this
technology became immediately apparent to the major political parties (1998, pp. 3,
4). Medvic explains that the use of the informal campaign manager goes back to
Lincoln in 1860, but that the phrase "campaign manager" had entered the political
vocabulary by 1882 (1997, p. 31). Still, as it relates to I&R, the political consulting
firm of Whitaker and Baxter are generally recognized as central figures in the socalled professionalization of campaigns (Kelley, 1956; Sabato, 1981; McCuan, 2001;
Medvic, 1997).
By 1933, Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter, with their firm, Campaigns, Inc.,
was the nation's first full-time, full-service political consulting firm (McCuan, 2001).
The firm was hired by Pacific Gas & Electric (PGE) to work in opposition to the
Central Valley Project Act in California. The law provided for the development of
Central Valley water resources and was supported by local Chambers of Commerce,
5

Introduction
then-Governor James Rolph, and then-Senator Hiram Johnson, among others (Goebel,
2002). However, because the act permitted public agencies to buy the project's
power, private utilities, most notably PGE, brought it to the ballot in the form of a
voter referendum. On behalf of their client PGE and other private utilities, Whitaker
and Baxter were successful in their referendum campaign (Kelley, 1956). Journalist
and scholar Susan Rasky argues that not only were Whitaker and Baxter pioneers, but
the means by which they sought to strengthen their clients' chances of winning should
be viewed as important as well. Their use of billboards, direct mail, planted news
stories, radio spots, and movie trailers, presaged the era of sophisticated public
relations techniques of contemporary initiative and candidate campaigns (Rasky, 1999,
pp. 52, 53). One pioneering technique that remains popular in both initiative and
candidate campaigns is the creation of campaign committee names that belie the
interests financing the effort. Under the direction of Whitaker and Baxter, private
utilities, led by PGE, raised and spent campaign money as the Greater California
League and the People's Economy League (Goebel, 2002, p. 161).
Most scholarly work on the rise of the so-called professionalization of political
campaigns emphasizes the changes in communication technology and its impact on
the increasing employment of those with greater proficiency in its use (Sabato, 1981;
Bowler & Farrell, 1998; Thurber, 1999). Additionally, the recognizable shift in
resources from parties to individual campaigns is evident by the decade of the 1960s
(Nimmo, 1970). Moreover, advances in marketing techniques, including more
sophisticated public opinion research, is also viewed as boosting the importance of
6
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experts offering specialized knowledge and understanding of the growing arsenal of
campaign technologies (Newman, 1999). Such conventional views of political
campaign professionalization, the professionalization thesis, posit an inexorable
evolution in communication technologies and the need for technical know-how and
assistance as central to the growth of the rising corps of political consultants in
candidate and initiative campaigns (Scammell, 1999). Finally, the weakening role of
political parties in elections and the transfer of resources to individual campaigns are
other major factors consistently highlighted in the literature (Sabato, 1981; Bowler &
Farrell, 1998; Thurber, 1999).
A Critical Approach to I&R Campaigns
In contrast, this study takes a critical approach to the so-called
professionalization of direct legislation campaigns. A critical approach seeks
understanding of the "professionalization" of initiative campaigns within the broader
context of the contemporary era of neoliberalism, sophisticated political marketing,
and productive surveillance. By "critical," I mean an approach that recognizes the
need to examine the broader context and social forces, including political economic
and technological forces that affect the system of direct legislation, our understanding
of it, and its implications for democratic theory. A premise of a critical approach is
that social reality is historically constituted, and that to achieve a greater
understanding of social relations it is necessary to identify and examine contradictions,
conflicts, language and power dynamics. Finally, specific to the present study, a
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critical approach will be employed to examine the broader political economic and
technological context within which the system of direct democracy exists.
Neoliberalism
Broadly speaking, neoliberalism refers to the set of principles supporting socalled free trade and free markets, and which emphasizes the superiority of market
forces and privatization over governmental control and influence over institutions and
individuals. The importance of "market choice," the privileging of the individual over
the community, and the powerful ethos of the "marketplace as supreme," parallels
arguments in support of direct democracy. The philosophical principles of
neoliberalism naturalize the increasing significance of money as a determining factor
in elections as well as the acceptability of initiative campaigns treating voters as
consumers and objects to be managed, as opposed to citizens invited to participate in
grassroots campaigns. The market-centered logic of neoliberalism rationalizes
multimillion-dollar campaigns and unrestricted contributions and expenditures
viewing it as a matter of choice if wealthy individuals and powerful organized
interests choose to invest their capital in this manner. Faith in the market also
rationalizes the increasing expense of purchasing the best political consultants and
political/commercial technologies for initiative campaigns as simply the cost of
business. Similarly, neoliberal principles encouraging privatization, consumer choice,
individualism, and personal responsibility, construct citizens as consumers. To
paraphrase Garnham, campaigns do not appeal to voters as rational beings with
concerns about the public good; instead voters are addressed in the mode of
8

Introduction
commodity advertising. As such, voters as consumers are appealed to as individuals
with largely irrational appetites whose self-interest must be purchased. Consequently,
citizens are addressed within the set of social relations created for different purposes
(Garnham, 1990). For what is a political campaign if not an exemplar of the free
marketplace of ideas (and dollars), wherein individual citizens have the opportunity to
signify their preference for the most compelling products with the most persuasive
marketing campaigns? And what better venue for "market choice" than a political
realm in which amateurs are responsible for the very products for which citizens are
casting their ballots?
Essentially tracking historically the significant increase in the number of
initiatives confronting voters in the past quarter century, neoliberalism has become the
dominant global political economic and cultural paradigm of the late twentieth and
early twenty-first century. And as explained by Sussman (2005), politics, following
neoliberal principles, is now more privatized. Therefore it is not surprising that both
candidate campaigns and elections, and as argued here, initiative campaigns and
elections, have witnessed significant growth in the use of private consultants largely
financed by wealthy organized interests. Initiative campaigns, especially in states
such as Oregon where voters may face anywhere from four to ten ballot measures or
more per election, place a premium on political marketing expertise and the ability to
sell images and ideas to an often overburdened and time-constrained public.
In this study, I also take the position that the significance and sophistication of
capital-intensive, technologically-mediated twenty-first century initiative campaign
9
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represent an important yet neglected element in the scholarship on direct democracy in
the United States. Although communication technologies continually evolve and
political campaigns have always sought to exploit their power and reach, the
unrestricted financial resources permitted in initiative campaigns provide great
leverage for organized interests with the wherewithal to employ them. Equally
important, the sheer sophistication of the tools and techniques utilized by political
operatives in I&R campaigns, necessitates closer scrutiny if we are to properly
understand direct legislation campaigns in the early part of the twenty-first century.
Scholarship concerning direct democracy in the United States in the past three decades
has produced a considerable amount of work on the relationship between initiative
campaign expenditures and election won/loss records (see especially Lupia &
Matsusaka, 2004; Stratmann, 2006). However, a critical approach, one that places the
initiative system within the dominant neoliberal political economy, to the so-called
professionalization of initiative campaigns in the era of microtargeting and
increasingly sophisticated political marketing tools and techniques, is relatively
unchartered territory in the academic literature.
In this study, I borrow the term, productive surveillance from critical
communication studies scholar, Mark Andrejevic, who uses it to describe the function
of interactivity in the genre known as reality television. For Andrejevic, the promise
of interactivity offered by surveillance technologies such as the web cam, and now
cellular phones, which allow your friends to know where you are at any moment, uses
the promise of participatory interactivity to act as a form of productive surveillance
10
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allowing for the commodification of the products generated by what he describes as
"the work of being watched" (Andrejevic, 2004, p. 2). In Andrejevic's analysis, socalled reality television induces subjects to voluntarily submit to comprehensive
monitoring as a means to participate in a medium that has traditionally relegated
spectators to the sidelines. For Andrejevic, this arrangement serves as "an
advertisement for the benefits of submission to comprehensive surveillance in an era
in which surveillance is increasingly productive." Thus, promoters of electronic
commerce (e-commerce) invite consumers to subject themselves to ever more precise
forms of surveillance, with the promise of more individualized marketing and
production — so-called mass customization. Mass
customization refers to marketing and manufacturing processes that seek to use low
unit costs of mass production, with the flexibility of individual customization (Pine,
1992). Thus, individuals purchasing a product online can request particular features
(customization) by providing sufficient data about themselves and their particular
product specifications. Put even more succinctly, "viewers and consumers are invited
to subject themselves to forms of interactivity that monitor their behavior with the
promise that this interactivity offers an outlet for creative self-expression"
(Andrejevic, 2004, pp. 2, 3).
In similar fashion, political consultants surveill voters through online and inperson focus groups, promising participatory political interactivity that ultimately
serves to fashion the very campaign themes and images used to move voters into the
win column for highly-paid consultants in initiative campaigns. Participants in the
11
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focus groups are offered nominal remuneration, or none at all, yet willingly participate
in productive surveillance by generating highly valuable information that is
subsequently commodified by consultants and the financiers of initiative campaigns.
The information is highly valuable for the reason that political marketers seek
maximum data collection about the potential targets of their campaign communication
and to inform their resource allocation decisions. While it is arguable whether
participating in focus groups and surveys constitutes creative self-expression, it does
follow the mass customization marketing approach that promotes submission to
monitoring when such activity is increasingly productive. Although the value of
voter's reactions to campaign language, themes, and overall political marketing
strategy is difficult to quantify, to the extent such information is representative of
likely voters, it is indispensable to campaign financiers and their hired political
operatives.
With these factors in mind, some of the concerns animating this study include:
what techniques and strategies are employed by capital-intensive initiative campaigns
in the first decade of the twenty-first century? What functions do campaign
professionals fulfill in these citizen-initiatives? How do campaign consultants and
their activities in direct legislation campaigns construct citizen/voters?
Because the research and case studies in this dissertation focus on the state of
Oregon, before detailing the specific focus and methods, I offer a synoptic history
concerning the state of Oregon and its experience with direct legislation.

12
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Oregon and Direct Legislation
Since adopting a direct legislation option in 1902, Oregon is the most prolific
user of the initiative process in the nation. In fact, from 1904 — the year in which
Oregon held the nation's first election with direct legislation on the ballot — through
2008, Oregon voters have faced more initiatives (353) than any other state in the
union. Oregon's large neighbor to the south, California, with more than nine times the
population of Oregon, has been the second most prolific initiative state, with a total of
327. Oregon also has the highest average initiative use — 6.6 per general election —
the most statewide initiatives and referenda (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2008)
on the ballot in a single year, with 28 in 1912 (Ellis, 2002, p. 34). Finally, Oregon is
the state where the first legal challenge to the initiative and referendum occurred. The
central argument in the case was that direct legislation violated the guarantee of a
republican form of government. The case went all the way to the Oregon Supreme
Court of 1903 where the verdict held that direct legislation ".. .does not destroy the
republican form of government...." (Goebel, 2002, p. 52).
Figure 1, Top Initiative Users 1904-2008
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Source: Initiative & Referendum Institute, 2009

Exactly why Oregon is the state with the most extensive initiative system is not
fully understood. In 1896, members of the Populist Party (one of the progenitors of
the direct legislation option) constituted approximately one-sixth of the Oregon
legislature. However, by the following election the Populists had effectively
disappeared (see Chapter Three for a discussion of the decline of the Populist Party).
In 1897, creation of the Non-Partisan Direct Legislation League symbolized a shift in
support away from the Populist Party and toward a group of establishment figures
including the president of the State Bar Association and the conservative Republican
editor of the state's largest newspaper, the Oregonian (Ellis, 2002). Support for direct
legislation among the aforementioned prominent establishment figures in Oregon
certainly facilitated its popularity in the early years of its use.
Historians chronicling Oregon's early prolific use of I&R also inevitably cite
the efforts of William Simon U'Ren (Cronin, 1989; Ellis, 2002; Waters, 2001). U'Ren
was a central force in the creation of Oregon's Joint Committee on Direct Legislation,
which was an umbrella group consisting of members of the Oregon Knights of Labor,
State Grange, Oregon Farmers' Alliance, and Portland Federated Trades. The Joint
Committee advocated for direct legislation, and U'Ren did so as a Populist Party
member of the Oregon State Legislature in 1896. U'Ren's efforts and advocacy have
earned him the designation as the founding father of Oregon's initiative system (Ellis,
2002, pp. 29, 30). It was through repeated attempts by U'Ren and others that direct
legislation was approved in the 1899 and 1901 legislatures with Oregon voters
14
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ratifying the constitutional change in 1902 (Cronin, 1989, p. 50). U'Ren, recognized
nationally for his advocacy of direct legislation, will always earn mention as a driving
force in Oregon's early adoption and frequent use of I&R.
During the first decade after constitutional adoption, Oregonians confronted
over 100 statewide initiatives and popular referenda on the ballot (Ellis, 2002, p. 32).
The early years of I&R saw prolific use not only in Oregon, but also in California
(which adopted the initiative in 1911), Colorado (1910), Arizona (1911), and North
Dakota (1914). States such as Arkansas (1910), Michigan (1908), and Nebraska
(1912) held far fewer I&R (Barnett, 1915, p. 81; Ellis 2002, p. 32). Nevertheless, in
Oregon and other states resorting to heavy use of direct legislation in the early
twentieth century, activity slowed considerably between the early 1940s and 1971
(Waters, 2001; Ellis, 2002, p. 34). The nation's preoccupation with three significant
wars is most often cited as a primary causal factor in the reduction of the use of direct
legislation in Oregon and throughout the nation during this period (Waters, 2001).
Thus, in Oregon elections from 1940 to 1970, there were 39 I&R on the ballot. In
contrast, Oregonians saw 52 I&R in just the two elections of 1912 and 1914
(Ballotpedia, 2008).
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Table 1, State Adoption of Initiative and Referendum
State Adoption of Initiative and Referendum, 1898-1940
State Adoption of
or Legislative

Constitutional
Initiative

State Adoption of Legislative
Referendum

1. South Dakota (1898)
2. Utah (1900)
3. Oregon (1902)
4. Montana (1906)
5. Oklahoma (1907)
6. Maine (1908)
7. Missouri (1908)
8. Arkansas (1910)
9. Colorado (1910)
10. Arizona (1911)
11. California (1911)
12. Idaho (1912)
13. Nebraska (1912)
14. Nevada (1912)
15. Ohio (1912)
16. Washington (1912)
17. Michigan (1913)
18. North Dakota (1914)
19. Massachusetts (1918)

1. South Dakota (1898)
2. Utah (1900)
3. Oregon (1902)
4. Nevada (1904)
5. Montana (1906)
6. Oklahoma (1907)
7. Maine (1908)
8. Missouri (1908)
9. Arkansas (1910)
10. Colorado (1910)
11. Arizona (1911)
12. California (1911)
13. New Mexico (1911)
14. Idaho (1912)
15. Nebraska (1912)
16. Ohio (1912)
17. Washington (1912)
18. Michigan (1913)
19. North Dakota (1914)
20. Kentucky (1915)
21. Maryland (1915)
22. Massachusetts (1918)

Sources: Cronin 1989; Schmidt 1989; Council o f State
Governments 2000.

The Contemporary Era of Direct Legislation
The contemporary era has witnessed direct legislation usage rivaling, and
sometimes surpassing, I&R frequency during the populist and progressive periods. In
fact, between 1990 and 2000 alone, there were 458 initiatives nationwide, making it
the most prolific era of initiative use in the nation's history (Ellis, 2002, p. 35). While
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the majority of initiative states have used direct legislation infrequently, California and
Oregon have been its most habitual users. This has been especially true in recent
decades. In Oregon, voters faced 56 statewide initiatives during the 1990-2000
decade. And California voters saw more initiatives on the ballot in the 1980s and
1990s than they had the previous half-century (Ellis, 2002, p. 36). Still, other states,
specifically: Colorado, North Dakota, Arizona, and Washington have considerably
active initiative cultures as well.
Figure 2, Number of Initiatives By Decade
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In the modern era of direct legislation, it is often claimed that California's
property tax limitation, Proposition 13, championed by Howard Jarvis in 1978,
ushered in the reemergence of direct legislation's prolific use (Waters, 2001; Schrag,
1998). The success of California's Proposition 13 is widely credited with heralding
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both the contemporary era of initiative use nationally, as well as spawning "anti-tax"
efforts such as Oregon's Measure 5.2 The argument holds that active supporters of
Oregon's Measure 5 (a significant restrictive property tax measure passed in 1990)
and similar ideological interests around the country, realized that substantial economic
policy changes could be garnered through deft political campaigning and an attractive
"anti-tax" populist message (Waters, 2001). Yet, as pointed out by Ellis, prior to
Proposition 13 in California, in 1976-77, there were 52 initiatives nationwide, which is
the most since the 1938 to 1939 election (Ellis, 2002, p. 36). Moreover, it was not
until 1988 that the number of initiatives on the ballot increased dramatically. Still,
whether it is the increasing strength of interest groups, court decisions permitting
unlimited contributions and expenditures, intransigent legislatures, neo-populist
entrepreneurs, particular laws, requirements, and political histories of certain states, or
simply the current political Zeitgeist in the nation, the fact remains that direct
legislation has become a significant part of the political landscape in several states,
including Oregon.
Faux-Populism
Regardless of the most compelling arguments for its resurgence, more central
to the present study is the critique found in Smith's (1998) important work on what he
labels "tax crusaders." Smith's analysis of California's Proposition 13 and other socalled tax revolts illustrates that despite the populist rhetoric and mainstream media
coverage of an "amateur grassroots campaign," proponents of the "property tax revolt"
ran a very well-funded professional operation. Smith counters what he considers the
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myths surrounding three prominent anti-tax initiatives by demonstrating how powerful
moneyed interests effectively portrayed their campaigns as populist revolts and
grassroots efforts. At the same time, despite the increasingly substantial financial
contributions and expenditures in initiative campaigns, and the fact that sophisticated,
professionally run campaigns have become the rule and not the exception, the notion
of the grassroots, citizen-driven plebiscite largely continues. And while there is
scholarship documenting the contrast between the image of the amateur constructing a
policy proposal on the back of a napkin versus the reality of well-funded
"professionalized" efforts (Broder, 2000; Schrag, 1998; Smith, 1998), a critical
approach to the so-called professionalized, capital-intensive initiative campaign
appears absent from the literature on direct legislation.
Notwithstanding the competing arguments concerning the genesis of increased
use of direct legislation in the past three decades, from both an historical perspective
as well as a contemporary exemplar of direct legislation, Oregon's extensive
experience merits investigation. In fact, so profound is the link between Oregon and
direct legislation that during the first half of the twentieth century I&R was referred to
nationally as "The Oregon System" (Ellis, 2002). Commenting on this connection and
the aspirations of supporters of direct legislation, the 1911 editor of Hampton's
Magazine proclaimed Oregon as "the most complete democracy in the world" (Ellis,
2002, p. 33). Voters in Oregon have seen initiatives on everything from women's
suffrage and physician-assisted suicide, to comprehensive healthcare, the labeling of
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genetically modified foods, and an extensive array of tax measures and amendments to
its state constitution.
Research Approach
At a minimum, practical understanding of Oregon politics requires serious
consideration of this integral component of its governing structure. More broadly,
analysis of Oregon's initiative-industrial complex provides a useful examination of a
state with the most active and prolific initiative system in the United States. Apart
from placing more total initiatives on the ballot than any state in the nation, according
to some political consultants and observers interviewed in the course of my research,
Oregon is viewed by some as a kind of proving ground for interest groups considering
a multi-state strategy for particular policy proposals (Wimmer, personal
communication, 2008; Wagner, personal communication, 2008; Black, personal
communication, 2008). It was suggested that because Oregon has a relatively small
population, less expensive media markets than California or other states, and has no
distribution requirement for signature-gathering or other overly burdensome obstacles,
that it offers a practical testing ground for national groups.
Equally important, and similar to other states with a direct legislation option,
Oregon has witnessed significant growth in the "professionalization" of its initiative
process. From professional signature-gatherers and election attorneys, to pollsters and
threct mail specialists, the "citizen-initiative" has become a highly "professionalized"
and increasingly expensive endeavor. As is discussed at greater length in the ensuing
chapters, political consultants, campaign marketing firms, and the entire panoply of
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surveillance and communication technologies employed in campaigns, constitutes a
substantive change in the contemporary system of direct legislation. Paid political
consultants, lobbyists, and an entire direct legislation campaign infrastructure now
comprise a more or less permanent part of the Oregon initiative landscape. And it is
the activities and the democratic implications of these political consultants, their
modus operandi, and the powerful moneyed interests financing these efforts that
together comprise the focal point of this research.
Financing Direct Democracy
As earlier noted, inextricably linked with so-called professionalization is the
financing of direct legislation, both in terms of the costs of getting measures on the
ballot, and the expenditures for consultants and promotional efforts throughout the
campaign (i.e., the initiative-industrial complex). Even a decade ago, Oregon and
many other states with direct legislation, witnessed a significant increase in the
amount of money spent on these campaigns. Nationally, in 1998 alone, issue
committees spent almost $400 million promoting and opposing direct legislation
(Sabato et al., 2001, p. 76). Similarly, while the Republican and Democratic parties
raised $193 million in soft money during the 1997 to 1998 election cycle, and
congressional committees raised another $92 million, the combined amounts are less
than the total amount raised and spent on ballot measures during that same period
(Ballot Initiative Strategy Center, 2003). In the 2004 general election, over $398
million was spent on 59 initiatives in 18 states. Of that total, measure committees in
just four states, California, Florida, Michigan, and Oregon, accounted for $338
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million, or 85 percent of total expenditures for the November 2004 election cycle
(Smith, 2006, p. 3). In the 2006 election in California, Proposition 87 was the most
expensive initiative campaign with over $156 million spent on the race. Proposition
87 would have allotted approximately $4 billion for alternative energy research and
would have imposed a profit tax on energy companies. Proponents spent
approximately $62 million in what was ultimately an unsuccessful campaign.
Notably, environmental activist, Stephen Bing, contributed $49.5 of the $62 million,
or approximately 80 percent of the total, in support of the measure. Opponents,
primarily large oil and gas interests, financed the $94 million opposition campaign
(Ballotpedia, 2009).
In Oregon, with a population of approximately 3.4 million at the time, $10.4
million was raised for the 12 initiatives on the 2002 ballot (Oregon Secretary of State,
2008). To contextualize this, in Florida, with a population of 15.9 million,
approximately $14.4 million was raised for the 10 measures during the same election
period (Nelson, 2002, Appendix A). In one recent example calling into question the
notion of grassroots popular support, Oregon businessman Loren Parks gave $918,406
to three committees advocating two ballot measures pertaining to judicial elections on
the state's 2002 ballot. Parks provided 98.4 percent of the total funding for the
respective measures and over 99 percent of the contributions paying signaturegathering firms to achieve ballot access (Thompson, 2002).
Another relatively recent example of the cash-consultant nexus was Ballot
Measure 27 in Oregon's 2002 general election. The initiative sought to require
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labeling of genetically engineered foods sold or distributed in the state. Transnational
corporate (TNC) agribusiness firms spent approximately $5.5 million in opposition to
the proposed law (Cole, 2002, p. Bl). Among the TNCs financing the opposition
effort was: Monsanto ($1,480,000); DuPont ($634,286); Syngenta ($528,571); Dow
Agro Sciences ($396,429) and Aventis ($396,429) (Oregon Follow the Money, 2002).
These TNCs coordinated their spending under the name "Crop Life International,"
providing the bulk of spending for the "Coalition Against The Costly Labeling Law"
initiative committee. The overwhelming majority of the expenditures were used for
paid media working through the political consulting firms Opinion Dynamics, Winner
& Mandabach, and Target Enterprises LTD (Oregon Secretary of State, 2002). This
well-funded opposition effort was successful with an ultimate cost of approximately
$6.50 per voter (Cole, 2002, p. Bl).
Figure 3, Contributions to Ballot Measure 27, 2002 Election
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An even more recent example of capital-intensive ballot measure campaigns
would be Oregon's November 2007 special election. With just two legislative
referrals on the ballot, funders on competing sides of measures concerning land-use
policy and a cigarette tax proposal contributed over $22 million dollars (Thompson,
2007). In comparison, aggregate expenditure totals for the 10 most expensive state
legislative candidate races in the 2008 general election (20 candidates) were $7.2
million (Mapes, 2008). And in the November 2006 election, with 10 initiatives on the
ballot, the top 10 contributors alone supplied over $11 million (Thompson, 2006).
The bulk of the funds for all of the aforementioned ballot measure campaigns
was spent by and for political campaign consultants for the following purposes:
broadcast media creation and production, fundraising consultants, direct mail, voter
database creation and maintenance, signature-gathering, phone banking, legal
assistance, field staff, general consultants, get-out-the-vote, and other professional
campaign functions and services (Oregon Secretary of State, 2008). Scholarship
focusing on the increasing use of political professionals in the initiative process, both
in Oregon and in the other 23 states with the direct legislation option, although
increasing, fails to adequately capture the significance of the phenomenon. While
scholarship addressing the significant increases in money for direct legislation
campaigns does exist, the focus has largely been on its impact on electoral outcomes.
Nevertheless, research locating the system of direct legislation within the larger
political economy, as well as the attendant increasing technification of I&R
campaigns, has not received the attention that it merits. Moreover, much of what has
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been written about political consultants and the "professionalization" of direct
legislation is largely atheoretical (Broder, 2000; McCuan, 2001; Thurber, 2000). After
reviewing much of the literature on the subject, one of the few scholars to have written
extensively about the so-called professionalization of direct legislation, McCuan
concludes that "a fundamental problem remains the dearth of data on the actions and
the role of political professionals in direct democracy" (McCuan, 2001, p. 14).
Finally, despite Oregon's more prolific initiative use, most of l&R literature focuses
on California.
This study seeks to help address this gap in the scholarly literature. It analyzes
the so-called professionalization of Oregon's initiative process during the 2000 to
2008 election period, with a particular focus on four specific initiative campaigns that
took place during these years. This period reflects the continued strength of
neoliberalism (and its resistance to regulation) unprecedented campaign expenditures
for initiatives in Oregon and beyond, and exemplifies the heightened technification,
informatization, industrialization (Sussman, 2005; Gandy, 1993) and scienticization
(Habermas, 1974) of direct democracy campaigns increasingly evident in Oregon and
states with the most active initiative systems in the nation. The scienticization of
politics concerns the increasing use of instrumental means to control voter behavior,
information processes, and election results. Technification refers to the increasing
employment of information and communication technologies for a growing number of
campaign purposes. It also concerns how technologies and their uses in I&R
campaigns mediate and construct the relationship among measure advocates, their
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hired consultants, and the consumers of campaign communication. Some of the key
elements constituting industrialization include segmentation of tasks and the division
of labor, standardization of processes, and the substitution of technology for labor.
Finally, informaticization describes the increasingly data-driven, surveillance activities
and regimes constructing social relations in the twenty-first century.
From 2000 to 2008, the period under consideration, Oregon voters faced a total
of 52 initiatives and referenda on the ballot, with 21 of those being proposed
constitutional amendments (Oregon Secretary of State, 2008). From a research
standpoint, this eight-year period is also one in which most campaign and expenditure
records are available from the Oregon Secretary of State's Office, as the Oregon
Secretary of State's Office only maintains readily accessible and comprehensive
initiative contribution and expenditure records for the most recent six-year period.
This eight-year period also is one in which many of the individuals involved in the
campaigns remain available for interviews. And while scholarship debating the
implications of big money and ballot measures has been rigorous and plentiful,
consideration of the links between funders and initiative outcomes, and the
"professionalization" of the campaign process have received much less scrutiny.
Considering the egalitarian and democratic objectives of the founders of I&R, as well
as its extensive use in Oregon and nationally, the "professionalization" turn of direct
legislation, and its implications for democratic theory merit further examination.
Although the involvement of political consultants in initiative campaigns is by
no means unprecedented historically, significant distinctions exist within the
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contemporary era of initiative "professionalization." Campaign practitioners today
employ ever-more powerful surveillance technologies, and have access to ever-more
comprehensive demographic and psychographic information about voters. Moreover,
at a more generalized level, one might heed the observations of Stanley Kelley, sexbiased language notwithstanding, in his 1956 study of public relations professionals in
political campaigns:
Political campaigns are the principal institution in which this interaction
between politician and electorate occurs, and the most striking role of the
public relations man is that of a campaigner. The particular kind of campaign
activity with which he is most often concerned has, in terms of the theory and
aspirations of democratic government, an importance all its own. For the
public relations man is occupied with directing the course of public discussion
as it relates to the selection of government officials and the settlement of
controversial issues of public policy. While, in practice, discussion has not
always had a decisive influence in the determination of these matters, our
theory has always held that it should. Any assessment of the quality of public
discussion, any reckoning of the degree to which it is achieving the purposes
which our political system makes it imperative to achieve, today calls for a
consideration of the role of the public relations man in our political life
(Kelley, 1956, pp. 7, 8).
Specifically, this study offers a counter-thesis to prevailing research and
opinion on the so-called professionalization of the initiative process, both in terms of
its causal factors and its implications for democratic political theory (McCuan, 2004;
Tolbert & Smith, 2004). Current scholarship on political professionals essentially
views the increasing use of political operatives and technologically-mediated I&R
campaigns simply as a logical response to a greater demand for technical experts and
individuals with significant campaign experience. In short, it is simply a supply and
demand response to market conditions and modernization. In contrast, the present
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study's critical approach situates higher dollar amounts, more political operatives, and
increasing use of technology in I&R campaigns within a political economy based on
neoliberal principles that includes, among other features, the increasing privatization
of public spaces and the substitution of technology for labor. I argue that identifying
political consultants as "professionals" naturalizes the capture of a political process
created to counter the very corporate and elite-interest power now in ascendance.
Furthermore, I will argue that while the "secondary effects" or educative aspects of the
initiative process, (i.e., the way it informs voters), as posited most recently and
comprehensively by Tolbert and Smith (2004) is significant, I call into question
several of the claims and the analyses presented in their research.
In brief, while the secondary and educative effects of the initiative system are
an important and legitimate concern for anyone seeking to analyze the democratic
implications of the process, the present study challenges many of the sanguine
conclusions Smith and Tolbert (2004) et al. derive from their research. In-depth
interviews with political professionals, examination of their campaign strategies and
techniques, and analysis of expenditures and campaign rhetoric, calls into question the
claim that initiative campaigns produce democracy-enhancing educative and so-called
secondary effects. In fact, the evidence gathered in the course of my research has led
me to conclude that strategies and tactics, including voter surveillance, market
segmentation, microtargeting, and appeals to citizens as individual consumers, serve to
undermine the democratic outcomes sought by populist and progressive champions of
direct legislation. Beyond the increasingly significant aggregate contribution and
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expenditure numbers for initiative campaigns, lies a sophisticated, professionalized
political marketing4 campaign regime. Analysis of an ostensibly grassroots, "citizeninitiative" process that constructs voters not as citizens to be engaged, but rather as
consumers and objects to be surveilled, microtargeted, and "moved," constitutes an
important element of this research.
Research Question
The central question guiding this study is: What are the democratic
implications of increased professionalization of Oregon's initiative process? The
dissertation seeks to inform theory on the professionalization of the initiative process
by offering a counter-thesis to prevailing research and opinion concerning
professionalization's causal factors, and its implications for democratic theory.
Equally important, I argue that the industrialization, technification, informatization
(Sussman, 2005; Gandy, 1993) and scienticization (Habermas, 1974) of modern
initiative campaigns have been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature on direct
democracy, and that the strategies and techniques in the campaigns themselves raise
questions about the secondary or educational effects of the initiative process in the
United States as described by Tolbert and Smith.
The purpose of the research is not to claim that Oregon, and the particular
cases identified and discussed, are somehow representative of all states, all initiative
systems, and all campaigns throughout the United States. Yet, precisely because
Oregon is the most prolific user of the initiative and referendum in the entire country,
with more than a century of experience with this plebiscitary mechanism, it presents
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an empirical example of the prevailing condition of direct legislation in the United
States. Although each state has its own set of political dynamics and historical
idiosyncrasies, it is hoped that analysis of Oregon's initiative-industrial complex will
prove instructive to scholars and policymakers alike. Moreover, increasingly
professionalized and capital-intensive campaigns have become progressively more
common in most states with a similar system of direct legislation. It is hoped that
applying a critical approach to direct legislation campaigns, and broadening the scope
of the analysis to include a political economy that is functionally and ideologically
driven by the principles of neoliberalism, will both enhance our understanding of the
initiative system in the United States, and generate further scholarship that locates the
system of direct democracy within the larger political economy.
Research Methods
This collective case study will analyze Oregon's initiative process during the
2000 to 2008 period, with a detailed examination of four measure campaigns that took
place during that period. The principal focus will be on the so-called
professionalization of Oregon's initiative process. Professionalization in this context
refers to the privatization of public sector activities, employment of political
consultants, firms offering campaign and election services and expertise, and includes
the financial resources necessary for their remuneration.
The primary purpose of this study is to inform theory on the
professionalization of the initiative process in the United States, as well as to argue for
a different understanding of the significance of professionalization and its implications
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for direct legislation and democratic theory. Scholarship investigating the role of
political professionals in the initiative process is a relatively recent phenomenon
(McCuan et al., 1998; Gerber, 1999; Johnson, 2001; McCuan, 2001). McCuan writes:
"We know relatively little about the process behind how groups conduct their
campaigns and where the campaigns allocate their money. We know even less about
the individuals who are involved in these campaigns advising interest groups where
and how to spend their dollars" (McCuan, 2001, p. 4). There is also general
acknowledgement in the campaigns and elections and direct legislation literature that
political professionalization is undertheorized (Thurber & Nelson, 2001; McCuan,
2001; Thurber, 1998). Although more has been written about the professionalization
of candidate than initiative campaigns, the lack of theory is lamented by Thurber,
"Much of the work on political consulting is atheoretical, produced by journalists or
by practitioners whose writing consists of insider accounts of campaigning and 'howto' books" (Thurber, 1998, p. 145). This study seeks to help address this gap in the
scholarly literature, and provides a heretofore unexamined link in I&R scholarship
between changes in the larger political economy and the current state of direct
legislation. Furthermore, my analysis of the professionalization of direct legislation
campaigns includes a rejoinder to recent research concerning the educative or
"secondary effects" claimed most explicitly by Smith and Tolbert (2004). In brief,
claims that direct legislation elections increase political knowledge, civic engagement
and political participation are analyzed critically.
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This analysis will include a close examination of four Oregon initiative
campaigns taking place during the 2000 to 2008 time period selected. Specifically,
those campaigns include Measures 98 and 92 in the 2000 election, and Measures 48
and 41 in 2006. Briefly, Measure 98 in the 2000 election was initiated by the
operation of chief petitioner and Oregon's most prolific initiative author, Bill
Sizemore, and it was a proposed constitutional amendment that would have prohibited
payroll deductions for political purposes without specific written authorization.
Measure 92 in 2000, another constitutional amendment from chief petitioner
Sizemore, would have prohibited payroll deductions for political purposes as well.
Although the impact of the measures was essentially similar, the specific language of
the measures necessitated that they be distinct measures on the ballot. In the 2006
election, Measure 41 was brought to the voters by the Oregon Taxpayer Association,
and it would have allowed a state income tax deduction equal to the federal exemption
for individual filers. Measure 48 for that year was also introduced by the Oregon
Taxpayer Association and was a proposed constitutional amendment that would have
limited any increase in state spending from one biennium to the next to the increase in
population plus inflation from the prior biennium.
The four campaign cases chosen for greater scrutiny arguably represent
initiatives that are both representative and perhaps unrepresentative of the larger
subset of all initiative and referenda to which they belong. The campaigns for these
measures are representative of the increasing number of capital-intensive campaigns
that take place in Oregon in several ways. First, they involve both statutory and
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constitutional amendment campaigns, and Oregon has seen a considerable number of
both types of initiatives employed by proponents in the contemporary era. Second, the
four initiatives involve what has become the persistent biennial political rivalry
between Oregon's major public employee unions and anti-union interests from both in
and out of state. This now dependable competition plays out in states such as Oregon,
Colorado, California, and others with similarly active systems of direct legislation.
Third, all four initiatives exemplify what one prominent direct mail consultant
cryptically called the "political consultant full employment act" which exists when
you have a system that allows for unlimited contributions and expenditures and
moneyed interests with distinct agendas seeking to emerge victorious on election day
(Wiener, personal communication, 2008). Finally, these initiatives are representative
of the capital-intensive initiatives that have become increasingly common. The
millions of dollars in campaign contributions and expenditures in these initiatives
demonstrate the importance of these cases for the interests involved.
And while these particular campaigns primarily involved public employee
unions versus anti-union interests, Oregon and other states have witnessed similar
high-stakes battles involving the insurance industry, trial attorneys, physician groups,
and other prominent concerns. Finally, three of these ballot measures, Measure 92,
Measure 98, and Measure 41, are repeat measures. Oregonians have seen either
identical or very similar measures before them in past elections. Nevertheless, it
would be inaccurate to claim that the majority, or even a large percentage of initiatives
on general election ballots in Oregon during the past three decades, are repeat
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measures. Still, similar to Smith's study of "tax crusaders," the focus here is not on
the content of the particular measures, and whether or not they make for effective
public policy, rather, the focus is on the procedural side of these measures and their
campaigns. The argument here is not that these measures are representative of all
ballot measures. Rather, they are "limiting" or "critical cases" and not "normal
cases." In fact, these repeat measures are more likely to be statistical outliers.
However, they are valuable cases for the very reason they are statistical outliers
(Smith, 1998, p. 14).
The initiatives in this study are supported by the most prolific initiative
"entrepreneurs" in a state with the most active initiative system in the country. They
represent populist themes according to their supporters and by their very repetition on
the ballot imply a sense of public demand and a degree of urgency. Also, they are
largely financed by wealthy individuals and out-of-state special interests, and are
packaged by private political consultants and "astroturf' facades. (The term
"astroturf is often used rhetorically to refer to efforts of professional organizations,
politicians, corporations or others in positions of power, who construct public relations
efforts that will be perceived as grassroots or of the people). Finally, the particular
initiatives under investigation arguably represent an attempt to force their political
opponents to expend substantial resources to fight the measures as well as seek to
drive higher voter turnout among their natural constituency to influence the outcome
of other items on the ballot. As noted by Smith in his study of "tax crusaders," as such
efforts become more and more common, other citizen-initiatives employing similar
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strategies and tactics become suspect (Smith, 1998, p. 14). In other words, since
citizen-initiatives ostensibly represent the popular will, what should be made of
initiatives repeatedly placed on the ballot, only to go down to defeat? Do they actually
represent the popular will? If not, than what do they represent? And what is their
actual purpose? According to Oregon initiative petitioner Sizemore, forcing public
employee unions to expend valuable resources (time and money) to oppose his ballot
measures, is admittedly one purpose of such efforts {Oregonian editorial, 2008). A
related claim of initiative skeptics is that such ballot measures are deployed with the
hope of influencing voter turnout (Tolbert et al., 2001). Finally, critics of the initiative
process often employ the term "astroturf' campaigns to contrast with genuine
grassroots efforts ostensibly representing actual popular sentiment (Sanchez, 1996).
Granted, not all initiatives are repeat measures placed on the ballot by interests
seeking to force their political opponents to expend resources and drive voter turnout,
and not all employ phony or astroturf campaigns. However, measures with these
strategies and tactics do exist, and they represent a standard feature of the initiative
system in Oregon.
Essentially, these exceptional cases can be used to "confirm, challenge, or
extend" current hypotheses about the initiative process, which can facilitate better
understanding of the process and direct future research. As mentioned by Smith, in
his case study analysis of tax crusaders: "Because qualitative research tends to be
exploratory or descriptive, in-depth case studies that stress the importance of context,
setting, and subjects' frame of reference can highlight complicated patterns or nuanced
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relationships that are frequently discounted or overlooked in more quantitative
studies" (Smith, 1998, p. 14).
This study will employ the case study approach that recognizes the utility of
investigation of one or multiple cases, not in an attempt to find a representative
example allowing for generalization to the larger set of objects, but rather to inform
theory on direct democracy in the United States. As Yin argues, the goal of the case
study researcher is analytic generalization as opposed to statistic generalization. The
purpose of the case study is "to expand and generalize theories" (Yin, 1989, p. 10).
Furthermore, the case study method is useful in analyzing a contemporary
phenomenon with a high degree of complexity and where contextual conditions are
critical. Although the present study will focus on a finite recent historical period, not
only does the phenomenon of ballot initiatives continue many of the players and
certainly the elements of the initiative industry remain active. Finally, as the case
study method relies on multiple sources of evidence, the current study will include
information from campaign expenditure reports as well as interviews with political
consultants, initiative activists, and others involved in the process during the period
under investigation (Yin, 1989, p. 13).
Data Sources
This study will employ a variety of methods to investigate the so-called
professionalization of the ballot initiative process in Oregon. Examination of the
historical record concerning Oregon's experience with direct legislation provides
necessary background information and context for this study. This material has been
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culled from government documents, newspaper articles, books, and journals
chronicling the history of the system of I&R.
To trace the organized interests funding Oregon initiatives and their campaigns
during the 2000 to 2008 period, an examination is undertaken of the Summary Reports
of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, published by the Elections Division of
Oregon's Secretary of State, as well as the recently constructed ORESTAR5 online
database supplemented by media accounts and nonprofit groups, such as Oregon
Follow the Money, the Ballot Initiative Strategy Center Foundation, and the Initiative
& Referendum Institute. All of the sources document campaign finance data and
related information on direct legislation. The purpose of examining contribution and
expenditure reports is to learn which interests or individuals contribute to campaigns
and perhaps more importantly, the amounts and expenditure choices of the campaigns
themselves. Campaign expenditures offer evidence of the priorities and strategies of
the political consultants running campaigns, as well as identifying the financiers of
those efforts.
The study also includes extensive interviews with Oregon-based political
consultants, initiative authors or chief petitioners, and individuals either active in or
familiar with Oregon's initiative process. Both face-to-face and telephone interviews
were conducted over the period of this study. Interviews ranged from 30 to 90
minutes contingent on the availability of the subjects, as well as their knowledge and
experience with the issues pertinent to the study. Additionally, on a personal note,
although it had not been anticipated prior to undertaking this research, the author has
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been serving in the Oregon State Legislature as a state representative since 2004, and
therefore has had the opportunity to have numerous informal conversations with
individuals who have been involved with Oregon State Government during the period
under investigation and beyond. Moreover, working directly as a policymaker in state
government has provided the researcher the opportunity to witness firsthand some of
the impacts of initiatives and referenda on the budgeting and lawmaking processes, as
well as to hear from colleagues on their respective views of direct democracy in
Oregon. The interviews provide more than mere individual perspectives on the system
and specific campaigns. Conversations with several key players in Oregon initiative
campaigns have resulted in observations that have been repeated or contradicted, thus
providing useful background information. Also, through the interviews I have
garnered more in-depth information concerning the strategies employed in campaigns,
the technologies used to implement the strategies, the extent to which citizenvolunteers are utilized, and details concerning the entire process — from construction
of the measure through the end of the campaign.
Since the drafting and petition component of initiative campaigns deals
directly with the question of ballot access, this little studied but essential element of
the process requires attention. In addition to the data concerning contributions and
expenditures at this initial stage, to the extent state records permit, the research will
include analysis of contributions and expenditures during the petitioning stage of the
process. This evidence will help indicate the degree to which ballot access is
circumscribed by money and the use of paid signature-gatherers. Somewhat
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analogous to candidate primary campaigns, what are the democratic implications if
money has become a necessary and sufficient condition of accessing the ballot?
Examination of contributions and expenditures during the campaign
component will be analyzed with the following questions in mind: have campaign
contributions and expenditures increased significantly during the period under
investigation? Do campaign contributions derive from a variety of sources? What
patterns, if any, emerge from analysis of campaign expenditures? What does money
purchase in initiative campaigns?
Further, analysis of campaign expenditures combined with interviews with
political consultants will help illuminate the degree of technification of initiative
campaigns. Questions guiding this analysis include: To what degree do initiative
campaigns mirror a globalizing neoliberal regime that replaces labor with technology?
To what degree are initiative campaigns capital or labor-intensive? To what extent are
efforts made to recruit campaign volunteers? To what extent do initiative campaigns
employ electronic data and impression management similar to commodity advertising?
Analysis of expenditures and consultant interviews will shed light on the degree to
which initiative campaigns resemble the strong democracy and citizen participation
articulated by Barber (1984) and staunch initiative advocates.
Also, to understand the legal and legislative environment within which
Oregon's initiative system exists, I will examine and discuss relevant state and federal
cases. The primary focus will be on court decisions and legislation concerning
initiative campaign finance and signature gathering. This will include both federal and
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state statutes relevant to issues surrounding the professionalization of Oregon's system
of direct legislation.
Plan of the Study
In Chapter Two, I lay the groundwork for a critical theoretical approach to the
so-called professionalization of Oregon's initiative system, with a literature review
supporting the introduction and discussion of the core concepts anchoring the study.
In Chapter Three, I describe the democratic promise, animating principles, and
historical interests and circumstances fostering the direct democracy movement in
Oregon and the United States. In Chapter Four I present a discussion of the contested
concept of populism and its implications for the contemporary I&R. In Chapter Five I
provide a detailed description of four ballot measure campaigns, two from Oregon's
2000 election and two from the 2006 election. I then apply a critical theoretical
approach to these initiative campaigns supplemented by access to internal campaign
documents and interviews with consultants and activists involved in the campaign.
Finally, in Chapter Six I summarize the analysis and findings from the study as well as
suggestions for future research.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Approach and Literature Review
In this chapter I review literature concerning neoliberalism, issues relevant to
democratic theory, and the so-called professionalization of campaigns, as well as
scholarship that directly addresses the initiative system in the United States. I also
identify and discuss key concepts informing the current study's critical theoretical
approach to direct legislation campaigns. Unlike more conventional approaches to
direct democracy, the present study locates the initiative system, the
"professionalization" of its campaigns, and its purported secondary and educative
aspects, within a global political economy dominated by the principles and logic of
neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism
Media studies scholar Robert McChesney refers to neoliberalism as "the
defining political economic paradigm of our time." He describes neoliberalism as
committed to market-oriented principles and policies that favor privatization,
liberalized trade and finance, untrammeled competition, and the proliferation of
markets (McChesney in Chomsky, 1999, p. 7). Critical geographer David Harvey
explains that a neoliberal political economy reflects and privileges the interests of
private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital.
Equally important to a predominant neoliberalism is a political and cultural system
reinforcing the principle that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the
market. Harvey expounds that once neoliberal goals and priorities become embedded
in a culture's way of thinking, institutions will engage in that mime and extend
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neoliberal principles. Finally, he argues that for a way of thought to become
dominant, "a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions
and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in
the social world that we inhabit" (Harvey, 2005, p. 5). With unrestricted financial
flows, direct-to-consumer marketing campaigns, and extensive voter surveillance
regimes, the twenty-first century initiative campaign exemplifies and reinforces a
market-oriented paradigm for what is considered our most democratic electoral option.
Labor and public sector advocates successfully opposing measures argue that
they have little choice but to participate in the relentless fundraising and electioneering
activities deemed necessary to compete in the contemporary I&R regime. With a
$250,000 to $1 million investment to procure space on the ballot, neoliberal interests
force labor and public sector advocates to occupy their time raising funds and
organizing opposition campaigns in lieu of activities arguably more beneficial to their
overall project. The capital-intensive campaign emanating from the unlimited money
permitted in the I&R means labor unions are not spending limited time engaging in
more democracy-enhancing activities such as union recruitment, on-the-ground, faceto-face political discussion, and
At the heart of neoliberal capitalism is the belief that barriers to capital flow
are inherently bad. A largely unregulated and efficient marketplace will permit
individuals and businesses maximum freedom of choice in deciding where to invest
and expend resources. From this perspective, I&R campaigns and elections are
superior to candidate-campaigns since in most states and at the federal level,
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candidate-campaign contributions are limited. In contrast, I&R campaign
contributions are virtually unregulated. Such an electoral regime fits neatly within the
dominant ideology of market fundamentalism and naturalizes the increasingly large
sums of money spent on ballot measure campaigns. And while individual corporate
and wealthy interests may differ on the margins on particular issues or even ballot
measures, on balance, there is a great deal of consensus on the principles of neoliberal
capitalism that include deregulation, a weakened union movement, and the penetration
of privatization and market-fundamentalism into spheres previously off-limits or out
of the purview of the marketplace.
Consequently, the populist anti-government origins of direct legislation, and
the common perception of it as a grassroots endeavor representing the will of the
people, provide an appealing instrument for powerful organized interests seeking to
capitalize on its populist and progressive beginnings. As chronicled by scholars of
populism, the populist tradition in the U.S. includes a mistrust of the elite, belief in the
wisdom and goodness of the common person, and the right of ordinary people to
govern themselves by majority rule. The political economic origins fostering the rise
of populism included an ever-expanding industrial capitalism, fervent anti-monopoly
sentiment, and corporate control and capture of state legislatures (Haskell, 2001;
Cronin, 1989; Smith, 1998). According to one researcher on the origins of direct
legislation in the U.S., the key principles of populism could be summed up as: "The
people know better; the distant elite establishment controls government illegitimately
against the wishes of the majority of average men and women, today; ordinary people
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are stymied in their efforts to gain access to the political system" (Haskell, 2001, pp.
33, 34).
Harvey observes that contemporary neoliberalism has significant impacts on
virtually all institutions, including electoral mechanisms and increasingly expensive
political campaigns. Importantly, to the extent direct democracy is viewed as
representing the fight against a tyrannical government, and the embodiment of
freedom, true democracy, and individual liberty, it will remain a powerful means for
moneyed interests seeking to advance a policy agenda and influence public opinion.
Advocates of the system of direct legislation consistently claim that it embodies the
aforementioned populist principles. Haskell describes the connection between the
principles animating the populist movement and the procedure of direct democracy:
Populism is really, then, more than just an impulse in American political
culture; it is a full-fledged theory of democracy that can be summarized as the
belief that a legitimate democratic political system should be arranged to
ascertain the popular will (usually by the majority-rule principle) and then to
implement that will as public policy (Haskell, 2001, p. 21).

Appropriating Populism
Nevertheless, within the current neoliberal political economy, powerful
corporate interests have increasingly employed the initiative system to advance an
agenda largely at odds with the fundamental principles animating the origins of the
system of direct democracy (Broder, 2000; Schrag, 1998; Smith, 1998). That agenda
appears to include not only policy goals such as weakening labor unions and
decreasing the capacity and regulatory role of government, but co-optation of a system
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conceived historically by individuals and interests seeking to counteract powerful
organized interests and captured state officials.
Although mistrust of government has been a hallmark of American politics and
culture from the nation's founding, an exceptionally well-funded effort to shift the
locus of American's skepticism from powerful corporate interests and Wall Street
elites to the failings and evils of big government really began to hit its stride during
the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The late communications scholar, Alex Carey,
explains that in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, public regard for American
institutions, certainly including big business, became especially low. In 1975, the
Advertising Council, 6seeking to counter the rising tide of public skepticism of
corporate capitalism, expanded a public relations campaign that had initially begun in
the post-World War II era (referred to as "economic education"). At the same time,
American business was spending approximately $ 1 billion annually to persuade the
citizenry that corporate interests were essentially indistinguishable from the interests
of the American public. The success of the campaign was documented in a poll
concluding that by 1980, the proportion of Americans perceiving there to be too much
government regulation had risen from 42 to 60% (Carey, 1995, p. 89).
A well-documented effort at public opinion management included the work of
several corporate-funded think tanks beginning in the 1970s. Some of the most
prominent conservative think tanks advocating the principles of neoliberalism have
included the American Enterprise Institute, Hoover Institute, Hudson Institute,
Conference Board, Manhattan Institute, Heritage Institute, and Cato Institute, among
45

Theory and Literature Review
others. Overall, the growth in the number of active think tanks between 1970 and
1996 went from fewer than 60 to more than 300. Scholar Andrew Rich calculated that
of the 165 explicitly ideological think tanks, roughly two-thirds, or 65 percent, were
conservative. Moreover, the ratio of avowedly conservative to liberal think tanks at
the state and local level is even greater at three to one having an ideologically
conservative platform. Furthermore, conservative think tanks have outspent liberal
think tanks by more than three to one during that same period (Rich, 2001, pp. 54, 56;
& Rich, 2006, p. 20). A core group of 12 conservative foundations have provided the
financial backing for think tanks promoting a neoliberal agenda, including the Bradley
Foundation, Carthage Foundation, Earhart Foundation, Koch and Lambe charitable
foundations, Phillip M. Mckenna Foundation, JM Foundation, John M. Olin
Foundation, Henry Salvatori Foundation, Sarah Scaife Foundation, and Smith
Richardson Foundation. In 1994, these 12 foundations controlled more than $1.1
billion in assets. A substantial portion of these conservative foundations' largesse was
"particularly critical in the shift of the economic debate to the right and provided much
of the groundwork for the radical change in policy taking place from 1978 through
1981" (Covington, 1998, pp. 1, 2). This three-year period coincided with the national
tax discussion shifting to enact supply-side economic theory and was the basis for the
Reagan Administration's Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which reduced federal
income tax rates by 25 percent (Feldstein & Poterba, 1996, p. 5).
More recently, organized economic interests have continued to spend heavily
on public relations and marketing recognizing the significance of fostering legitimacy
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for their respective enterprises and activities. Chair of the Commission on Global
Public Relations Research and adjunct professor at New York University, Toni
Falconi, estimates that the global economic impact — annual expenditures plus
associated outlays — of the public relations industry is between $130 and $230 billion
(Falconi, 2006, p. 8). The growth in awareness and practice of what is referred to as
"branding" represents further evidence of the extensive resources and the scope of the
efforts aimed at marketing and promotion. One researcher estimates that branding can
account for as much as 40 to 60 percent of a company's worth, and that branding
could now account for as much as one-third of global wealth (Curry Jansen, 2008, p.
125). In brief, recent direct legislation campaign activity by wealthy organized
interests should be seen as a constituent part of much larger campaign promotion
activities and agenda setting by powerful neoliberal capitalist interests. Essentially,
marketing and electoral activities represent privileged efforts to achieve legitimacy
and justification for the policies and activities of powerful organized groups.
Conventional analyses of direct democracy view significantly increased
campaign spending, greater use of political consultants, and increasingly sophisticated
voter surveillance efforts as the natural outgrowth of technological progress,
modernization, and business efficiency (McCuan, 2001; Bowler & Donovan, 2000;
Waters, 2000). In contrast, the present study places these features of twenty-first
century initiative campaigns within the larger political economy recognizing that
corporate interests and business elites view elections as necessary elements and
important opportunities to set the public agenda and to engineer consent. Moneyed
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interests favoring a neoliberal agenda maintain financial and structural advantages for
a direct legislation system that allows unlimited financial contributions and
expenditures, and which necessitates and rewards sophisticated direct-to-consumer
marketing efforts.
Consequently, I now discuss the concept of legitimation and its import for
organized interests working within political systems self-defined as democratic.
Legitimation
Understanding the vital role of managing public opinion as it relates to direct
democracy, this study approaches direct legislation campaigns and elections first as
constituent parts of a system of legitimation. The work of Habermas, (1975, 1978)
Gramsci, (1971; & cited in Femia, 1987; & Kellner, 1989) and Chomsky (1988; 1989)
conceptualizes legitimacy and its significance to nations self-defined or generally
referred to as democratic. For governments self-identified as democratic, legitimacy
requires that the domestic population perceives that it is operating under democratic
principles, and its general direction is subject to the will of the people. And since the
presumed purpose of elections is to identify the will of the people, they play a major
role in fostering legitimacy for interests seeking to gain and/or maintain power.
Chomsky explains that in a democratic system "necessary illusions cannot be imposed
by force. Rather, they must be instilled in the public mind by more subtle means."
And, "what is essential is the power to set the agenda" (Chomsky, 1989, p. 48). As
will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing chapters of this study, initiative
campaigns and elections represent opportune occasions to set the agenda for public
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discourse in addition to achieving policy victories. Seventeenth-century British
political philosopher John Locke, in his discussion of the social contract described
how issues of legitimacy are linked to those of consent. In his Second Treatise, Locke
posited that government is not legitimate unless it has the consent of the governed
(Ashcraft, 1991). In Dahl's discussion of legitimacy, he employs the metaphor of a
reservoir. Dahl argues that as long as the reservoir of goodwill is maintained at a
certain level, there will be stability (Dahl, 1971). However, should it fall below this
minimum level, instability will occur.
Advocates of I&R argue that its very nature represents the will of the people,
and therefore, for some, has a greater degree of legitimacy than does the more indirect
republican system of governance. Quite simply, a consistent premise of those
advocating on behalf of I&R is that the outcome of a direct plebiscite reflects the will
of the people, and that policies enacted via initiative by definition have the consent of
the governed (Haskell, 2001; Clark, 1998; Smith, 1999). Recent prolific use of the
initiative system indicates that the legitimation function of direct democracy elections
is not lost on wealthy organized interests participating in the process. Moreover,
within the current global neoliberal regime, powerful corporate and political interests
spend heavily on public relations, branding, and marketing, clearly mindful of the
significance of fostering legitimacy for their activities. Such efforts represent the cost
of doing business, and the financing of initiative campaigns denotes a logical
extension of such activities. Additionally, ongoing public relations and marketing
efforts by moneyed organized interests make them well positioned to participate in
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initiative campaigns and elections. For electoral campaigns, although unique in
certain aspects, are essentially marketing and public relations campaigns not unlike
corporate marketing and branding operations.
Chomsky (1988; 1989) describes ostensibly democratic regimes as requiring
"necessary illusions" and the "manufacturing of consent" to foster legitimacy for
power and to uphold the existing set of social relations. Whereas totalitarian or
fascistic regimes employ blunt force to maintain order, democratic systems demand
the broadly perceived legitimacy of the domestic population to endure. Gramsci
(1971), in his discussion of hegemony, argues that democratic structures rely on
hegemonic ideology to legitimate and maintain the existing set of social relations. As
described in Kellner (1989), Gramsci identifies the process of hegemony as the social
construction of reality through certain dominant ideological institutions, practices, and
discourses. For Gramsci, ideological hegemony is a type of assenting behavior that is
bound up with the concept of legitimacy. Essentially, through the institutions and
technical instruments that create and diffuse thought, hegemonic ideology legitimizes
ruling class power and the existing set of social relations. Electoral campaigns, and
especially those involving "citizen-initiatives," ostensibly represent a means to
understand and affirm the will of the people and the consent of the governed. To this
end, they comprise an essential ingredient for the legitimation of the existing set of
social relations.
Habermas argues that crises of capitalism necessitate state intervention. Yet
active engagement by the state, specifically administratively socialized production
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with the continued private appropriation of surplus value, must be legitimated. A
substantive democratic state of affairs would raise consciousness about the
contradiction inherent in this decidedly undemocratic structure. Habermas contends
the aforementioned inconsistency is resolved through a system of formal symbolic
democracy that creates diffuse mass loyalty while avoiding true participation.
Gramsci, similar to Habermas, viewed the elaborate structure of liberal democracy
(parliaments, courts, elections, etc.) as creating a facade of freedom and popular
control by educating the citizenry in the ways of bourgeois politics (Habermas, 1975;
Femia, 1987).
In Gramsci's analysis, hegemony is never established once and for all but is
continually subject to contestation. As a terrain of contesting groups and forces,
society features the ruling class trying to smooth out class contradictions and
incorporate potentially oppositional groups and forces (Kellner, 1989). Similarly, in
discussing Weber's concept of legitimate authority, Habermas states that:
as belief in the legitimacy of an existing order vanishes, the latent force
embedded in the system of institutions is released — either as manifest force
from above (which is only a temporary possibility) or in the form of expansion
of the scope for participation (in which case the key to the distribution of
chances to legitimately satisfy needs, that is, the degree of repression, also
changes) (Habermas, 1975, p. 96).

A reasonable claim can be made that the historical conditions in late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century America that gave rise to the populist and progressive
movements (creating the system of direct legislation) exemplify an expansion in the
scope of public participation. Assessing the class struggle of the times, Goebel writes:
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The call for the initiative and referendum in the 1890s.. .unfolded within a
model of political economy that located the origins of oppressive monopolies,
corporations, and trusts in the special privileges bestowed on private parties by
dishonest lawmakers and legislative assemblies" (Goebel, 2002, p. 4).

The Public Sphere
Both Gramsci and Habermas discuss the ideological effects of institutional
structures, forms, and technologies as well. That is, participation in the processes
themselves constitutes a form of ideological control. As such, examination of the
public sphere provides an important additional theoretical construct through which to
examine the role of the initiative process as a democratic phenomenon. The public
sphere, the conceptualization of which is typically credited to Habermas, refers to an
arena of discursive relations not an arena of market relations, a space for democratic
deliberation (Fraser, 1990). The claim is that the public sphere mediates between the
private sphere, and the sphere of public authority. The private sphere refers to the
realm of commodity exchange and social labor, and the sphere of authority deals with
the state, police, and the ruling class. The public sphere crosses over both of these
realms —through the vehicle of public opinion it put the state in touch with the needs
of society (Habermas, 1989, p. 31).
Although the public sphere may be more of a Utopian model of democratic
communication than a definitive post-Enlightenment historical reality, the significance
of public debate, discussion, discourse, and the formation of public opinion is central
to every theory of democratic politics. Significant for this study's analysis of direct
democracy campaigns is Habermas's description of the decline of the public sphere in
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the mid-to-late twentieth century; what he refers to as its "refuedalization." Habermas
argues that the spread of the public relations and lobbying culture made contemporary
debate a false version of the public sphere (Habermas, 1975). As outlined by Frank
Webster, Habermas describes two features of the public sphere that led to this decline.
First are the elevation of capitalism that privileges privatization and the domination of
the state by capital. Consequently, powerful organized interests used the state to
further its own ends (Webster, 2002). Habermas argues that the existence of extensive
public relations efforts by powerful interests indicates that the contestation over the
public sphere is an enduring struggle. Yet, even though the need for legitimacy
necessitates major efforts on the part of powerful interests, the methods employed by
such interests often conceal the parties responsible, thus producing a spurious forum
for public debate. Quite simply, if the public is unaware of the source(s) behind a
persuasion campaign, then it is an inauthentic mode of public discourse.
For instance, in the early years of Oregon's experience with direct democracy,
with 25 initiatives on the ballot in 1910 and 28 in 1912, there was no requirement that
initiative campaigns disclose the sources of their funding, nor the amount they had
received. Moreover, it was not until 1913 that Oregon's Secretary of State was
required to record the name of the individual who had filed the petition for initiative.
This meant that voters facing 53 initiatives in two general elections were not only
ignorant of the financiers of the measures, but the very sponsors as well (Ellis, 2005,
in Clucas et al.). In 2009, Oregon campaign and election laws regulating the initiative
process are considerably more transparent for voters motivated to identify the interests
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qualifying and financing ballot measures. Still, in a state where registered political
action committee names have included, "Don't Let the Wackos Get Away with the
Lies This Time" in support of Measure 34 in 1996 seeking a statutory change allowing
the use of dogs for cougar hunting, and "Let's put Children First" for Measure 95 in
2000 supporting teacher merit pay, voters are still often unaware of the specific
sources financing initiative campaigns.
Mass Media and Electoral Campaigns
Another factor leading to the decline of the public sphere is the development of
mass media into monopoly capitalist organizations. As tools of profit-seeking
interests, media function more as propagandistic arms of capital and as sellers of
audiences to advertisers, than as providers of public information (Webster, 2002). I
use the term "propagandistic" here not in its contemporary pejorative sense but rather
as it was employed, for example, by public relations pioneer Edward Bernays and
journalist Walter Lippmann in the early twentieth century. Bernays and Lippmann
were both members of Woodrow Wilson's Creel Commission that worked to sway
public opinion to enter the First World War. Bernays, in his classic book,
Propaganda, speaks very frankly of the necessity of "engineering public consent."
Both Bernays and Lippmann believed that a necessary condition of democracy was for
members of the ruling class to use strategies and techniques to shape public
perceptions and to direct behavior. As Bernays explains in the first sentence of his
work, Propaganda, first published in 1928, "The conscious and intelligent
manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important
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element in democratic society" (Bernays, 2005, p. 37). Both Bernays and Lippmann
argued that a "specialized class," the elite of the society, was to manage public opinion
for the ultimate benefit of all classes of society; even those they viewed as unfit and
incapable of participating in the management of the democracy.
This figures prominently in the construction of political campaigns, which
have become enormous revenue streams for media concerns selling advertising time to
organized interests and candidates (McChesney, 1999; Witcover, 2001; Bennett, 2001;
Schudson, 2003; Edelman, 1988). Thus, in 2008, media corporations received
approximately $2.6 billion in political advertising (Seelye, 2008). Political reporter,
Jeff Mapes, of Oregon's largest circulating daily newspaper, the Oregonian, recently
described a local Oregon example of the political advertising/mass media nexus. In
2007, Oregon voters were confronted with Ballot Measures 49 and 50 — both
legislative referrals. Measure 49 concerned land use and Measure 50 a sizeable
cigarette tax. By October 30, 2007, campaigns for and against the measures had
already spent over $8 million on television advertising in Oregon, a state with less
than four million residents. In just the two months leading up to the election, Portland,
Oregon television stations had earned approximately 10 percent of their entire
quarterly revenue from initiative campaign spending on advertising (Mapes, 2007).
Ballot measure campaigns are particularly lucrative for broadcasters since, in
contrast to candidate campaigns, there are no restrictions on how much broadcasters
can charge clients seeking advertising slots. Evan Tracey, head of Campaign Media
Analysis Group, explains that approximately three-quarters of total campaign
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spending are for local broadcasters. As Mapes observes, "ballot measures have
become a big business" (Mapes, 2007). One 2002 study by the Lear Center found that
nationally, of the 4,850 half-hour local news broadcasts analyzed in a study of local
news in the country's 50 largest media markets, just over one in three (37 percent)
carried any campaign coverage. In contrast, almost three of four (72 percent) of these
same broadcasts aired at least one paid political advertisement, and over half (52
percent) aired at least two political commercials (Lear Center Report, 2002). Such a
state of affairs further rationalizes a political system ensconced in money favoring the
very corporate entities broadcasting the political spectacle (Edelman, 1988;
McChesney, 1999; Boggs, 2000).
In the status quo political marketplace, corporate media outlets have a financial
incentive to limit coverage of ballot initiative campaigns, thereby necessitating the
purchase of expensive advertising time by advocates and their opponents. American
mediated political campaigns thus become consultant and corporate media entitlement
programs as much as anything else. In addition, as conservative entities benefiting
handsomely from neoliberal federal communication policies, campaigns and elections
are covered as the most important elements of a functioning democracy. This is
evident in the sheer volume of media coverage of campaigns and elections, as well as
in the constant repetition of phrases such as, "the people have spoken," and paeans to
the peaceful transition of power — even following the debacle that was the
presidential election of 2000. While campaigns, elections, and voting are key
components of any working democracy, they represent a part of the necessary
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conditions of a functioning democracy. More importantly, in the coverage of
campaigns and elections, rarely discussed is the fact that a majority of eligible voters
in the United States do not participate in the electoral process, that a very small
percentage of the population contributes money for political purposes, and a relatively
small number closely follows political news (Edelman, 1988; Boggs, 2000; Sussman,
2005). In the United States, despite the exception of the uptick in the 2008 general
election, over the last 50 years the percentage of eligible voters choosing to exercise
the franchise has been on the decline with more than 40 percent of population not
participating in general elections (U.S. Census Bureau Web site, 2008).
Additionally, there is a great deal of research concerning several deficiencies
in corporate media's coverage of campaigns and elections. Thus, for example, of the
local news broadcasts in the Lear Center Study cited above, the average election story
length was 87.5 seconds on the top-rated early evening news, and 63.7 seconds on the
top-rated late-evening news, for an overall average of 75.6 seconds. Furthermore, of
the 2,487 political stories captured by the sample, 40 percent included sound bites
from candidates. The average length of a sound bite was 11.2 seconds for early and
late news combined (Lear Center Report, 2002). Local news broadcasts in Oregon
and other states represent the most likely source of information about ballot measure
campaigns not emanating directly from the campaign themselves.
Constructing the Political Spectacle
Unquestionably, campaigns and elections represent important rituals
maintaining and supporting democratic regimes. Swanson and Mancini list several
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essential functions of campaigns and elections including, their symbolic power.
"Symbolically, campaigns legitimate democratic government and political
leaders.. .both the practical outcomes and symbolic meaning of campaigns are
important to the health of democracies." They continue:
The manner in which democracies conduct their election campaigns is in some
ways as important as the results of the voting. Governments are regarded as
democratic not because their rhetoric describes them as such, but because their
manner of choosing decision makers is consistent with some recognizable
conception of democracy (Swanson & Mancini, 1996, pp. 1, 2).

Chomsky discusses a prevalent ideology promulgated in elite circles in the
early twentieth century about the necessity of managing public opinion and reinforcing
powers of a "specialized class," to use the words of journalist and political critic
Walter Lippmann, to direct policy ostensibly for the common good (Chomsky, 1989).
With about 1,600 American companies self-identifying as public relations firms,
approximately 150,000 practitioners by the year 2000 (Campbell, 2002, pp. 431, 432),
the practice of public opinion management has grown to a multibillion-dollar industry.
Political campaign professionals represent an important subfield of public relations
and opinion management, and their specialty is the electoral campaign. Their
expertise in the construction of the political spectacle (Edelman, 1988) focuses on the
credibility and electability of their client — whether that is a candidate or an interest
group financing a ballot measure. In short, legitimation is one of their primary
functions. In discussing the symbolic and legitimation functions of elections, political
scientist Murray Edelman observes: "The intense publicity given to voting and
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elections is itself a potent signal of the essential powerlessness of political spectators
because elections are implicitly a message about the limits of power" (Edelman, 1988,
p. 97; emphasis in the original). To the extent that initiative campaigns are
constructed and understood as exemplars of citizen-generated ideas and policy
prescriptions, their potency as a form of legitimation is considerable. The initiative
election spectacle largely masks the activities of organized interests financing efforts
to qualify measures for the ballot as well as the often-extensive activities of political
consultants running the campaigns.
Political Economy
The study is also informed by a critical political economy. As an approach,
political economy prioritizes efforts at "understanding social change and historical
transformation through the study of the social relations, and particularly the power
relations, that mutually constitutes the production, distribution, and consumption of
resources" (Mosco, 1996, p. 25). Political economy seeks to uncover the linkages
among structures and those interests and entities both constructing and benefiting most
from the existing material conditions, as well as those with the power to control
resources. Thus, understanding contemporary U.S. electoral processes, including the
initiative process, requires examination of the global industrial order and the new
technological mode of industrial, cultural, and political production (Sussman, 2005;
Sussman & Galizio, 2003).
Political economy links control of politics with the defense of organized
political and economic power. It views U.S. electoral processes as demonstrating the
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increasing global concentration of wealth, the privatization of public space, and the
commercialization of the public sphere. As elections have become more commercial,
industrialized, and more expensive, powerful private and state interests find natural
allies in political consultants, mass media, and firms constituting the political
marketing industry (Sussman, 2005; Sussman & Galizio, 2003). Political economy
directs our focus to the core concerns implicated in the initiative-industrial complex
and the commodification of politics of direct legislation. It compels an inquiry into
the industrialization of the system of ballot initiatives, and what Habermas (1974)
referred to as the scientiflcization of politics (Swanson & Mancini, 1996, p. 14).
Habermas (1974; 1978) chronicled the increased use of campaign
professionals, pollsters, public relations practitioners, and the panoply of experts and
firms responsible for the marketing of political candidates and initiatives today
(Mancini & Swanson, 1996). The capital-intensive campaign reflects the larger
political economy where subcontractors and professional specialists "use flexible
forms of media and digital technologies for the collection, processing, and editing of
data and images" (Sussman & Galizio, 2003, p. 7). In such a system, potential voters
are constructed not as citizens constituting the polis, but as consumers to be surveilled,
test-marketed to, and sold a product.
Campaign technologies deployed in initiative and candidate campaigns alike
include: campaign software to assist in fundraising, volunteer list management, mediabuying, and campaign expenditure accounting ledgers. Databases and CD-ROMs
permit data harvesting for voting targeting, information sharing among interest groups,
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and voter analysis. Computer-assisted dialing services are used for get-out-the-vote
efforts, fundraising and survey efforts. Direct mail and direct marketing employ
sophisticated customized databases and graphic design technology to mobilize
targeted segments of the electorate. Psychographic data from hand-held perceptionanalyzers during focus groups shape messages and are central to the creation of
campaign rhetoric.
Such technologies and their use in the contemporary capital-intensive
campaign reify systems of power (Sussman & Galizio, 2003). The very logic of the
system is embedded in the methods serving to reinforce and legitimize the money
focus of contemporary electioneering. Capital-intensive initiative campaigns now
feature political marketing techniques indistinguishable from the corporate branding
and selling of consumer goods and services. In sum, "politics has become
commercial, market-oriented, commoditized and industrialized, privatized and less
public, centralized while more decentered" (Sussman & Galizio, 2003, p. 8).
Ballot initiative campaigns and elections are run similar to marketing blitzes
for Hollywood films or other products hawked to consumers (Sussman, 2005). The
use of sophisticated marketing techniques mined from corporate America situate
citizens as consumers, treating them as customers to be marketed to rather than as
voters and residents of a state making significant policy choices affecting their lives.
Nicholas Garnham makes perhaps the most cogent statement of this campaign
approach:
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Politicians appeal to potential voters not as rational beings concerned for the
public good, but in the mode of advertising, as creatures of passing and largely
irrational appetite, whose self-interest they must purchase. The campaigners
thus address citizens within the set of social relations that have been created for
other purposes. Thus the citizen is addressed as a private individual rather than
a member of the public, within a privatized domestic sphere rather than within
public life (Garnham, 1990, p. 11).

While Garnham uses the term "politicians," the observation also holds true for
initiative campaigns employing the same political operatives and their marketing
techniques to win consent. One consultant working for progressive causes argued that
the reason conservative forces were so much more successful at placing initiatives on
the ballot was because liberals tend to view government, the state, as serving a public
collective good, whereas conservative philosophy holds that individual freedom and
smaller government should reign supreme. Thus, initiatives attacking government (i.e.
the collective good) is a logical target of conservative interest groups (Blazak,
personal communication, 2009).
In the next section I discuss the scholarly literature concerning political
consultants, including theory relating to their role in the system of direct legislation.
After summarizing recent scholarship on political consultants and their functions in
campaigns and elections, I introduce the present study's critical theoretical approach
to the so-called professionalization of direct legislation.
Current Theory on Initiative Professionalization
To date, McCuan has taken the most in-depth look at the role of political
consultants in direct legislation. While his focus is on the state of California, the
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analysis and discussion refer to the national phenomenon of initiative growth in the
post-Proposition 13 era as well as to the overall increased use of political professionals
in direct legislation campaigns. In accounting for the significant growth in the use of
political consultants in I&R campaigns, McCuan points to a favorable cost-benefit
analysis of the initiative process by interest groups, increased technological
sophistication in electioneering, and the subsequent demand for political campaign
professionals familiar with these campaign technologies and techniques (McCuan,
2001, p. 7).
McCuan cites the lack of general theory in the scholarship of political
consulting in general and a "dearth of data on the actions and role of political
professionals in direct democracy." He notes two broad conclusions reached by those
in the subfield of campaigns and elections: 1) that new technologies contributed to
changes in political campaigns, and 2) the scope and level of professional assistance
has changed as the need for specialized consultants emerged. McCuan seeks to learn
why the role of political professionals has increased in ballot measure campaigns in
the last 20 years. If this is not an entirely new phenomenon, then what accounts for
this significant change? He concludes that virtually all interest groups employ
political professionals in the initiative process. "The whole process is virtually
professionalized across each stage from the drafting of ballot language, to the
collection of signatures, to the actual campaign stage" (McCuan, 2001, pp. 14, 22, 26).
McCuan identifies three primary factors that resulted in what he refers to as the
"spillover" of campaign professionals from candidate to initiative campaigns.
63

Theory and Literature Review
Specifically, he points to: 1) changes in the regulatory environment following the 1974
Political Reform Act,8 2) the recognized utility of consultants as showcased in
California's Proposition 13, and, finally, 3) the supply of services offered by political
professionals in candidate campaigns created a demand among those involved in direct
legislation efforts. This supply and demand model argues that initiative campaigns
offer political professionals opportunities to increase their exposure and develop their
business models (McCuan, 2001, p. 88).
McCuan concludes his study of the growth of political professionals in
California initiative campaigns with several important points. First, he observes that
professionals are essential to most campaigns for signature gathering, drafting ballot
language, framing the message, and for carrying out legislative and legal compliance
throughout the process. However, he argues that the increased number of political
consultants in the initiative process does not merely represent a "linear development of
more wide-ranging developments in campaigns and elections." Rather, the increase
can be attributable to the high profile of campaigns, such as California's Proposition
13 and its successful use of direct mail, television advertising, and professional
consulting services. Second, McCuan cites an increase in interest group activity using
the initiative process from the 1960s onward, coinciding with "a revolution in
campaign technology." This convergence has served to benefit political professionals,
as their expertise is perceived as vital to successful year-round initiative battles.
Lastly, McCuan points to a spillover effect, as the supply of campaign professionals
from candidate races to initiative contests is fostered by the stringent regulatory
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environment along with the greater use of ballot measures by interest groups.
McCuan concludes his study with many more questions than answers. His focus on
how political professionals affect the initiative process is an important step in creating
an understanding of a long-standing phenomenon that only lately has been receiving
scholarly attention (McCuan, 2001, pp. 230, 231).
Analyses of the phenomenon of increased use of political consultants for
initiative campaigns by McCuan and others (see Donovan, Bowler, & McCuan in
Sabato et al., 2001) supports a "professionalization" thesis extant in the literature on
candidate campaigns (see esp. Scammell, 1998; Faucheux, 1996; Mancini & Swanson,
1996; and Farrell, 1996). One major premise of the professionalization thesis is that
as campaign technologies (including mass media outlets) have become more
numerous and complex, the demand for technical expertise offered by political
professionals becomes increasingly useful. Another is that campaign regulations and
election laws necessitate the employ of consultants conversant with the complexities
of election law. A third is that parties have weakened and the electorate has become
more mobile and reliant on mass media for political information, campaign
communication experts provide strategically critical advice on the ways and means to
persuade the electorate.
Magleby and Patterson (1998), as well as Schrag (1998), envision a consultantdriven initiative industry whereby political professionals actively seek new business
by pitching novel initiative ideas to interest groups in the hopes of drumming up
clients. Apart from being a rather narrow interpretation of an initiative-industrial
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complex these authors convincingly argue that issue-advocacy groups and economic
interests, not political professionals, are driving the demand for initiatives. They point
to anti-tax lobbies, environmentalists, and others with an institutionalized presence
and very professional lobbying operations as being central to the increase in initiative
use (Magleby & Patterson, 1998, p. 130). Additionally, Magleby and Patterson, as
well as Schrag, also cite economic interests with specific industry-related concerns as
another group responsible for the increasing number of initiatives on the ballot.
Industrialization not Professionalization
In contrast, Donovan, Bowler, and McCuan, in their survey research and
examination of the initiative-industrial complex, disagree with the analysis by
Magleby and Patterson and Schrag, and essentially view the initiative process as
simply one more point of access to the political system. In other words, they view the
initiative as simply another means by which interest groups can achieve policy goals.
Accordingly, similar to lobbying the legislature directly, communicating with voters
directly requires significant financial expenditures. Donovan et al. conclude their
examination of the initiative-industrial complex with several claims. First, they
believe that population growth necessarily leads to reliance on mass media to
stimulate interest and persuade voters. They argue that almost all initiative campaigns
require the use of campaign professionals and that contemporary initiative politics do
not resemble the progressive idea of an open forum. Moreover, ballot access requires
significant financial resources, professional assistance and "corporate and economic
interests have greater ability to employ professionals needed to wage modern
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campaigns" (Donovan et al., 2001, p. 134). Despite this nod to the power of money
and organizational power, the authors claim that wealthy interests merely have more
defensive than offensive advantages and that the initiative system still does offer
another access route to the political system for groups that might otherwise remain
virtually shut out. The first conclusion is reinforced by other studies of expenditures
and initiative election outcomes. However, focusing merely on electoral outcomes
ignores significant secondary effects of ballot qualification, such as agenda setting,
pressuring legislators, and so-called crypto-initiatives.9
In contrast, the proposed study's political economic perspective hypothesizes
that political professionals serve as brokers and retailers within the logic of a system in
which powerful organized interests and wealthy individuals have largely captured the
political processes, including the ballot initiative. While much has been written on the
subject of campaign finance and its impact on electoral outcomes, what remains
largely unchartered territory is scholarship that links changes in the political process,
including ballot initiatives, to the larger political economy. Prolific initiative
campaign spending not only lines the pockets of political operatives in the initiative
industry, but it arguably privileges well-heeled neoliberal interests and wealthy
individuals. The presence of big money in initiative elections not only raises the
barriers to entry for true grassroots movements (as opposed to"astroturf' facades), it
enables powerful organized interests to maintain a disproportionate hold on political
discourse, agenda-setting, and forces citizen interests to go begging for money from
the very interests they seek to counter. Further, corporate capital, wealthy individuals,
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and pressure groups maintain relationships with experienced, well compensated
political campaign consultants, thus securing the rhetorical and strategic advantage of
the top public relations and symbol manipulating professionals (Sussman, 2005;
Sussman & Galizio, 2003).
A system that ostensibly places power in the hands of citizen-inspired
grassroots political movements and strengthens the public sphere is now firmly
ensconced in the system of private exchange relations that privileges wealthy interests
(Sussman, 2005; Sussman & Galizio, 2003). Indeed, the rhetorical elements
embedded in the initiative as a process or means of promoting ideas/legislation, in
addition to the often populist tropes of initiative campaigns, are important to analyze.
I argue that the populist myth surrounding the initiative system in the United States
creates the legitimating foundation for moneyed interests to advance its interests
through direct legislation. The convergence of the populist myth of the initiative
process with campaigns that portray their respective positions as "grassroots" and
emanating from "the people" often serves to mask the interests seeking political gain.
Therefore, rather than acting as a counterweight to powerful organized interests,
initiatives become another means for the concentration of economic power (Sussman,
2005; Sussman & Galizio, 2003). Such a state of affairs further alienates an already
depoliticized population and feeds the cynicism of those lacking the capital to
participate.
In her important work on money and direct lawmaking, Garrett (1999) sets
forth two critical elements of the initiative process that privilege wealthy interests: 1)
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the qualification stage and 2) shaping the policy agenda. In states that provide for the
initiative, the majority of measures fail to make it onto the ballot. Petitioners must
reach a signature threshold that is generally set as a percentage of the votes cast for
governor in the last general election (Magleby, 1984). Deep pockets allow the chief
petitioner(s) to purchase the services of a professional signature-gathering firm. Some
of these firms offer money-back guarantees on ballot access (Ellis, 2002). One
illustration of the effect of having paid petitioners is evidenced by the experience in
Oregon.
Approximately one in eight volunteer-only efforts made it to the ballot
between 1988 and 2000. In contrast, since 1996, 93 percent of the initiatives on the
Oregon ballot employed the services of a for-profit firm (Ellis, 2002, p. 50). A 1996
Portland City Club Report on Oregon's initiative and referendum system contained
testimony that $100,000 to $150,000 was sufficient to land a measure on Oregon's
ballot (cited in Ellis, 2002, p. 59). A more recent report by the Portland City Club
(2008) placed the price of securing ballot access at between $250,000 and $1 million.
Hence, money has become a sufficient condition to qualify for ballot access and the
trend has it becoming a necessary condition as well. In brief, not only does this
electoral structure advantage moneyed interests, it serves to all but exclude the
interests and issues of those at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale.
Equally, if not more important, is the impact getting on the ballot has on public
discourse and shaping the policy agenda. Kingdon defines the policy agenda as "the
list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of
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government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention
at any given time" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3). Without question, the initiative process in
Oregon (and in neighboring states California and Washington) has been influential in
setting the agenda for public discourse and for legislative policymaking as well. One
measure of this impact is the amount of media coverage given to prolific initiative
sponsor Bill Sizemore between 1996 and 2000. As documented by Richard Ellis,
despite being trounced by John Kitzhaber in the 1998 gubernatorial election, the only
Oregon politicians to receive more statewide media coverage than Sizemore were the
state's two U.S. senators and the governor (Ellis, 2001, p. 93). For this reason, merely
looking at aggregate spending and subsequent won-loss records of ballot initiatives
fails to document the actual political impact of moneyed interests utilizing the process.
Also, the increasing costs of initiative electioneering appear not only to favor
individual and corporate wealth, it risks alienating further an already cynical
electorate. The perceived cooptation of an ostensibly grassroots process risks greater
voter apathy and depoliticization, a situation favoring organized interests benefiting
handsomely from the status quo.
It can be argued that such a structure does not represent a natural phenomenon
resulting from an invisible hand guiding political systems to their most efficacious and
logical ends. Rather, such a system may illustrate neoliberalism and the incursion of a
kind of industrialization that has appropriated public spaces and serves to weaken
counterforces to the onslaught of privatization and the maneuvers of entrenched
wealthy interests (Sussman, 2005; Sussman & Galizio, 2003). Neoliberalism has
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resulted in the expansion of market forces and industrial logic to erstwhile public
forums and spaces and the deepening of commoditization into spaces not already
within the sphere of exchange relations (Sussman & Galizio, 2003; Sussman, 2005).
It reflects the consequence of the erosion of public space and the cooptation and
domination of public venues by private exchange relations and market-centered logic.
In the contemporary neoliberal regime, campaigns and elections represent simply
another market ripe for creation, penetration and domination (Sussman, 2005;
Sussman & Galizio, 2003). Political campaigns, including ballot initiative campaigns,
embody new sites of accumulation for capital (Sussman, 2005).
Citizens/Voters as Targets/Consumers
In their book analyzing the educative effects of the initiative process, Tolbert
and Smith argue that citizen lawmaking benefits civic engagement — as defined by
increases in political knowledge, interest in politics, and more frequent political
discussions. Additionally, the authors find a correlation between states having
frequent ballot measures and higher levels of social capital. Finally, Tolbert and
Smith report a "contextually constrained" relationship between initiative use and
voting participation, yet ultimately conclude that the initiative system may serve to
enhance voter turnout (Tolbert & Smith, 2004, p. 71).
Tolbert and Smith point to repeated statements by the founders of the
Progressive Movement favoring the initiative not only for its potential affect on policy
outcomes, but for the aforementioned "secondary effects." One of the key contentions
of backers of the initiative during the Progressive Era and continuing today is that
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initiative states will produce voters with increased political knowledge10 — a more
"informed electorate." To measure this, the authors employ American National
Election Studies (NES) data from 1996 to 2000. More specifically, the authors use
data from respondent's scores on correct answers to six general political knowledge
questions. Positing that political interest is closely related to an informed electorate,
the authors measure political interest using a Likert scale concerning degrees of
interest in political campaigns. Rounding out their analysis of overall civic
engagement, Tolbert and Smith measure political discussion by a dichotomous
variable whereby respondents indicate either participation in political discussion, or
conversely, not engaging in such discussion.
The NES data are merged with state-level data, and several explanatory
variables such as educational level, media consumption, and income are controlled for
in their analysis. The authors conclude that exposure to ballot initiatives leads to a
more politically informed citizenry, with the caveat that the effect is evident when
initiatives are interrelated to issues of national and state campaigns (Tolbert and
Smith, 2004, pp. 53, 56, 59, 60, 63). Tolbert and Smith's research leads them to
conclude that ballot initiatives have a more important and consistent effect on political
interest than on political knowledge. They surmise that the data suggest that
initiatives may increase interest in politics by providing people with additional sources
of information.
Finally, political discussion represents the third element of civic engagement
Tolbert and Smith analyzed for their research. Their research leads them to the
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conclusion that exposure to ballot initiatives does increase the frequency of political
discussion. However, similar to Tolbert and Smith's findings on political knowledge
and interest, the effect appeared to vary with electoral context (Tolbert & Smith, 2004,
p. 66).
Progressive and populist champions of the initiative process boasted of the
secondary or educative effects in addition to its importance in shaping government
policy. Senator Jonathan Bourne Jr. of Oregon, a Republican Senator from 1907 to
1913 stated: "The study of measures and arguments printed in the publicity pamphlet
is of immense educational value. The system not only encourages the development of
each individual, but tends to elevate the entire electorate to the plane of those who are
most advanced" (cited in Tolbert & Smith, 2004, p. 53). Harvard professor William
Munro, in his tract on direct democracy, claimed:
The way to get voters interested in measures is to ask for their opinion upon
measures, not for their opinion on men. The way to educate the voter upon
matters of public policy is to submit measures to him in person and not to
some one who holds his proxy. The educative value the ordinary ballot has
long since been demonstrated; and friends of direct legislation now urge that
this be enhanced by making the ballot a more elaborate political catechism"
(Tolbert & Smith, 2004, p. 30).

The authors make a convincing case not only that such secondary effects represented
an important aspiration of the founders of I&R, but also that contemporary research
regarding these elements of the entire process of direct legislation is in short supply.
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Counterargument on Education
While concurring with Tolbert and Smith (2004) that assessment of secondary
and educative effects represents a worthy endeavor, in this paper I present a series of
counterarguments to the claims that the initiative process enhances civic engagement,
political knowledge, and civic participation. I will not directly address Tolbert and
Smith's claims concerning voter turnout, as such a focus is simply beyond the scope
this study.
I argue that the analysis surrounding the claims of beneficial
secondary/educative effects largely ignores the means or processes by which
campaigns present their messages to voters, and it does not adequately account for the
electioneering context within which such information is packaged. The increasingly
sophisticated information management and political marketing active in contemporary
initiative campaigns constitutes a significant qualitative distinction that has been
heretofore largely overlooked in the scholarly literature on direct legislation. Despite
the persistent myth that somehow ballot measure campaigns are distinct from
candidate campaigns in terms of being populist, citizen-driven, grassroots endeavors,
increasingly, the reality in Oregon and many other states with the direct initiative is
that campaigns are industrialized, technologically-mediated practices of electoral
management. In fact, such a state of affairs has led to scholarship referring to the
initiative process as a "parallel legislature" (McCuan and Stambough, 2005).
Importantly, the significance of this status quo is not that consultant-run,
technologically-mediated campaigns cannot by nature be labeled "grassroots"
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(although it certainly calls into question the significance of this term); rather the
strategies and techniques extant in contemporary electioneering completely alter the
relationships of everyone touched by the processes as well as the significance of the
democratic rituals of elections themselves. It should be noted here that Smith, in his
1998 work on "Tax Crusaders" as well as in other works (see especially his taxonomy
of anti-tax ballot initiatives, 2004), has been one of the most trenchant critics of the
populist myth of contemporary ballot initiatives. In fact, Smith makes a convincing
case that direct legislation researchers looking at aggregate expenditures should
consider a more contextualized and nuanced analysis of such numbers. To quote Smith
directly:
Although aggregate spending measures allow us to generalize about the
initiative process fairly easily, they unfortunately tell us little about the
underlying processes of direct democracy generally, or more specifically, the
motivations behind the supposedly populist and grassroots nature of anti-tax
measures. Aggregate data may reveal the wide disparity in spending between
proponents and opponents of ballot measures, but they only deal with part (and
perhaps not a very important part) of the initiative process (Smith, 2004, p. 94).

A great deal of research has focused on the question of the impact of the
enormous sums of money now being spent on initiative campaigns (see especially
Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004; & Stratmann, 2006). The debate centers primarily on
whether well-financed campaigns hold a significant advantage, measured by whether
or not the better-funded side of a ballot measure campaign emerges victorious a
greater percentage of the time. Despite research illustrating that money does not
guarantee victory in initiative campaigns, the record does clearly indicate that all
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things being equal, it is ultimately advantageous to have greater financial resources
than the opposition, and that money is especially beneficial to interests seeking to
defeat a citizen-initiative (Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004). This is certainly an important
question, yet one that often ignores the qualitative dimensions of the campaigns. This
element of the equation becomes especially important in lieu of the research on the
secondary/educative effects of this plebiscitary system.
Webster (2002) suggests that the significant expansion of public relations and
the scientific management of information corrupt the public sphere as economicallypowerful interests have a disproportionate advantage over less privileged groups. The
present study explores this observation by examining the financing and constituent
elements of increasingly capital-intensive initiative campaigns. For the capitalintensive, professionalized initiative campaign constructs individuals as consumers
and engages them in the mode of exchange relations rather than as citizens
participating as sovereigns7' partaking in authentic/grassroots politicking,
policymaking and shared governance. Evidence of this dramatic shift in campaigns
and electioneering is evidenced by the creation of an entirely new subfield of
marketing known as political marketing.
Political Marketing
Political marketing as an industry and academic discipline comes complete
with its own academic journal, graduate degree programs, and an increasing number
of practitioners. Newman (1999), one of the pioneering scholars of the field, describes
the similarities between business and politics: "both rely on the use of standard
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marketing research, market segmentation, targeting, positioning, strategy
development, and implementation. Second, the voter can be analyzed as a consumer
in the political marketplace, using the same models and theories in marketing that are
used to study consumers in the commercial marketplace" (Newman, 1999, pp. 36, 37).
One might paraphrase Smythe (1981), one of the pioneer scholars of the
political economy of communication, and coin the term "voter commodity" to draw
attention to the function of the sophisticated technologies, tactics, and methodologies
of professionalized campaigns. The determinative focus of many initiative campaigns
is not to enhance voter knowledge or civic engagement, but to deliver voters to
moneyed interest groups and wealthy individuals funding initiative campaigns. And
while the targets of these political marketing operations may indeed come away with
greater familiarity with some of the arguments and issues pertinent to the initiatives on
which they are asked to render a decision, the more likely result is short-term
familiarity with decontextualized soundbites and repetitive arguments manufactured
by the multimillion-dollar intensive campaigns. The focus of the campaigns
themselves is not edification about the issues; rather it's delivering the most
emotionally compelling argument/theme(s) as identified in extensive focus-grouped,
poll-tested methodologies. Referring to the campaign theme, one experienced
consultant explained: "If you stick to it, and say it often enough, you will define the
criteria for the voters that they should use to make their choice" (Bradshaw, 1995, p.
44).
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It is beyond the scope (and available resources) of the present study to collect
the data required to definitively show that voters rendering decisions on repeat ballot
measures from chief petitioner Bill Sizemore failed to comprehend or adequately
recall that it was the second or third time in the past decade that they were being asked
to vote on virtually the same initiative.

However, according to professional

consultants (including the lead pollster for the opposition campaigns for all of the
repeat initiatives over several election cycles) the overwhelming majority of voters
surveyed either could not recall ever having voted on virtually the identical measure in
a previous cycle or had a vague memory of having done so, but with little to no
recollection of the specific issues and arguments involved (Grove, personal
communication, 2008). The large numbers of initiatives that typically fill the Oregon
ballot mean that the generic oppositional strategy of sowing confusion and creating
doubt might result in voters having difficulty recalling the issues in any particular
election cycle. Still, this calls into question the claim that initiative campaigns
increase citizens' political knowledge.
Political campaigns, whether initiative or candidate-campaigns, are largely
environments for rhetorical communication. And part of the argument here is that
what is missing from much of the scholarship on initiative campaigns concerns the
qualitative significance of contemporary capital-intensive campaigns. This includes
the rhetorical elements of campaigns that practice microtargeting, voter segmentation,
and targeted messaging that appeal to voters in the mode of product advertising. This
type of mass customization includes distinct appeals and messages that may bear little
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similarity to communication emanating from the same campaign and are being sent to
a completely different segment of the voting population.
Among the most repeated arguments and justifications for the initiative process
now, and especially among its pioneers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, has been the promise of advancing participatory democracy. The controlling
notion has been that the citizen-voter, with the direct plebiscitary mechanism available
to exercise a more direct form of democracy and policymaking, would be a betterinformed and more engaged member of the polity. In their book on the educative and
secondary effects of I&R, Smith and Tolbert again quote Oregon Senator Jonathan
Bourne, Jr., an outspoken early proponent of direct legislation:
In Oregon the farmer at his plow, the mechanic at his bench, devote a portion
of their time to study of their government and methods of improving it. They
have become the most intelligent, most progressive and most independent
people in the world. They wear not intellectual halters. They cannot be led to
the polls and voted on Election Day. They do their own thinking. They do
their own voting. They acknowledge no human authority higher than a
mandate legally recorded in a popular election (Smith & Tolbert, 2004, p. 12).

The argument from I&R advocates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century that direct democracy enhances political knowledge and participation
continues today. However, contemporary I&R champions also cite the so-called
information revolution as significantly strengthening the case for direct democracy.
Highlighting the availability of information through the Internet and a myriad of other
modes of information transmission, proponents of direct legislation argue that citizens
possess even greater capacity to engage in direct legislation today than was possible in

79

Theory and Literature Review
the Progressive Era (Waters, 2000). Yet, as political scientist Steven Schier notes in
his discussion of initiatives: "The information costs in initiative voting are high, and
even a small and relatively elite electorate can find it difficult to vote rationally." He
continues "Designed to prompt popular deliberation over policy, it offers few
incentives for citizens to master the arcane content of initiatives" (Schier, 2000, pp.
151, 153). Although some initiatives, such as those concerning gay marriage or
perhaps physician-assisted suicide may not constitute as high a cost for voters in terms
of time and effort, a significant number of initiatives in the past eight years in Oregon
concern less emotive, more complex issues for consideration.
Indeed, absent from the Utopian vision of the empowered citizen armed with
virtually unlimited information at the click of a mouse, is acknowledgement of the
concurrent explosive growth and sophistication of the scientific management of
information. Living to the age of 103, public relations pioneer Edward Bernays got
more than a glimpse of the advanced market research and communications
technologies employed primarily in the commercial sector, yet now moving full-force
into the political realm {New York Times, 1995). Certainly, in both candidate and
initiative political campaigns we have reached the age of the scientific management of
political marketing.
Acknowledging that Habermas' notion of a vibrant public sphere in the
nineteenth century may itself have been more aspirational than actual, nonetheless, the
idea that citizens in a democracy engage in public discourse to help determine the
direction of the nation constitutes a fundamental premise of strong advocates of direct
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legislation. And while general education levels of citizens in the U.S. have generally
shown a gradual increase over time, the explosive growth of the entire apparatus and
professionalism of opinion management is unprecedented.
Enter the symbol-manipulating professionals and their gold-plated toolboxes.
In a truncated period of time, with upwards of 12 initiatives and legislative referrals,
candidates (including judicial candidates) running for national, state, county, and
municipal offices, plus local bond measures or other issues on the ballot, and you have
quite a challenge for even the most well-intentioned citizen/voter. It is within the
context of these challenging circumstances that campaign professionals approach
initiative elections.
As reiterated in almost every interview I conducted during the course of my
research, political campaigns are not about education, they are about winning. The job
of the political consultant is to deliver victory for his or her client. The goal of the
campaign is to get a plurality of the vote for one's client. Sussman (2005) has made
this point powerfully but with a focus on candidate-campaigns in his discussion of
global electioneering, political consulting, and nexus of neoliberalism and politics.
While Sussman focuses almost extensively on candidate-campaigns, I argue here that
the analysis holds true for the large majority of twenty-first century ballot measure
campaigns in Oregon and other states. Sussman explains:
Professionally and technologically mediated elections also alter the
relationship of the voter to the party and political candidate. Elections and
politics in general have become to a far greater extent than before exercises in
communication and public relations ("language that works"), and
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professionalization has reduced the importance of representative leadership for
both party and politician (Sussman, 2005, p. 5).
Interviews with consultants, pollsters, campaign managers, and activists in the
initiative process — all of whom have experience working on candidate races as well
as initiative campaigns — confirm the fact that initiative campaigns contain far more
similarities than differences in terms of the strategies and techniques employed to
move the electorate in the desired direction. Still, important distinctions do exist
between initiative and candidate races. In brief, what emerged in the discussions with
political professionals is that in many cases, the ambiguity of ballot measures provides
greater maneuverability in the construction of images and themes than do candidate
campaigns. Quite simply, packaging a set of words, as opposed to a flesh and blood
candidate with a personal history and background, allows greater maneuverability for
consultants in the construction of campaign themes and images. Candidates have life
histories, physical features, idiosyncratic behavior, and often a paper trail that may
include votes on legislation. In contrast, a ballot measure contains none of the
aforementioned qualities that political consultants must take into account when
creating a campaign plan. Although not a tabula rasa, initiatives often provide a
greater degree of latitude for campaign professionals to construct themes, images, and
language, than do candidate campaigns. This arguably denotes even greater
significance for the role of campaign professionals and the initiative-industrial
complex.
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Citizen Participation
In terms of citizen participation, the contemporary initiative campaign in
Oregon; from its use of professional signature-gathering enterprises, election
attorneys, database vendors, and the panoply of pollsters, media, mail, and general
consultants, has become, in the words of a title of Dennis Johnson's book on political
consulting, No Place for Amateurs (2001). Schier's description of the distinction
between activation and mobilization in political campaigns finds its corollary in the
twenty-first century initiative campaign in Oregon. Schier's basic argument holds that
American political campaigns once featured ward bosses and block captains
mobilizing citizens — albeit often through a system of corrupt patronage —
stimulating involvement of individuals regardless of their voting history or
demographic profile. Although certainly an approach of questionable propriety and
one that is tremendously inefficient by contemporary standards, nonetheless one that
sought to mobilize a broader swath of the public than is evident in today's campaigns.
In contrast, Schier describes today's "professionalized" niche campaigning and
voter targeting as one almost exclusively focused on activation of likely voters and
individuals identified through sophisticated computer-modeling as targets of
opportunity by campaign professionals. While more efficient and arguably a superior
utilization of campaign resources, the result is an electorate that is segmented to
exacerbate the cleavage among the voting and non-voting population. Whereas
mobilization generally involved broad appeals with party workers and a partisan press,
activation is research-driven by polling and focus groups. Such methods do not seek
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to get as many voters as possible to participate in the process; rather it focuses on
activating a small effective segment of the eligible voting population (Schier, 2000, p.
9).
In focusing specifically on initiative campaigns, Schier makes the critical point
that because the Supreme Court in the 1978 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
and related cases have consistently ruled that restricting initiative campaign
expenditures would violate the Constitution, unrestricted spending allows interest
groups to spend unlimited sums of money to purchase experienced campaign
professionals and their arsenal of profiling information and communication
technologies. In the Bellotti case, the court rejected a Massachusetts law aimed at
limiting corporate spending in ballot measure campaigns (Hasen 2005). The Court
held in Bellotti that since initiative elections concern issues and not candidates, there is
no real risk of corruption. Essentially reinforcing this line of reasoning, in a 1981 case
concerning a city ordinance limiting contributions to ballot measure committees to
$250, the Court in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, struck down that
limit citing the argument that absent a candidate to be influenced, such a limitation
was antithetical to protected political speech. Thus the Supreme Court has held that
since the fate of a ballot initiative ultimately lies in the hands of the public rather than
elected officials, there is no one to be "corrupted" by large contributions to ballot
measure committees.

84

Theory and Literature Review
No Place for Amateurs
Another key feature of the consultant-managed campaign is an emphasis on
command and control of every aspect of the endeavor (Sussman, 2005). From the
construction and dissemination of the messaging, the submissions and language in the
voter's pamphlet, to the symbols, images, and the carefully selected high profile
messengers representing the campaign, the contemporary initiative consultant works
from an extensively poll-tested, and focus-grouped set of arguments and images. It
may be relevant to mention here that Oregon is an entirely vote-by-mail state.
Registered voters receive a voter's pamphlet approximately one month prior to
election day, and the secretary of state mails one out to every household in the state.
Because of this, it has become a top priority of political campaigns to place what they
view as the most effective communication with voters as they can. Still, one
prominent direct mail consultant insisted that running a campaign was as much an art
as it was a science; and that experience and good judgment were vital components to
success (Weiner, personal communication, 2008). Regardless, not once during my
interviews with campaign operatives did any of them suggest relinquishing control of
the campaign to untested amateurs who might question the strategies and tactics
emanating from the top. It was clear that political operatives had explicit control of all
aspects of the campaign, and that any volunteers were foot soldiers tasked with
implementing the tactics and strategies crafted by the consultants.
Describing the nexus between capital-intensive campaigns and qualitative
effect on democracy, Putnam observes, "Financial capital — the wherewithal for mass
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marketing — has steadily replaced social capital — that is, grassroots citizen networks
— as the coin of the realm (Putnam, 2000, p. 40). Verba et. al (2006) observe that
professionalization in politics has been a primary factor in redefining the role of the
citizen/activist as someone who writes letters and checks. And Putnam concludes "the
rise of ballot initiatives is a better measure of the power of well-financed special
interests than of civic engagement" (Putnam, 2000, p. 164).
In the following chapter I trace the historical origins and the democratic
aspirations of the movement resulting in of the system of direct legislation. I then
describe and analyze the contemporary capital-intensive initiative campaign system
with specific examples of campaign strategies and tactics utilized by political
consultants and supported by moneyed organized interests funding their efforts. My
goal is to help demystify the initiative campaign by pulling back the curtain on the
activities of the political consultants in these ostensibly citizen-run grassroots
undertakings.
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Chapter Three: The Democratic Promise of Direct Legislation
The use of direct legislation in Oregon and 23 other states are based on
presumptions of democracy and a check on powerful economic interests. Since its
inception, advocates of the initiative process have steadfastly viewed it as a method to
reduce or prevent political corruption, enhance participatory democracy, and a means
to advance the concerns of citizens lacking the economic and political wherewithal to
compete with the well-connected elite (Goebel, 2002; Ellis, 2002; Broder, 2000;
Cronin, 1989; Schmidt, 1989). Although populist and progressive advocates of direct
legislation focused on corruption, democratic participation, and economic justice,
historical accounts of the movement's radical economic origins are often neglected
(Goebel, 2002). As the rhetorical strategy of I&R advocates in the early twentieth
century shifted from a critique of corporate capitalism to a focus on political
corruption and unresponsive legislatures, this concentration is understandable.
Nevertheless, it is evident from a review of the scholarly literature and primary source
material concerning Oregon's adoption of I&R that economic radicalism was the
prevailing orientation in the earliest years of the direct legislation movement (Goebel,
2002; Ellis, 2002; Culbertson, 1941; Kazin, 1995).
According to the Pulitzer Prize winning author and muckraking journalist
Burton J. Hendrick, the town of Milwaukie, Oregon had been a key location of the
intellectual and political origins of the initiative and referendum movement in the
United States. Hendrick explains that an ex-Unitarian clergyman, and representative
of the Farmer's Alliance,13 Reverend M.V. Rork, lectured rural Oregonians on the
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evils of Wall Street, corrupt political parties, and the exploitation of capitalism. Rork
was one of many populist agitators who would gather at the home of wealthy
Milwaukie, Oregon nurseryman Seth Lewelling. The Lewelling family farm served as
a kind of intellectual salon for populists, spiritualists, and so-called "advanced
thinkers" of the time. The "advanced thinker" was described by Hendrick as
usually a man who declaimed vigorously against the exhortations of the
railroads, who considered that both political parties existed only to serve the
interests of corporate wealth, who believed in the free coinage of silver at the
ratio of sixteen to one, and in the single tax (Hendrick, 1911, p. 236).

Convening at the Lewelling farm at various times during the 1890s were members of
organizations that would ultimately make up the Populist Party including farmer's
alliances, grangers, labor unions, greenbackers,14 and socialists.
Referendum U'Ren
A key participant in these assemblages was William Simon U'Ren. Known
variously as "Referendum U'Ren" or "the Law Giver" for his zealous advocacy of
direct legislation in Oregon and nationally, William U'Ren has maintained his status
as one of the most influential figures in the direct democracy movement in the U.S.
(Schmidt, 1989). U'Ren was born on January 10 , 1859 in Lancaster, Wisconsin and
was educated in public schools in Colorado. U'Ren's father was a blacksmith
originally from Cornwall, England and a member of the Socialist Party in the United
States. U'Ren earned a law degree at the age of 26 in Colorado, and had lived in
Iowa, Hawaii, and California before coming to Oregon for reasons of physical health.
U'Ren had worked as a blacksmith, miner, newspaper editor, bookkeeper, and a
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lawyer (Hendrick, 1911, p. 236). A strong proponent of the single tax after reading
James W. Sullivan's 1891 book, Direct Legislation in Switzerland, U'Ren, exclaimed:
"The one important thing was to restore the law-making power where it belonged —
into the hands of the people. Once give us that, [sic] we could get anything we wanted
— single tax, anything" (Ellis, 2002, p. 29). U'Ren would ultimately become secretary
of the Oregon Direct Legislation League and would be elected chairman of the state's
Populist Party in 1894. In 1896 U'Ren earned a seat in Oregon's House of
Representatives where he advocated for adoption of I&R. Although he was defeated
in his run for state senate in 1898, his advocacy for I&R was successful as the state
adopted it after the 1901 legislature referred it to the voters for ultimate approval.
U'Ren would stay very active in the direct legislation movement and Oregon politics,
helping to secure passage of initiatives, including popular election of U.S. senators, as
well as a prohibition on free railroad passes to politicians. William U'Ren died in
Portland, Oregon in 1949 at the age of 90 (Schmidt, 1989; Culbertson, 1941; Goebel,
2002).
Nineteenth-Century Capitalism and Anti-Monopolism
Economic dislocation from the rapid industrialization of the late nineteenth
century was exacerbated by the panic of 1893. From the perspective of the populist
activists gathered at Lewelling's Milwaukie farm, the damage done to Oregon
(including the Lewelling's orchard business) had been caused by Wall Street,
corporate capitalism, and the railroad trust. U'Ren, the Lewelling's, and others active
in the Oregon group believed that it was imperative to restructure state government, as
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the same factors responsible for the national panic were to blame for Oregon's
economic hardships. From the perspective of these I&R advocates, reform of what
they viewed as "the oppression of capital" was a necessary if not sufficient condition
of progress (Hendrick, 1911, p. 241).
Advocates for direct legislation viewed its successful implementation as the
key to addressing economic and political inequality so rampant in the late nineteenth
century. James W. Sullivan, nineteenth-century union leader and author of an
important early book on direct democracy, expressed his hope that the initiative and
referendum would empower the wage-working majority and destroy "the American
plutocracy" (Ellis, 2002, p. 28). Sullivan viewed direct legislation as a means by
which the working class could fight the oppressive conditions of the capitalist system
that granted privilege to the economic and political elite (Henry, 1995, pp. 57, 58).
The Populist governor of Washington from 1897 to 1901, J. R. (John Rankin) Rogers,
proclaimed "I am in favor of direct legislation. The people are helpless against the
bribery which is resorted to by the great corporations and interests which fear the
people and deal with their corrupt officials" (Broder, 2000, p. 33). Nathan Cree,
author of Direct Legislation by the People (1892) argued that I&R would "break the
crushing and stifling power of our great party machines, and give freer play to the
political ideas, aspirations, opinions and feelings of the people" (Cronin, 1989, pp. 47,
48).
Thomas Goebel, in his masterful historical analysis of direct democracy from
1890 to 1940, argues that conventional treatments of populist and progressive era
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reforms erroneously interpret the changes as attempts by upper and middle class elites
to wrest power from immigrants and their political allies. In what he labels an
economic interpretation of the origins of direct legislation, Goebel suggests that a
thorough analysis of the reformer's rhetoric demonstrates a powerful economic
element as the driving force behind the electoral reforms:
By enabling the people to remove the power wielded by special interests, and
by preventing legislatures from handing out special privileges, the people
would be empowered to abolish monopolies and trusts. The vision that
inspired many direct democracy reformers was a distinctly economic one, that
of a republic of small independent producers freely competing in an unfettered
marketplace (Goebel, 2002, p. 5).
For Goebel, rapid industrialization in the U.S. during the nineteenth century
engendered a pervasive fear of the impacts of modernization and commercialization
fostering an open hostility to corporations and monopolies. This analysis leads Goebel
to conclude that the most trenchant critique of corporate capitalism at the time
emerged from the antimonopolism that fueled the populist movement of the 1890s. In
what he labels "populist republicanism," Goebel argues that at the heart of the populist
movement and critical to support for direct legislation was the belief that by
"manipulating and exploiting the power of the state, private interests acquired their
wealth and their monopolistic position" (Goebel, 2002, p. 12).
Goebel chronicles the transfer of public power to private interests that took
place during this period of rapid industrialization. Railroads were given enormous
land grants, the power of eminent domain, and proceeded to charge the public very
high rates for travel. Inflated price levels resulted from private banks controlling the
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money supply and placing pressure on creditors. Corporations undermined their
competition through discriminatory practices as consumers were subject to inflated
prices. A central premise of the populist doctrine was that the American farmer's
economic travails had been caused by laws instigated by pressures to concentrate
wealth and power in the hands of corporations and trusts. Consequently, populist
efforts focused on legal and regulatory reform of corporations. To quote from one
Kansas populist paper from 1895 "corporate influence sits serene in the legislative
halls of state and nation," with the initiative and referendum, "corporations and
monopolies will soon become things of the past" (Goebel, 2002, pp. 13, 21, 22, 34).
Ellis explains that early supporters of I&R were primarily on the left of the
political spectrum. The Knights of Labor15 were active supporters of direct
legislation, as were individuals such as socialist labor leader Eugene Debs and the
Utopian novelist Edward Bellamy (Ellis, 2002, pp. 26, 30). In short, for farmers,
organized labor, and a host of economic populists, the promise of direct legislation
was mitigation of the power of corporations and their legislative enablers.
Thomas Cronin notes that the Populist Party sprung primarily from members
of the Farmer's Alliance, the Grange, socialist movements, and single tax groups that
became prominent from the 1870s to the late 1890s. The first Populist Party political
convention was held in Omaha, Nebraska in 1892. During that convention, a
successful resolution stated that "we commend to the favorable consideration of the
people and the reform press the legislative system known as the initiative and
referendum" (Cronin, 1989, p. 45). Evidence of the corporate critique of the populist
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movement exists in several of the policy prescriptions they put forth. The Populist
Party platform included an end to the violent strike-breaking practices of the era, strict
regulation of the railroads, the rights of labor to negotiate with management, shorter
workdays, a graduated income tax, free coinage of silver, and an increase in the money
supply to facilitate the redistribution of wealth (Haskell, 2001, p. 29; Cronin, 1989, p.
45).
Socialists and the I&R
The capitalist critique was front and center for the Socialist Labor Party which
in 1885 became the first political party in the United States to call for I&R at its fifth
national convention in Cincinnati, Ohio. The call for adoption of I&R was the fourth
demand of the Socialist Labor Party Platform of 1885, which also included the direct
vote and the secret ballot. Other small radical parties calling for direct legislation in
the early years included the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Party in the
years that followed (Henry, 1995, p. 55). In New Jersey in 1894, the Socialist Labor
Party put I&R first in its platform of political reforms, with its candidate promising
that "when once the workers unite, knowing they have nothing to lose but their chains,
speedy and radical reforms will soon result" (Henry, pp. 59, 60). In 1896, Charles
Walter Browne believed that I&R would bring a "leveling of the conditions of
mankind, end monopolies and corporations and abolish landlordism" (Browne, 1896,
pp. 554, 555).
However, among members of the Socialist Party there was disagreement as to
whether or not the initiative and referendum would materially effect the economic
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configuration at the heart of the Socialist Party's critique of capitalism. Algie Simon,
of the International Socialist Review, dismissed direct legislation as "good sucker
bait," charged that the direct legislationists were inadvertently "doing the cause of
concentrated wealth a most valuable service" and said that I&R would "postpone
anything deeply effective for several hundred years". Socialist J.D. Stevens insisted
on the need to put I&R within the broader context of the socialist platform, and he
argued that without woman suffrage and public ownership of public utilities, I&R
would be too weak to change politics (Henry, 1995, pp. 65, 166).
A Confluence of Interests
Even some of the more radical elements amongst the populists believed that
supporters of I&R were naive in their belief about its efficacy. The self-identified
anarchist publication, the Portland Firebrand, proclaimed "You may theorize at will
about this way or that way of social reform, but the fact remains that where there is
legal ownership there is exploitation where there is exploitation there is government,
and where there is government there is rich and poor, oppressors and oppressed."
After the turn of the century, when many advocates for I&R used more conservative
arguments in seeking conversion of a broader audience to direct legislation, several
members of the Socialist Party became disenchanted with the direct legislation
movement (as cited in Henry, 1995, pp. 147, 65).
Although populist farmers were among the most visible group advocating
adoption of I&R, constituent groups in support of direct legislation during its
formative years represented a myriad of interests. Two of the most prominent groups
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included advocates of a single tax and organized labor. The single tax movement
developed from the belief that a monopoly on land existed that fostered inequality, and
that a tax based solely on land values would be a powerful remedy to the increasing
rate of poverty. Supporters of the single tax included a wealthy British manufacturer
named Joseph Fels. Fels created the Fels Fund, which provided $25,000 annually for
a period of five years in support of the single tax. The fund would also contribute to
campaigns in support of direct legislation in several states as well. Single taxers
viewed direct legislation as a means to bypass the legislature, and along with
organized labor and so-called good government progressive reformers, formed one of
the most important interest groups advocating for I&R (Goebel, 2002, p. 76; Ellis,
2002, p. 185).
Organized labor, and especially the American Federation of Labor (AFL), was
another important group in support of direct legislation. Support of I&R was part of
the AFL platform for almost three decades, but more important were the campaign
efforts by labor on behalf of direct democracy. In fact, the support of labor was
considered determinative in I&R's success in several states including Arizona,
Montana, Massachusetts, Washington, Maine and Ohio. Other interests supporting
direct democracy included prohibitionists, farm groups, and a panoply of smaller
interest groups (Goebel, 2002, pp. 76, 77).
The Strategic Shift of I&R Advocates
Still, many of its advocates viewed the association with economic populism as
limiting the potential appeal of I&R nationally and advocacy shifted to a more broad95
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based approach. As documented by Ellis, Oregon's experience was illustrative of
changes in the movement nationally. In 1897, the Non-Partisan Direct Legislation
League replaced the Joint Committee on Direct Legislation, and the league's executive
committee was reconstituted to include the president of the state bar association,
bankers, and business leaders. Along with Senator Jonathan Bourne, the refashioned
League included Abbot Low Mills, vice-president of the Security Savings & Trust
Company of Portland, Donald MacKay of the Pacific Lumber Company, and
Benjamin Selling, a prominent Portland merchant, all of them members of the
powerful Portland elite whose fortunes were tied to corporate development in the state
(Henry, 1995, p. 162).
Not only did the membership of the League reflect a shift to a group of more
mainstream establishment figures, but the rhetoric of the League went from explicit
economic radicalism to direct legislation as a means to check overzealous legislators
(Ellis, 2002, p. 31). The shift over time is recognizable in the rhetoric of James W.
Sullivan of the New York typographers' Union who had first encountered direct
legislation through members of the Socialist Labor Party. Sullivan's experience is
emblematic of the strategic shift in advocacy by supporters of I&R. As mentioned
earlier, in Sullivan's 1891 book, Direct Legislation in Switzerland, he argued that
direct legislation was a means by which the working class could fight against the
capitalist system. Sullivan envisioned a future in which I&R would lead to
progressive taxation, shorter worker days, higher wages, and a strengthened union
movement in the U.S.. Sullivan claimed that direct democracy would favor workers
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since they constituted a numerical majority, and that it would lead to a new brand of
politics empowering unions and leading to a new political party. However, in the
years following publication of Sullivan's book, his speeches advocating l&R focused
not on a strictly capitalist critique, rather it concerned privilege, with direct legislation
as a means to reform government. (Henry, 1995, pp. 57, 58).
Overall, the tension between advocates who viewed direct legislation as a
means to counter corporate power, monopolies, and business elites, versus those
holding up I&R as a necessary check on the legislature and something to be used
cautiously and sparingly, was present at its inception, and to some degree, that debate
continues. Nevertheless, regardless of the specific policy prescriptions put forth by
different elements of the movement or the strategic approaches favored to foster
change, a common theme had been the reduction of the corrosive effects of organized
power in the American political economy.
Populism in Decline
Many scholars of the era associate populism's decline with the presidential
election of 1896 in which the Democratic Party's nominee, William Jennings Bryan,
was defeated by Republican William McKinley. The free coinage of silver had been
an important element of the Populist's platform, and Bryan famously criticized the
gold standard in his "cross of gold" speech at the 1896 Democratic Convention. In
1896 Bryan had adopted much of the Populist's platform, and he had received the
party's endorsement for the election. As Bryan became the de facto spokesman for the
Populist Party, its members were essentially merged into the Democratic Party.
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Although the Populists ran their own presidential candidates in the 1900, 1904, and
1908 elections, much of the party had migrated to support the Democratic nominees.
The Populist Party in effect ceased to exist after 1908 (Kazin, 1995; Baldassare &
Katz, 2008, p. 7).
Clearly illustrating that I&R movement carried on after the populist's demise,
Sarah Henry lists the multitude of organizations created by advocates of I&R
following Bryan's defeat and the virtual dissolution of the Populist Party. They
included the National Referendum League, Non-Partisan Federation for Securing
Majority Rule, People's Sovereignty League of America, National Referendum Union,
National Federation for People's Rule, National Initiative and Referendum
Committee, and the Initiative and Referendum League of America (Henry, 1995, p.
63).
Nathan Cree and other early advocates also insisted that the process of direct
legislation would serve an educative function as citizens would engage with the
important policy issues of the day. Prominent advocate Sullivan voiced this belief in
his 1893 tract, Direct Legislation by the Citizenship through the Initiative and
Referendum, arguing that "the sphere of every citizen would be enlarged; each would
consequently acquire education in his [sic] role, and develop a lively interest in the
public affairs in part under his own management" (Cronin, 1989, p.48). Tolbert and
Smith focus squarely on the pedagogical functions of the initiative system and quote
Paul Rensch, a University of Wisconsin-Madison professor in 1912 (at the height of
the Progressive Era), who claimed that direct legislation "will assist the people, the
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body of the electorate, in the development of its political consciousness," because "it
will make the body of the electorate more familiar with legislative programs and more
interested" (Tolbert & Smith, 2004, p. xvi).
The Early Years of Direct Legislation
Early populist and progressive-inspired direct legislation victories in Oregon
confirmed the hopes of initiative proponents seeking an enhanced, more progressive
democracy. U'Ren himself co-sponsored a successful 1906 initiative banning the free
railroad passes that were often used to curry favor with politicians, in addition to
proposing the successful 1908 measure making Oregon the first state to have popular
election of U.S. senators. In 1910, Oregon voters passed an initiative establishing the
first presidential primary election system in the nation, and in 1912, (after it had been
rejected five times) led by the efforts of suffragist Abigail Scott Duniway, Oregon
became one of only two states where women gained the right to vote by initiative.
Also, on that same 1912 ballot, Oregonians passed a labor union initiative establishing
an eight-hour day for workers on public works projects, along with two others
prohibiting private employers from hiring convicts from state or local jails (Schmidt,
1989).
Still, despite its populist and progressive origins animated by antimonopoly
efforts, governmental reform, and the empowerment of the average citizen, the
historical record of the system of direct legislation demonstrates several of the
vulnerabilities and criticisms that plague its existence today. The 1912 Oregonian
railed against the Fels Fund Commission, which had been set up by Joseph Fels to
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support measures concerning the single tax. Similar to contemporary criticism of
Oregon's initiative system, the editorial argued that:
There is in Oregon a coterie of paid employees of an eastern organization. The
object and purpose of that organization is to impose somewhere in the United
States untried experiments in government and untested theories in economics.
Oregon with its wide open initiative is a fertile field for its (the Fels Fund
Commission) operations. Therefore, it has dumped its wealth into Oregon. It
has provided its employees with a war chest, collected in this and foreign
countries, with which to pay for literature, speakers, and petition shovers. It
has compelled property owners of Oregon to contribute to a fund to defend
against invasion of their property rights (Barnett, 1915, pp. 89, 90).
Eleven days later, the same publication made clear that initiatives funded by out-ofstate interests were not welcome in Oregon:
Efforts in [sic] behalf of economic theories or principles when directed from
without should cease at a certain point and that point should be when a
measure or the representative of a political policy is before the people and
there through the effort of Oregon citizens (Barnett, 1915, p. 90).

In 1922, the California State Senate launched an investigation of the system of
direct legislation spurred on by the expenditures and campaign activities of those
involved in the defeat of a Water and Power Act initiative in that same calendar year.
The committee found that vast sums of money had been spent on the 13 initiatives and
referenda that had been on the ballot that year. The committee concluded:
The power of money in influencing public opinion, its ability to carry popular
elections through vast expenditures for propaganda, literature, advertising and
organized campaign workers was made strikingly manifest in the
investigations of your committee (Goebel, 2002, p. 144).
The practice of paid signature gathering was also of concern in the early years
of I&R. In 1912, Los Angeles journalist Charles Willard wrote of the misuse of the
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process that occurred as paid petition gatherers had misrepresented the contents of the
initiative in order to collect names and earn money. In June 1914, the California
Outlook reported on the "commercialization of the circulation of signatures" and
advocated for the need to protect the process (Goebel, 2002, p. 145). As documented
by Ellis, despite the "mythic narrative" of a golden age of the initiative where only
volunteers and civic-minded individuals collected signatures to qualify petitions for
the ballot, paid signature-gathering has been a part of the initiative process since its
inception. A somewhat ironic set of examples comes from Oregon where "paid
petitioners were used to qualify all of the state's famous good government measures,
including the direct primary law of 1904, the Corrupt Practices Act of 1908, and the
presidential primary bill of 1912." From that same 1912 election, an Oregon circuit
court judge ruled that during the qualifying stage for a measure concerning university
appropriations, that 25 different petition circulators had written fictitious names and
forged the identities of voters to qualify the measure (Barnett, 1915, p. 66). Concerns
about the commodification of signature-gathering led to proposed bans on paid
petitioners in several states, including Oregon in 1909. In its discussion of paid
signature-gathering, the Oregonian editorialized about the advantage and power of
moneyed organized interests saying "The corporation, the 'vested interest' or 'big
business,' when it takes a hand in law-making, dips into a well-filled cash box and
never misses the money"(Ellis, 2002, pp. 48, 185).
Another recurring issue concerns the disclosure of ballot measure financing.
As previously noted, in the early years of the initiative process there was no financial
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disclosure requirement nor was there a requirement to identify the chief petitioner.
The Eugene Register opined during the early years of the initiative that it "gives the
interests that can command money a practical monopoly on the business of petition
making" (Barnett, 1915, p. 61). Examples of measures where direct legislation
backers were unknown by the voters from Oregon's early years of I&R include the
"open-town" initiative of 1908 to give cities control of liquor sales, referenda for
statewide public utilities regulation, and one regarding university appropriations in
1912, as well as the authors of four of the five referenda on the 1913 ballot were
unidentified. In addition, similar to the modern era of I&R, advocates and financiers
of initiatives often adopt misleading names. In Oregon's 1906 election, the owners of
the Barlow road initiated a measure for the state's purchase of the road appeared as "a
committee of farmers," and a private club sponsoring an amendment to require a
majority of votes cast for the enactment of initiatives appeared as "The majority Home
rule league" (Barnett, 1915, pp. 13, 14). And it was not until 1913 that Oregon
required the secretary of state to keep a record of parties filing petitions.
Political scientist V.O. Key, after studying the effects of direct legislation in
California, concluded that "initiated propositions involve disputes between conflicting
groups of the possessed." And between 1922, the year in which California began to
require expenditure reports, and 1934, almost $3 million had been spent on campaign
advertising for popular initiatives. Finally, commenting on the creation and activities
of Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter of Campaigns, Inc., Key concludes: "The
establishment of such a concern, operating successfully on a commercial basis, is
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extremely significant as an indication of the trend away from personal politics of the
precinct variety and toward the use of modern propaganda technique "(Key, 1936, pp.,
719, 722). Reinforcing Key's concerns political scientist Max Radin wrote about the
money spent on initiative campaigns observing that "propaganda has become a
business, involving considerable investments and an elaborate technique" (Goebel,
2002, p. 155).
In fact, Goebel makes the case that the prominence of political operatives in
contemporary campaigns can in part be traced back to the early work of Whitaker and
Baxter of Campaigns Inc. Focusing his analysis on the burgeoning direct democracy
movement in California during the period from 1920 to 1940, Goebel traces the
increasing costs of election campaigns, the expanding role of public relations and
advertising practitioners, and the use of public opinion polls. Although these
campaign conditions and practices were not unprecedented, their increased use
illustrates the sea change that was taking place in campaign politics as the role of
political parties in campaigns shifted toward a more concentrated fundraising role.
In the 1922 campaign concerning the California Water and Power Act, an
investigative committee of the California State Senate estimated that private utilities
spent upwards of $500,000 to defeat public ownership; an unprecedented use of
financial power for an initiative campaign. In a subsequent referendum campaign, a
coalition of chain stores in California spent $1,147 million, a vast amount of money
for the time, for public opinion polling, signature-gathering, and campaign advertising.
And in an early campaign that would presage the many battles in Oregon and other
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states pitting big business interests against labor, a 1938 California initiative that
would outlaw sit-down strikes, secondary boycotts, and most forms of picketing was
placed on the ballot by corporate interests. The public relations strategy of forming
third-party groups with euphemistic or ambiguous names to conceal the corporate
interests financing the initiative fostered the creation of the Southern Californians,
Inc., the California Committee for Peace in Employment Relations, the Associated
Farmers, and the Neutral Thousands. Campaign efforts by business advocates of the
initiative included 30 minute radio broadcasts in Southern California attacking union
organizing. Richard Prosser, one of the business leaders in charge of the campaign,
said of the radio broadcasts produced by the Lockwood-Shackleford advertising
agency:
The agency which has developed that technique through long experimentation,
finds that the best vehicle for this type of political matter over the radio is a
weekly program of 30 minutes, of which about 25 minutes is first-rate
entertainment and the other 5 is artfully disguised and beautifully-sugarcoated
propaganda (Goebel, 2002, p. 175).

In response, several labor unions waged an opposition campaign spending hundreds of
thousands of dollars ultimately defeating the anti-labor measure by some 400,000
votes (Pichardo, 1995).
Direct election of U.S. senators, extending the franchise to women, limiting
labor hours, and banning free railroad passes for politicians clearly represent policy
aligned with the philosophical tenets of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
populism. Yet for some critics of the modern system of direct democracy, initiatives
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marketed as populist or grassroots prescriptions violate the principles and objectives of
the populist movement (see especially Schrag, 1998; Smith, 1999, Broder, 2000). To
better understand this debate; in the next chapter I discuss the contested concept of
populism.
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Chapter Four: Populism and Initiative Practices as Contested Terrain
Prior to any further discussion of the state of the contemporary initiative
process in Oregon, it is important to consider the significance of the disputed term
populism, as well to recognize the necessity of focusing on processes as well as
outcomes when analyzing issues concerning direct legislation. Direct legislation
scholar Daniel Smith explains that although the term is historically rooted in the
radical agrarian movement of the late nineteenth century associated with the Populist
Party, the concept itself is politically ambiguous. A notable example of Smith's
observation exists in the form of the 2000 presidential campaign, where conservative
Republican Pat Buchanan and Green Party nominee Ralph Nader both identified
themselves as "populist candidates" despite offering profoundly divergent political
programs (Sprengelmeyer, 2008). More recently in 2008, Republican primary
candidate Ron Paul, Ralph Nader again, and to some degree the ultimate nominees of
the Republican and Democratic Parties, (both sitting U.S. Senators) employed populist
rhetorical appeals and programs in their respective campaigns (Bumiller & Zeleny,
2008). And as Smith explains, this has been a consistent practice in American politics
with figures as distinct as George Wallace, William Jennings Bryan, Ronald Reagan,
and Jesse Jackson — all of whom appropriated the label "populist." In like manner,
many, if not most, initiative campaigns claim the mantle of populism as they seek to
take advantage of the historical origins and populist myth of the initiative and
referendum (see especially Smith, 1998, p. 43; & Haskell, 2001).

Populism
For presidential aspirants seeking the popular vote, it is clear that attempts to
align one's persona and platform with "the people" is a political necessity. Thus it is
hardly surprising that history is rife with presidential candidates from both major and
minor parties chasing the populist mantle and claiming to be the candidate of the
people. It is equally rational for a ballot measure advocate to endeavor to win the
populist designation for his or her proposal. However, this begs the question as to
what criteria should be used when measuring whether or not a ballot measure deserves
the label "populist." In fact, since I&R is supposed to emanate not from a political
party or established group already in power but from a citizenry unable to gain more
traditional support through representative channels, it is even more important for
"citizen-initiative" to appear to be aligned with popular opinion.
Assessments as to whether or not a particular initiative is a populist idea may
center on the substantive policy advocated, yet it is equally important to direct
attention to the means or procedures by which a particular proposal qualifies for the
ballot and comes to the attention of voters. Smith makes the most cogent argument
about the distinction between the substantive and procedural side of populism, as well
as demonstrating its utility for analyzing direct legislation in the United States. In his
research on "tax crusaders," Smith contends that while the substantive side of
populism (i.e. the policies advocated) remains indeterminate, the procedural side, that
of a bottom-up, grassroots political struggle, has consistently embodied the main
conception of populism. "Regardless of the political leanings of "the people" or their
leaders, the process of populism indicates a mass outcry of a "common people" aimed
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at established elite, their norms, and their practices." He continues, "It is the active
participation of the people and the direction of the protest — the process, not the
substantive political prescriptions they espouse — that makes populist movements so
attractive and powerful" (Smith, 1998, p. 45). Thus, fundamental to the procedural
component of a populist movement is its ascension from the citizenry.
Although Michael Kazin in his extensive study of populism in the United
States focuses on the rhetorical devices employed by populist movements, Smith
argues persuasively that more central to the concept is the upward trajectory of the
campaign (Kazin, 1995). In essence, a populist movement entails a citizen-generated
bottom-up process with a recognizable measure of active participation (not merely
passive support) by non-elites (Smith, 1998, pp. 47, 48). For this reason, examination
of the procedural side of populism becomes essential for analysis of an initiative
process ostensibly empowering popular citizen-based movements challenging the
status quo. And while the substantive policy prescriptions of direct legislation in
Oregon and nationally cannot be ignored, attention must be given to the procedural
means employed by their proponents and financiers. This, of course, would include an
analysis of initiative campaigns. And it is the "professionalization" of such "citizeninitiative" campaigns that constitutes the focus of this study.
Initiative Advocates
Staunch advocates of direct legislation argue that it is the embodiment of
democracy. Doug Phelps, the chairman of U.S. Public Interest Research Group
opined, "The I&R process is a wonderful tool for citizens. It embodies fundamental
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right of self-government that is at the very core of democracy" (Waters, 1998). For in
contrast to the system of direct legislation, elected officials are beholden to their
campaign contributors, interest groups, lobbyists, and their desire to retain office.
Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform, argues: "One big difference
between initiatives and elected representatives is that initiatives do not change their
minds once you voter for them" (Waters, 1998). While politicians must contend with
the aforementioned obstacles and temptations, for many, ballot measures represent the
true will of the people (Waters, 2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has essentially
reinforced this position via their rulings in the 1978 First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti and the 1981 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley cases. As
mentioned previously in this study, in both cases concerning campaign contribution
limits and I&R, the Court has held that since initiatives involve issues and not
candidates (who may be subject to bribery or vulnerable to pressure once in office)
financial contribution limits violate the first amendment's protection of political
speech as there is no real risk of corruption with an initiative. (Schier, 2000).
Proponents of the ballot initiative nationally, as well as those working in
Oregon, view direct legislation as illustrative of many of the attributes of strong
democracy as described by Benjamin Barber. Strong democracy consists of several
elements that differentiate it from what Barber defines as thin democracy. In strong
democracy, activity, involvement, and participation are key components. As Barber
explains, "politics is something done by, not to, citizens." A second hallmark is that
of publicness. Strong democracy creates "a public capable of reasonable public
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deliberation" with the focus on the creation of a civic community. This contrasts with
private individuals and interests seeking to maximize rewards irrespective of the
consequences to others. In strong democracy, public ends are contingent upon "a
community of citizens who regard themselves as comrades and who are endowed with
an enlarging empathy" (Barber, 1984, p. 133).
Reasonableness is another component of strong democracy. Barber describes
reasonableness as a choice or settlement that is deliberate, nonrandom, uncoercive,
and fair in a practical sense. A broad or civic perspective is a necessary condition of
reasonableness and is described as choices that consider public goals in addition to
private interests. Barber's view of participatory politics might best be summed up in
his observation that "Politics in the participatory mode.. .makes preferences and
opinions earn legitimacy by forcing them to run the gauntlet of public deliberation and
public judgment. They emerge not simply legitimized but transformed by the
processes to which they have been subjected" (Barber, 1984, p. 136).
Tolbert refers to the initiative process as one that provides a "built-in
mechanism for increasing citizen participation in politics and policy making."
Political consultant Angelo Paparella writes that the initiative and referendum process
"gives us the opportunity to actively participate in self-governance." Paul Jacob,
National Director of U.S. Term Limits claims, "The initiative process is arguably the
only avenue for citizens to reassert their control over government" (as cited in Waters,
2001, pp. 38, 106, 121). Proponents of the initiative process in the United States
inevitably point to its populist nature, its check on powerful special interests, and its
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efficacy for the citizenry, and its encouragement for a more participatory democracy.
In his more than 650 page Initiative and Referendum Almanac, M. Dane Waters,
president of the Initiative & Referendum Institute, asserts that "For a century, the
initiative and referendum process has been THE critical tool to check the power of
unresponsive and unaccountable government at the national, state and local level"
(Waters, 2003, p. xix. Emphasis in the original.). Lloyd Marbet, anti-nuclear activist
and chair of the Coalition for Initiative Rights since 1995, in response to critics of
Oregon's initiative process wrote: "I am a citizen of Oregon and I have extensively
used the initiative process. If citizens using the initiative process truly belong to the
elite we wouldn't need the initiative process, we would have the legislature doing our
bidding" (Initiative & Referendum Institute Web site, 2003).
Such views contribute to the debate surrounding the democratic promise of
direct legislation and its current condition, and highlights questions pertinent to this
study: Does the initiative process and especially initiative campaigns advance
participatory democracy? Does it strengthen civic engagement in the political
process? Do initiative campaigns enrich the public sphere? Do they elevate the role
of citizens in the democratic process? To what degree are citizen-initiatives and their
campaigns grassroots endeavors? Do campaign professionals merely fulfill a
functional role providing electioneering expertise to citizens seeking political change?
What roles do the strategies, tactics, and technologies employed in initiative
campaigns play in citizen participation, civic engagement, citizen education, and
strengthening democracy? These questions have no definitive answers. Nevertheless,
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they are essential questions to address in seeking a deeper understanding of the
expanding role of direct legislation in American politics. It is hoped that this study's
focus on the so-called professionalization of initiative campaigns in the contemporary
era in Oregon will provide a constructive contribution to the growing body of research
on initiatives, electioneering, and the roles and methods of professional political
operatives in the United States.
Bill Sizemore - Oregon's Top Initiative Industrialist
No discussion of the industrialization of direct democracy in Oregon in the
contemporary era would be complete without talking about the operation of Bill
Sizemore. Beginning in the early 1990s, and up through and including the 2008
election, Bill Sizemore has been the most prolific and well-known initiative chief
petitioner in the state, and he has been central to some of the most expensive and high
profile ballot measures in Oregon.
To supporters, Sizemore represents the interests of the average citizen fighting
against the corrupt special interest unions, and his initiatives seek to reign in wasteful
government spending. To detractors and political enemies, Sizemore is a corrupt,
faux-populist hatchet man for a few wealthy conservative donors and out-of-state
interests.
But to focus on the personality and motivations of Mr. Sizemore is to miss the
larger set of issues concerning Oregon's initiative industrial complex. The most
frequent attacks on Sizemore are that he has made a living from his initiative activities
and has acted illegally. While both claims are accurate, it is more instructive to
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examine his operation from a critical perspective by focusing more on the structural
elements of the enterprise as opposed to the man himself. For just as media accounts
of California's Proposition 13 in 1978 focused largely on the brash personality of
Howard Jarvis (with similar media treatments of Washington State's Tim Eyman and
Colorado's Douglas Bruce), the material effect is to shift the public's gaze away from
the interests financing the activities of these dynamic front men (Smith, 1998). Media
accounts of Bill Sizemore too often center on the man rather than the architecture that
supports him. A critical perspective necessarily focuses attention on Sizemore more
as a convenient front man for wealthy organized and elite interests as opposed to a
rogue actor despoiling an otherwise pristine initiative process.
Bill Sizemore's primary financiers include ideologically-driven wealthy
individuals and corporate and elite interest-funded organized interests. From 1994 to
2006 Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) and its affiliate the Americans for Tax
Reform Foundation (ATRF) contributed $697,000 to Sizemore's Oregon Taxpayer's
United (OTU) and for the signature gathering for his Measure 96 in Oregon's 2000
election (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76). Support for Measure 96 in 2000
demonstrates ATR's strong commitment to maintaining Oregon's initiative system as
it had been functioning prior to 2000. Measure 96 was a constitutional amendment
that would have prohibited the Oregon Legislature from referring to the voters any
constitutional or statutory changes that would increase the number of signatures,
require a geographical distribution requirement for signatures, or make any legal or
material changes increasing the difficulty or expense of using Oregon's initiative
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process. The measure failed with 527,613 voting in support, and 866,588 in
opposition (Oregon Secretary of State, 2000 & 2009).
ATR is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) lobbying organization based in Washington D.C.,
and ATRF is its 501(c)(3) affiliate. Grover Norquist is the president of ATR which
according to its web site is an organization that "opposes all tax increases as a matter
of principle." The organization was founded in 1985 by Norquist "at the request of
Ronald Reagan" and may be best known in political circles for the "taxpayer
protection pledge" that it distributes seeking signatures of all federal and state elected
officials, as well as for its work on the K Street Project (ATR Web site, 2009). The K
Street Project is a controversial effort by the Republican Party to pressure lobbying
firms to hire Republicans to top positions and to reward lobbyists with access to
influence officials. Grover Norquist is credited with launching the Project in 1995 in
concert with former House majority leader Tom Delay (Confessore, 2003).
The National Taxpayer's Union (NTU) is an organization with ties to ATR that
has provided approximately $63,000 to Sizemore's operations between 1994 and 2000
(Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76). As mentioned earlier in the present study,
NTU is a 501(c)(3) that supports a flat tax and elimination of the estate tax among
other tax-related causes. Grover Norquist was the executive director of NTU in the
early 1980s. Major flinders of NTU include the Olin, Scaife, and Bradley foundations
(see page 40) (Media Transparency, 2009).
Carl Lindner financed $75,000 of Sizemore's work from 1998 to 2000
(Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76). Lindner was chair and CEO of American
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Financial Group, a financial concern controlling over $20 billion in assets. Lindner
was also majority owner of the Cincinnati Reds major league baseball franchise, the
former board chair of Chiquita Brands International, and the 133rd richest American
according to the Forbes 400 of 2005. From 1999 to 2002, Lindner donated more
money to candidates, PACs, and ballot measures than any other American with $2.6
million in contributions. Lindner was also one of former president George W. Bush's
first "Rangers" responsible for raising at least $200,000 for his presidential campaign
(Common Cause, 2009).
Robert Randall, CEO of Randall Realty Corporation, contributed $272,500 to
Sizemore Measures 8, 59, and 62, as well as contributing to Sizemore's 1998
gubernatorial campaign (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76). Measure 8 from 1994
was a constitutional amendment that would have eliminated the 8 percent guaranteed
rate of return for individuals in Oregon's public employee retirement system.
Although successful at the ballot box, the measure was subsequently invalidated by
the Oregon Supreme Court. Ballot Measure 59 from 1998 would have prohibited the
use of public resources for political purposes. The goal of the measure was to prevent
unions from using their member's paycheck contributions for political campaigns.
Virtually the same measure was reprised by Sizemore in both the 2000 and 2008
election cycles. The measure has gone down to defeat in all 3 elections. Measure 62
in 1998, which Sizemore opposed, sought to regulate the payment of initiative
signature gathering, as well as to establish campaign finance limits in Oregon.
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Although successful in the election, the measure was thrown out by the Oregon
Supreme Court (Oregon Secretary of State, 2009).
Another long-time significant contributor to measures sponsored and/or
affiliated with Bill Sizemore's enterprise is Seneca Jones Timber and its founder and
CEO Aaron Jones. From 1994 to 2000 Seneca Jones contributed $150,500 to
Sizemore initiatives (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76). More recently, Jones
contributed $332,000 to the opposition campaign to Measure 49 (Hogan, 2007).
Measure 49 was the legislative referral that sought to fix the legal and financial
problems that had plagued the controversial property rights initiative, Measure 37.
Founder and CEO Jones also contributed $157,000 to the successful 2004 Measure 37
campaign (Bjornstad, 2007).
Richard Wendt, founder and CEO of Jeld-Wen Windows located in Klamath
Falls, Oregon has contributed $110,988 to Sizemore's measures including $40,000 for
his 1998 gubernatorial campaign (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76). Moreover,
as revealed in Sizemore's court documents from December of 2008, Wendt and
medical equipment manufacturer Loren Parks contributed over $1 million to a sham
charity to compensate Sizemore for his political work (Kost, 2008). Wendt also
contributed $47,000 to the 2004 property rights initiative Measure 37. And Wendt
contributed $354,000 to Sizemore-sponsored measures in the 2008 campaign (Defend
Oregon, 2009).
Another major Sizemore benefactor has been Columbia Helicopters' founder
and CEO, Wes Lematta. Lematta contributed $242,5000 to Sizemore measures and
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his gubernatorial run between 1994 and 2000 (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 76).
Lematta's contributions were also prominent in the Measure 37 campaign of 2004
where he gave $45,000. Lematta also contributed $163,000 to the opposition
campaign to the aforementioned Measure 49 in the 2007 special election (Thompson
& Wetherson, 2007).
Finally, by far the most significant contributor to Bill Sizemore's ballot
measure enterprise has been Loren Parks. From 1994 to 2006, Parks contributed
$1,882,435 to Sizemore's measures (Thompson & Buttermore, 2008, pp. 32, 33).
Below is a chart illustrating Parks' support for various measures involving Sizemore
and his allies. As described in their 58-page report on the political activities of Loren
Parks, Janice Thompson and Charles Buttermore estimate that through November of
2008, Parks will have contributed over $11.3 million to ballot measure campaigns in
Oregon. The same analysis estimates that over $34 million has been raised by PACs
opposing measures supported by Parks since 1992. Since 2000, Parks has also
contributed $704,900 to Americans for Tax Reform, and $342,980 to FreedomWorks
Foundation and its predecessor, Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation. Loren
Parks is the founder of Parks Medical Electronics, a medical device company located
in Aloha, Oregon (Thompson & Buttermore, 2008, pp. 1, 2, 6, 11).
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Table 2, Top 20 Donors to Sizemore for Governor/Oregon Taxpayers United, 1998
Total
ContribContributor
Supported
utions
OTU-PAC -(1994 and 2000 1994) - Yes on
5 and 8 (1996) - No on 32 (2000) - Yes on
91 and 8, Yes on 95 (2006) - Yes on 42,
Oregonians for Honest Elections - No on
56 Yes on 58, 59, 60, 64 (2008),
Loren Parks &
FreedomWorks Issues PAC - No on 56 &
$2,565,541 affiliated groups 57, Yes on 54, 55, 58,59, 60, 61, 62, 63, &
(see chart 49)
64 (2008), Taxpayer Defense Fund - No on
56 and 57, Yes on 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
63, and 64 (2008) Oregon Citizens for a
Sound Economy - No on 56 and 57, Yes on
54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, and 64 (2008)
Americans for
Tax
Reform/America OTU-PAC - (1994, 1996, 1998), signature
$697,000
ns for Tax
gathering on 96 (2000)
Reform
Foundation
Oregon Family
$296,437
Yes on 7 (2000)
Farm PAC
OTU-PAC -(1994 and 1998) - Yes on 8
Robert
(1994) - Yes on 59, no on 62 (1998)Randall/Randall
$272,500
Sizemore for governor (1998) - Oregon
Realty Corp.
Family Farm PAC-Yes on 7 (2000)
OTU-PAC - (1996 and 2000) - Yes on 8
(1994) - Yes on 59, no on 62 (1998)$242,500
Wes Lematta
Sizemore for governor (1998) - Oregon
Family Farm PAC-Yes on 7 (2000)
Seneca Jones
Timber
OTU-PAC - (2000) - Yes on 8 (1994) Co./Aaron
$150,500
Sizemore for governor (1998)
Jones/Seneca
Sawmill
OTU-PAC -(1996 and 2000) - Sizemore for
Jeldgovernor (1998) - Oregon Family Farm
$110,988
Wen/Richard
PAC-Yes on 7 (2000)
Wendt
Mark
OTU-PAC - (1996) - Yes on 8 (1994) - Yes
Hemstreet,/Hem
$100,600
on 59, no on 62 (1998)
street Property
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Development

$88,190

$75,000
$64,219

$63,000

Oregon
Taxpayers
United
Education
Foundation
Carl Lindner
Oregonians in
Action/Oregonia
ns in Action
PAC
National
Taxpayers
Union

$61,869

Bill Sizemore

$57,850

I & R Petition
Services

OTU-PAC - (1996 and 2000) - Yes on 7
(2000), Oregonians for Honest Elections No on 56 Yes on 58, 59, 60, 64 (2008),
English for the Children - Yes on 58
(2008)
OTU-PAC - (1998 and 2000)
OTU-PAC - (2000) - Oregon Family Farm
PAC, Yes on 7 (2000)

OTU-PAC - (1994 and 2000)
OTU-PAC - (1996), Sizemore for governor
- (1998, signature gathering on 42 - 2006)
OTU-PAC - signature gathering on 7, 93,
95, 96, and 98 (2000)

Source: Thompson & Wetherson, 2008

Bill Sizemore has been active in Oregon initiative politics since 1994.
Between 1994 and 2008, Sizemore was the chief petitioner for 18 ballot measures. Of
the 18 Sizemore measures, four were successful and 14 were defeated by Oregon
voters. Of the four that passed, two were subsequently overturned as unconstitutional
and one, Measure 47 in 1996, required a legislative fix. Although Sizemore has been
unsuccessful in the majority of ballot measures where he has been the chief sponsor,
opponents have spent over $26 million in an effort to defeat these measures
(Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 1) The overwhelming majority of the $26 million
in opposition spending has come from public employee unions. It is the contention of
unions, and has been the subject of at least one editorial board comment by the state's
leading newspaper the Oregonian, that a primary goal of Sizemore's operation is to
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deplete unions' financial resources by forcing them to expend time and energy fighting
these measures {Oregonian editorial board, 2008, October 10th). Among other
arguments, unions point to Sizemore's support from Americans for Tax Reform,
Grover Norquist's national organization, and Norquist's stated goal to "cut government
in half in twenty-five years to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the
bathtub" as further evidence of Sizemore's intention to attack government and public
employees with impunity (Dreyfuss, 2001).
Equally significant, in September 2002, a Portland jury found Sizemore and his
umbrella organization Oregon Taxpayers United (OTU) guilty of fraud, forgery, and
falsification of records for its initiative-related activities during the 1990s. Under
Oregon's state racketeering law, Sizemore's initiative organizations were levied
punitive damages totaling $2.5 million payable to union plaintiffs filing suit (Hogan,
2002, Al). Especially relevant to the current study, the jury found that Bill Sizemore's
enterprise had engaged in a pattern of racketeering which included forged signatures
to qualify ballot Measures 98 and 92 for the 2000 general election ballot. Specifically,
the plaintiffs argued that employees of Sizemore's operation had forged signatures on
statements of sponsorship for Measures 98 and 92 thus facilitating their approval by
the secretary of state for circulation to qualify for the ballot. This in turn forced the
plaintiffs, the Oregon Education Association, to expend substantial funds to oppose
those measures (Thompson & Weatherson, 2008, p. 50). The jury awarded the
plaintiff OEA damages of $736,770 and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
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$210,500 on two of the counts plus a subsequent judgment awarding damages to OEA
of $2,014,974 and AFT $510,000 (Thompson & Weatherson, 2008, p. 54).
In addition to exposing the illegal activities of Oregon's top initiative creator
the legal battle between union plaintiffs and Sizemore's operation highlighted the
degree of industrialization extant in Oregon's contemporary initiative process. In
brief, Sizemore's initiative operation consisted of Oregon Taxpayers United, an
Oregon non-profit corporation, I&R Petitions, Inc., a signature-gathering firm, and
Oregon Taxpayers United Education Foundation, a nonprofit corporation (Oregon
Department of Justice, 2003). Oregon Taxpayers United also worked in concert with
numerous political action committees (PACs) with names reflecting the various
initiatives the organization sponsored. The OTU corporation did everything from
crafting petition language and signature-gathering, to fundraising and campaigning.
According to court documents money flowing to Sizemore's operation was hidden by
several sham corporations and charities. The labyrinth of corporations, charities and
foundations created in a shell game to hide money going to Sizemore and his
"operations" were so byzantine, that in a 46 page opinion, the circuit court judge
included the following quotation from Sir Walter Scott, "Oh what a tangled web we
weave, when we first practice to deceive" (OEA vs. OTU, 2008). Still, at the time of
this writing, Sizemore had filed 46 initiatives for the 2010 Oregon election.
Professionalization
Beyond the populist rhetoric of direct legislation's most fervent supporters,
political campaign consultants are often as central to the creation and campaigning of
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ballot initiatives as they are to representative democracy (Gerber, 1999; McCuan,
2001). Direct legislation scholar David McCuan concludes that "Most ballot measures
today are characterized by the frequent use of signature-gathering crews, pollsters, and
media consultants over the course of a campaign" (McCuan & Stambough, Eds., 2005,
p. 52). Citrin explains that "Full-service consulting firms now draft and circulate
petitions, collect signatures, raise funds through direct mail, prepare campaign
advertising, conduct polls, and get out the vote" (Citrin, 1996, p. 282). Magleby and
Patterson note that in many ballot measure campaigns political consultants "exercise a
tremendous amount of control.. .they define the message, construct the ballot wording,
and in some cases suggest issues to be placed on the ballot" (as cited in Johnson, 2001,
p. 207). One indicator of the breadth and depth of the initiative campaign consulting
industry is the annual political pages edition of the trade journal of political
consultants, Campaigns & Elections. The edition of March 2002-February 2003 lists
60 consulting firms specializing in I&R campaigns (pp. 56, 57). In the 2008 online
edition of the Campaigns & Elections Political Pages, 26 firms were listed as
initiative and referendum consultants, while 24 firms were listed under a separate
category: "public grassroots affairs - ballot issue campaigns" (Politics, 2008).
Additionally, dozens of firms working on initiative campaigns were also listed under
such categories as: campaign management, database/file management, direct mail,
petitions and signature gathering, and targeting, among others. More than likely, the
actual number of consultants working on direct legislation campaigns is substantially
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higher since most political consulting enterprises offer services to both candidate and
initiative campaigns.
A key issue raised in the scholarly literature concerning political consultants
and direct legislation is that of the significance of so-called professionalization of the
system. Donovan, Bowler, and McCuan ask if political consultants "are corrosive to
the process of democratic politics" (Sabato, Ernst, & Larson, Eds., 2001, p. 101).
Magleby and Patterson (as cited in Thurber & Nelson, 2002) argue for the
consideration of distinctions (if any) between representative democracy and the
initiative process when manipulation of public opinion by special interests appears to
be the norm in both arenas. And Smith inquires "if ballot measures, as proponents of
the process like to extol, ostensibly empower 'the people' to govern themselves
directly, how participatory, grassroots, and democratic is the initiative process?"
(Smith, 1998, p. 9).
In contrast (as discussed in chapter two of the present study), I argue that
current theory concerning direct democracy and political consultants that regards the
increasing use of political operatives as the mere "professionalization" of I&R
campaigns serves to naturalize what has been more accurately labeled an initiativeindustrial complex. Firmly ensconced in the market-centered logic of neoliberalism,
political consultants in direct legislation campaigns are more accurately identified as
brokers and retailers within a system that has been largely captured by powerful
organized interests. Scholarship placing political consultants as the central focus
shifts the gaze from wealthy organized interests and a larger political economy that
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privileges the penetration of private exchange relations and the commodification of the
public sphere. Still, central to electoral management is strategic utilization of the most
advanced information technologies that are available to organized interests able to
expend the necessary resources. In the section that follows, I discuss examples of the
use of sophisticated political marketing strategies, tactics, and technologies from
Oregon's 2008 general election campaign.
Structure of Professionalization
For the contemporary initiative campaign operative, advances in information
communication technology permit an exceptionally powerful means by which to
surveill voters and collect useful data. An example of this was evident in the majority
of opposition campaigns for measures on Oregon's 2008 ballot where the
sophisticated panoptic16 sorting known as microtargeting or computer modeling was
utilized by the coalition, Defend Oregon. Using a high-powered survey and data
collection instrument and methodology, the coalition of public employee unions,
nonprofits, and other members of Defend Oregon purchased services from the
Washington D.C.-based consulting firm, MSHC Partners (Wimmer, personal
communication, 2008; Black, personal communication, 2008; Wagner, personal
communication, 2009).
The purchase included a combined survey of 6,000 voters with demographic
and psychographic information culled from voter lists, membership lists, and
commercial demographic lists, all overlaid with geographic mapping and analyzed
using over 100 points of data. (Psychographic attributes include those relating to
124

Populism
social class, lifestyle, interests, values, and personality). Follow-up surveys were
conducted (which included 1,000 of the names pulled out as a control group) to
measure the effectiveness of the campaign's targeting efforts. As explained in
interviews with interest group representatives and political consultants hired by the
Defend Oregon Coalition, microtargeting17 permitted their opposition campaign to
target voters on the individual level. Microtargeting was used by the operatives to
select their universe of voters more efficiently, expand and contract target universes
with a simple manipulation of the data using the software program, and perhaps most
importantly, improve the ability to match message to voter. Ultimately, despite the
substantial cost of the computer modeling/microtargeting system, representatives of
the coalition concluded that the "cost-per-moved-voter" justified the purchase
(Wagner, personal communication, 2009; Wimmer, personal communication, 2008;
Black, personal communication, 2008).
An example of the use of the microtargeting strategy in the 2008 campaign in
support of Ballot Measure 57 and in opposition to Measure 61, was the use of distinct
"voter guides" for specifically targeted populations. Ballot Measure 57 was a
legislative referral in response to Measure 61 authored by former legislator and
political activist Kevin Mannix. Measure 61 created mandatory minimum sentences
for property crimes. Measure 57 included stricter penalties than did Measure 61, but
included a drug-treatment component and had a much less expensive price tag
(Oregon Secretary of State, 2008). Using data containing over 100 different variables
available through sorting mechanism technology, the Defend Oregon campaign sent
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slickly produced, demographically, geographically, and psychographically informed
and targeted official-looking direct mail labeled as "voter guides" to six distinct voter
groups.
For example, if you were identified as a progressive, young Democrat, Green
or independent, voting for Obama, and living in Multnomah County (a majority
Democratic, liberal county that includes the city of Portland), you were sent a voter
guide with a contemporary script font featuring an African-American social worker on
the front and back pages highlighting the importance of drug-treatment and working
with young offenders to get them back on the straight and narrow. The guide included
endorsements from progressive organizations such as the Oregon League of
Conservation Voters and the National Abortion Rights Action League of Oregon to
enhance the appeal of the mailer. Concurrently, suburban independents and female
voters identified as "safety moms" were mailed voter guides with a completely
different set of endorsers, appeals, and arguments to support Measure 57 and oppose
Measure 61. This more conservative voter guide included photos and quotations from
law enforcement officials, and stern-looking establishment figures praising Measure
57 as toughening penalties for repeat offenders and for enhancing public safety by
placing more people behind bars (Blevins, personal communication, 2008; Wiener,
personal communication, 2008).
Similarly, the Defend Oregon Coalition applied the same microtargeting data
and approach in sending out voter guides covering most of the measures on the 2008
ballot. According to the lead direct mail consultant working for the 2008 campaign,
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the goal was to employ the best third-party validation for the targeted universes for
each of the guides (Wiener, personal communication, 2008). (It should be noted here
that in my interviews with consultants representing both conservative and liberal
interest groups, there was agreement that voters often rely on their familiarity with
endorsing groups and/or individuals as cognitive short cuts for their initiative voting
decisions. Likewise, in 1907, after having experienced the first few Oregon I&R
campaigns and elections William U'Ren said of direct legislation:
In all our work we have found the great value of well-known names attached to
our measures as officers or members of committees.. ..You see, the average
man is either too indolent, too busy, or too distrustful of his own judgment to
study or decide for himself upon the details of a law or a great public question.
People always ask of a proposition to enact a principle they approve, "Who is
back of it?" If they find it to be indorsed [sic] by men whose reputation would
forbid them to allow the use of their names with any unpractical, improper, or
sinister law to apply the principle, they promptly conclude that it is all right
and worthy of support (as cited in Culbertson, 1941, pp. 81, 82).

There were at least four distinct voter guides sent to targeted universes based on the
extensive data-mining and microtargeting data, and a description of three of those
guides obtained by the researcher follows.
One 2008 voter guide created by Defend Oregon, was a single, two-sided eight
and one-half by eleven direct mail piece that went to frequent voting Democrats, union
members, and nonaffiliated voters in the most highly populated metro areas in the
state. On the front side, the title of the guide reads: "2008 Ballot Measures Made Easy
— with the subheading - newspaper recommendations." The front page highlights
newspaper endorsements (using the actual fonts of the papers) and mentions Bill
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Sizemore's name prominently and repeatedly in advocating rejection of Measures 58
through 64. In what looks to be a fairly objective chronicling of the endorsements of
eight of the major newspapers in the state, the back page lists all of the "no"
recommendations in a very visible black background. The newspaper endorsements
shown have 100 percent unanimity, save for one newspaper, The Bend Bulletin, which
advocates opposition to Measure 57. Included on the page are selected quotations
from several of the editorials concerning the measures. As was explained by the lead
direct mail consultant, Mark Wiener, the goal of listing the newspaper endorsements
in this relatively straightforward manner is to convey to voters that this paid political
mail piece is a more objective source of information (Wiener, personal
communication, 2008). By listing the newspaper's respective endorsements in a
simple, uncluttered format, the voter guides purported to make sifting through the
numerous measures on the ballot unnecessary. According to Wiener, the objective
was to get targeted voters viewed as "friendly" to the campaign's position (i.e.
predisposed to vote with the coalition) to vote on all of the measures rather than
skipping those where they might have a greater degree of uncertainty.
The same organization, Defend Oregon, sent another eight and one-half by
eleven, four-page, 2008 voter guide to a similar universe of targeted voters. Although
the guide clearly states, "Provided by Defend Oregon" on the front page, there is no
indication as to who or what Defend Oregon is. On the second page, it does list the
coalition's web site, and it describes the group as "a coalition of more than 150
groups, including the 12 listed specifically on this guide" (Defend Oregon Mail Piece,
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2008). This time, rather than newspaper editorial recommendations, the mailer targets
voters inclined to support progressive organizations such as Basic Rights Oregon, a
gay rights group, NARAL Pro-Choice Oregon, a group advocating reproductive rights,
and the Oregon League of Conservation Voters, an environmental advocacy group.
As explained by Wiener, the tracking poll results created concern about turnout among
voters who had been identified as progressives by their voting behavior in previous
elections, group affiliations and magazine subscriptions. The title of the mail piece is:
"2008 Ballot Measure Voter Guide," with the subheading, "Simple and Clear
Information and Recommendations from the Organizations You Trust." Employing a
similar use of quotations from newspaper editorials, the piece includes a reminder that
Sizemore authored five of the initiatives on the ballot, and that according to recent
court decisions he had engaged in fraud, forgery, and racketeering.
A third guide, this one with the words, "Provided as a public service by Our
Oregon" at the bottom of the first page, also lists itself as a "2008 Ballot Measure
Voter Guide" with the subheading, "Simple and Clear Information and
Recommendations for Oregon Voters." This eight-page smaller booklet is written in a
more professional and simple font, and it has an American Flag background on the
front and back cover. Although Our Oregon and Defend Oregon are largely the same
coalition of groups and interests, separate measure committees do exist. This "guide"
does provide its targeted audience with background information on all of the
measures, and its cleaner format seeks to appeal to the older, nonaffiliated, largely
home-owning voters. Along with mentioning Sizemore's sponsorship and his recent
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court conviction in an opening paragraph, the piece was undersigned with small green
bags with dollar signs on them and the words, "funded with out-of-state money."
Interviews with the lead consultants explained that in some focus groups, the
combination of Bill Sizemore's sponsorship, along with indication that a measure was
funded with out-of-state money proved an effective means to capture attention and
even move voters in their direction.
Although such targeted-messaging is not completely new, capital-intensive
initiative campaigns, with public relations and communication experts employing
cutting-edge political marketing strategies and the most advanced communication
technologies, constitutes a qualitatively distinct initiative campaign context. Not only
have citizen-led efforts at petitioning become a relic of a bygone era (having been
replaced by for-profit signature-gathering firms), but much of the initiative process has
become industrialized. Some of the key features of industrialization include
specialization, technification, and the division of labor. The case studies in chapter
five provide detailed descriptions and analysis demonstrating how capital-intensive
I&R campaigns have taken on these features of industrialization. In addition, all of
the necessary elements of the initiative process, from gathering signatures, to writing
measures and running campaigns, have become have become for-profit operations.
Moreover, campaigns run by paid political consultants have become increasingly
sophisticated, technologically mediated endeavors.
The presence of powerful computers, extensive voter lists, voluminous
consumer data, and the increasing use of predictive technologies, means that political
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operatives with adequate financial backing can segment and target voters in ways that
simply were not available to campaigns of an earlier era. One corollary to the
sophisticated political marketing regime, is a depoliticized, largely passive electorate
that is appealed to as individuals in the manner of private exchange relations, and not
as members of a collective society (Putnam, 2000; Schier, 2000; Boggs, 2000;
Garnham, 1990). As such, Sussman's critique of contemporary candidate-campaigns
arguably resonates as well with initiative-campaigns in that "it is the politicians who
are choosing the voters rather than the other way around" (Sussman, 2005, p. 40).
In addition to the evidence that many of the measures on the ballot in Oregon
since 2000 have been the handmaiden of moneyed special interests (whether narrow or
broad-based economic or social interest groups) and the fact that over 90 percent of
petitions have employed paid signature-gathering firms to secure ballot access, the
industrialization of the campaigns, indeed, the entire process, calls into question the
hope and promise that direct democracy would constitute a deepening of democracy
and enhanced civic engagement among the citizenry (Ellis, 2002; Broder, 2000,
Schlozman & Yohai, 2008). The promise of direct democracy to increase citizen
knowledge and engagement in the political process is undermined by the participation
and activities of political consultants involved in "citizen-initiative" campaigns. The
argument here is not that direct legislation campaigns should not be considered
legitimate or justified in their utilization of the same contemporary techniques and
strategies used by candidate campaigns. Rather, the argument is that direct democracy
has to be understood as far more similar to candidate campaigns and the entire regime
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of "professionalized," industrialized, capital-intensive electioneering extant in the
United States and abroad, and not as grassroots, citizen-based populist endeavors.
Scientific Management of Public Opinion
The contemporary initiative campaign is of course nothing like the populist
and progressive champions of direct democracy could have imagined. The growth of
the entire apparatus of information management has been well documented elsewhere
(Robins & Webster, 1999; Ewen, 1996; Sussman, 2005; Shea, 2006), and will not be
reprised here. Yet essential to understanding much of contemporary initiative
electioneering, it is necessary to understand a bit about the scope of the scientific
management of public opinion and the methods and strategies in its employ.
Oscar Gandy in his work on surveillance, refers to informatization in
describing the persistent and intensive regimes of surveillance and data collection that
pervade the relationship among consumers and retailers, the government and its
citizens, and in other areas of our lives (Gandy, 1993). Similarly, the relationship
between interest group campaigns and their voter-targets has been increasingly
informaticized. Rather than inviting volunteers to participate in initiative campaigns,
these professionally managed capital-intensive operations are run largely by and with
experienced political operatives with well-financed special interest groups in control.
According to political consultant and author, Hal Malchow, although commercial
direct marketers had been using computer-enhanced data collection, segmentation of
consumers, and targeting methods and technologies since the 1970s, political
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consultants and their clients had not fully embraced predictive technologies until as
late as 2002 (Malchow, 2008, p. 75).
As described by more than one experienced consultant familiar with the
initiative campaign process, the language of the ballot title is very important (Adams,
personal communication, 2009; Wiener, personal communication, 2009; Grove,
personal communication, 2009). Research supports the concern for the ballot title, as
it is the most cited element in voters' decision-making calculus (Hibbits, personal
communication, 2009). Therefore, political pollsters play an enormously important
role in the overall strategic approach of initiative campaigns. In order to test the
language and potential campaign messaging, pollsters will convene a benchmark poll
to gauge the attitudes, values, and beliefs of likely voters concerning issues likely to
emerge during the campaign. One pollster interviewed explained how focus groups
are used to prepare the representatives of the campaign (in this case they were
attorneys hired by the campaign) for the inevitable debate with the opposition and the
secretary of state's office over the specific language in the ballot title. Illustrative of
the import of this element of the campaign, one pollster hired for the 2008 opposition
to the Measure 64 campaign (A Sizemore-led initiative that would have banned the
use of money collected with public resources from being used for political purposes),
lamented that the lawyers hired to contest the ballot title language were not armed
with sufficient poll-tested language and therefore permitted very difficult language for
the Defend Oregon Coalition campaign to oppose18 (Grove, personal communication,
2008).
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Focus Groups
The focus group is another common element for well-funded measure
campaigns. The goal is to permit a group of 30 to 50 likely voters to engage in a
guided discussion of the issues and concepts of concern. When asked to describe the
participation of citizens in this process, one consultant referred to the people
participating as "lab rats for the campaigns" (Victoria, personal communication,
2008). In contrast, one pollster described participants as consumers of messages as
well as "idea generators," and explained how people knew that they were helping to
generate ideas for the campaigns and willingly consented to this element of the
process. "They appreciate the opportunity to tell you what they're thinking as
consumers." In fact, in an interesting type of "voter education," one prominent
pollster in Oregon observed that people admit to doing "homework" the evening
before the focus group had been convened. Seeking to exploit the extra work done by
some focus group participants, the consultant described how campaigns could use this
to their advantage in future campaigns. She suggested that it would be useful to have
people do "diary work prior to their coming in" if they were going to "cheat" the night
before participating in the focus group (Grove, personal communication, 2008).
A well-financed campaign will convene focus groups in multiple geographic
areas and media markets to discover regional variations in attitudes and beliefs. One
prominent Oregon-based consultant explained her preference to hold focus groups
even prior to a benchmark poll since such focus groups often bring up novel issue for
the campaign to consider. Additionally, since this pollster is typically hired by a
134

Populism
coalition to oppose several ballot measures in one election cycle, her focus group
participants work with multiple potential ballot titles, issues, arguments, and language
each session (Grove, personal communication, 2008). Furthermore, explaining the
strategy behind the focus groups, another Oregon-based consultant described the
necessity of excluding individuals who have strong loyalty to a political party, or those
who are members of a union or influential special interest group (Albers, personal
communication, 2009). For this same consultant, Portland residents comprise a
special interest group as they are excluded from her focus groups for statewide Oregon
campaigns. As described by one pollster, the ideal focus group would represent the
"muddled middle" (Grove, personal communication, 2008). Similarly, focus group
conveners tend to separate respondents by gender, or make certain any mixed-gender
groups have more women then men, since men tend to dominate the conversations and
skew the results. Furthermore, if resources are available, more than one pollster
explained that it was important to convene a minimum of four focus groups in
different geographic regions (Conkling, personal communication, 2008).
One interesting variation on the focus group explained by one pollster is a
voter pamphlet focus group where dummy voter pamphlets are created to resemble as
much as possible the actual pamphlets all voters in Oregon receive. Different
arguments are created and tested for effectiveness, and likely talking points from the
opposition are also placed in the pamphlet to better understand potential strengths and
weaknesses of what they might face during the campaign. Participants are asked to
arrive early and mark up the pamphlet to highlight what they perceive as important
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information. One consultant explained how a great deal of useful information is
obtained by the campaign in these faux-voter pamphlet focus groups (Blevins,
personal communication, 2008). One example concerning Ballot Measure 64 from the
2008 election and previous iterations from the 2006 and 2000 elections, was a
potential oppositional argument that the measure, if passed, would eliminate the
voter's pamphlet itself, since in that case public resources - tax dollars funding the
secretary of state's office which distributes the voter's pamphlets - would be
expended for political purposes — distributing political information in the form of
ballot measure and candidate information. The pollster explained that participants in
the survey simply did not believe the argument to be accurate, and therefore it was not
used in the Measure 64 opposition's campaign commercials or literature.
Benchmark Poll
Benchmark surveys are lengthy interviews with likely voters most often over
the phone or occasionally internet-based. Typically there are 500 people interviewed
for approximately 20 minutes each in the benchmark poll. One consultant explained
that there are times when a "mutt poll" is conducted in January, prior to either the
focus groups or benchmark survey. The "mutt poll" is used to assess the viability of
potential ballot measure ideas, or to get an early reading of petitions that seem certain
to be on the upcoming general election ballot. The information extracted from the
benchmark poll includes the levels of support for different sides of measures/ballot
titles, and according to one pollster, can provide an indication of the amount of money
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and the scope of a campaign necessary to pass or defeat a measure (Grove, personal
communication, 2008).
Dial-Testing
Additionally, some campaigns will employ "perception-analyzers" or dialtesters to permit campaign consultants (and often their funders sitting behind a twoway mirror) to gauge second-by-second reactions to issues, phrases, and/or potential
advertising themes and images. And recently, consultants have been using the
convenience of the internet to have political advertisements tested. Participants are
provided a password to gain access to a protected site that houses videos of potential
advertisements on the measure. One of the advantages of the web-based
advertisement testing is the ability to significantly increase the number of participants.
Also, according to one veteran consultant, people are very willing to disclose a great
deal about their perceptions of the various advertisements online. He explained that
these dial-tests or online advertisement tests often lead to very useful information or
"aha" moments (Conkling, personal communication, 2008). However, the number of
advertisements that one can test via the Web is limited. This same experienced
politico claimed that while it was possible to test as many as 15 different television
and/or radio ads with an in-person focus group, web-based focus groups typically
yielded comments on about five or six ads (Conkling, personal communication, 2008).
One method used for the in-person dial-testing by one of the consultants interviewed
was to separate out respondents after the first round or two based on whether or not
they were moved by any of the messages. Thus, individuals who were persuaded to
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take a position more strongly against a particular measure following an advertisement
would all be taken to a location to explain their reasoning.
Tracking Poll
Tracking polls are then employed in these capital-intensive initiative
campaigns to find out where the voters stand during a particular moment in time, and
they are used to learn whether or not the advertising that has been introduced into the
campaign is having its desired effect. Tracking polls are also useful to test whether or
not particular messages are "sticking" with the voters. Thus, if a campaign is running
advertisements telling voters that a particular measure is bad for law enforcement's
ability to apprehend criminals, the tracking poll will include questions seeking to
identify whether or not that particular message has been effective. Following the
direct questioning, the pollsters typically employ regression analysis and analytical
modeling seeking to predict whether or not this meant that people would or would not
vote a particular way. Initiative campaigns will do between 3 to 5 tracking polls
beginning in late September if they have the necessary resources. One consultant
interviewed expressed the importance of coordinating the tracking polls with the
advertising buys so that it was possible to measure whether or not a particular message
was working. In addition, tracking polls are also used to test and perhaps react to the
opposition's advertising and messaging.
Microtargeting
Microtargeting or computer modeling has become increasingly popular in the
most recent election cycles and was used in Oregon in several of the 2008 initiative
138

Populism
campaigns. As defined by Malchow (2008), one of the pioneers and practitioners of
the computer modeling approach to campaigning, "Microtargeting is the use of data
and advanced analytical tools to make more accurate predictions about who will vote,
whom voters will support, and which issues each voter cares most about. The
foundation of microtargeting is data" (Malchow, 2008, p. 74). In describing some of
the data utilized by campaigns (including the Defend Oregon coalition in the 2008
election), Malchow explains that in addition to the information culled from the
standard voter databases in every state including: name, address, date of birth, date of
registration, party affiliation etc., plus census data indicating a myriad of demographic
information about a voter's neighborhood. Contracting with commercial databases,
Defend Oregon campaigns have access to information on: religion, ethnicity, marital
status, hobbies and interests, car ownership, presence of children or whether or not the
voter is likely to subscribe to pay-per-view or satellite television. While there are
several possible methods employed to use the aforementioned data sets to microtarget
campaign messaging, the Defend Oregon coalition used regression analysis to create
and manage the campaign plan.
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis is used to predict the likelihood that a voter will vote, will
vote for or against an initiative, will be undecided, or will lean toward the affirmative
or negative side of a measure. A regression analysis results in a probability score and
ultimately creates a numerical value of communicating with a particular voter with a
particular medium of communication. Regression analysis is useful in decisions
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concerning resource allocation. In addition to helping to decide which households
promise the best value for a mailing, or which viewers or listeners to target with media
buys, it may also indicate whether or not it makes sense to expend resources for
certain households and/or groups at all (Malchow, 2008, p. 134).
While these methods and technologies are familiar to those conversant with
product advertising or contemporary candidate-campaigns at the highest levels, the
juxtaposition between the "citizen-initiative" and its capital-intensive, industrialized
campaign is striking and largely out of the purview of the targets of these campaign
methods. Voters in this process are treated as objects for data extraction and
manipulation, and not as citizens to be engaged in a participatory process of
deliberative democracy. Consultants interviewed consistently expressed the need to
focus their efforts on likely voters, as opposed to attempting to recruit and engage new
people in the process. Most expressed this as nothing more than a question of
resource allocation, time limitations, and the imperative of delivering the requisite
number of voters for their clients.
Increasing use of interactive and surveillance technologies in modern initiative
campaigns constitute a cybernetic campaign methodology that substantiates the
panopticism metaphor used to describe contemporary political marketing. As Gandy
explains:
The operation of the panoptic sort increases the ability of organized interests,
whether they are selling shoes, toothpaste, or political platforms, to identify,
isolate, and communicate differentially with individuals in order to increase
their influence over how consumers make selections among these options
(Gandy, 1993, p. 2)
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The aforementioned political campaign techniques, rather than liberating and
affirming citizen participation, civic engagement, and political knowledge, serve not
only to objectify the subject, but to empower the best-financed interests to more
effectively market their initiatives and political programs to the objects of their
surveillance. As the collection of data becomes increasingly determinative with
sophisticated political microtargeting utilizing multiple databases to sort, identify, and
target particular audiences with poll-tested emotive messages, the voter commodity
becomes as valuable for their labor in the data collection process as they do for their
vote in the election. As initiative campaigns in Oregon and other states use firms such
as MSHC Partners for microtargeting and Aristotle, the list vendor, the
commodification of political information serves to privilege moneyed interests with
the wherewithal to purchase or rent the most comprehensive and sophisticated voter
information and political operatives with the experience and capabilities to use it.
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Chapter Five: The Incorporation of Direct Democracy: Case Studies in
Initiative Professionalization
This chapter looks at four ballot measure campaigns from two different
election cycles in Oregon, specifically Measures 48 and 41 from 2006, and Measures
98 and 92 from the 2000 election. Measure 48 was a constitutional amendment
labeled by supporters as the "taxpayer bill of rights" or TABOR. The measure sought
to limit state spending to a formula based on the state's percentage increases in
population plus inflation (a.k.a. "popuflation"). I refer to Measure 48 in this chapter
as the "spending limit." Measure 41 in 2006 would have allowed a state income tax
deduction equal to the amount deducted on a filer's federal taxes. The measure would
have changed how state income taxes are calculated in Oregon, reduced taxes for most
Oregonians, and decreased revenue available for state programs and services. I refer
to Measure 41 as the "federal tax deduction." Greater detail on the content and
potential effects of the measures appear later in this chapter. In brief, both measures
would have substantially decreased the revenue available in the state's general fund
that is used to pay for programs and services, and importantly from a strictly political
standpoint, would have resulted in the loss of public sector union jobs and support.
Ballot Measure 98 in the 2000 election was a constitutional amendment that
would have prohibited the use of public resources to bring in or help collect money to
be used for political purposes. For example, under Measure 98, unions would have
been prohibited from using any public buildings, telephones, or equipment to collect
funds for anything campaign-related. So in the case of a public college or university
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with a union office on campus, Measure 98 would have prohibited the use of campus
mail, phones, or any equipment to collect or solicit union dues if any of those funds
were ultimately to be used for political activity. I refer to Measure 98 in the 2000
election as "public resources." Finally, this chapter also examines the Measure 92
campaign in Oregon's 2000 general election. Measure 92 was also a constitutional
amendment that would have prohibited the common practice of using payroll
deductions for political purposes absent specific written authorization. Measure 92
applied to both public and private employees. The effect of the payroll deduction (92)
initiative would have been to virtually shut down the current means by which public
employee unions collect and expend money for both campaigning for elections and
lobbying the Oregon State Legislature (Nesbitt, personal communication; 2009; Black,
personal communication, 2009). I will refer to Measure 92 as "payroll deduction."
Although 24 states permit some type of direct legislation, the framework and
specific requirements differ substantially. Therefore, prior to presenting the case
studies of the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) from 2006, and public
resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) from 2000,1 first look at the legal
requirements of Oregon's system of direct legislation primarily taken from the Oregon
Secretary of State's web site.
Requirements for Oregon's I&R
Oregon's I&R allows for citizens to initiate both statutory and constitutional
changes in addition to having the ability to overturn laws enacted by the legislature
through the referendum process. In Oregon, an initiative first requires submission of
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the proposed language to the secretary of state who then files a copy with the state's
attorney general. After collection and submission of 1,000 valid signatures to the
secretary of state, the attorney general has five days to write a ballot title and
summary.19 It is worth noting that Oregon is one of 12 states with direct legislation
without a distribution requirement for signatures. In short, there is no mandate that a
90

particular percentage of signatures must come from distinct counties or jurisdictions.
The attorney general then sends the ballot title to the secretary of state. The secretary
of state sends copies of the full text, ballot title, and a proposed measure summary to
members of the legislature, proponents, and potential opponents of the proposal.
Citizens and activists interested in the process can request that the secretary of state
place them on the list of individuals to receive notification of pending initiatives.
After the secretary of state notifies interested parties of the proposed petition,
there is a 15-day comment period during which the public can review and debate the
ballot title, summary, and full text of the proposal. If there are no challenges to the
proposed language, the ballot title can be used to gather signatures to place the petition
on the ballot. However, any challenges during this 15-day period go directly to the
Oregon Supreme Court.
According to several individuals active in the process and interviewed during
the course of my research, it has become common practice in Oregon for opponents of
proposed measures to challenge the language in the different elements of the proposal
simply to delay proponents from the signature-gathering phase (Wimmer, personal
communication, 2008; Adams, personal communication, 2008; Black, personal
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communication, 2008). Still, under Oregon law as of early 2009, petitioners have
almost two years to gather the required number of signatures. Initiative signatures
may be collected any time after July two years prior to the election and are due in to
the secretary of state's office in July of the election year.
Of the 24 states with an I&R process, 18 permit constitutional amendments
through direct legislation. Of the 18 that permit amending the constitution via the
I&R, 10 require a double-digit percentage of the votes cast in either the last
gubernatorial or presidential races, with Nevada and Nebraska requiring 10% of all
registered voters (Waters, 2003, p 21). In contrast, to qualify a constitutional
amendment in Oregon a petitioner needs only 8 percent of the total number of
Oregonians casting votes in the most recent gubernatorial election and 6 percent of the
total to qualify a statutory change.
Among initiative states, Oregon is particularly attractive to moneyed interests
since it has a relatively low threshold to qualify constitutional amendments and has
neither a subject limitation nor a geographical distribution requirement for signatures.
Therefore, wealthy organized interests are able to qualify constitutional initiatives,
especially tax-related initiatives, with a relatively small investment. Once a proposed
constitutional amendment has been successfully placed on the ballot, it takes only a
simply majority of the voters in that particular election to enshrine the change in
Oregon's Constitution.
The Oregon Constitution has been amended through the initiative process over
240 times since 1902 (Oregon Blue Book, 2009A). Between 1990 and 2000, almost
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60 percent of the 74 initiatives that qualified for the ballot in Oregon were
constitutional amendments (Ellis, 2002, p. 138). Thus, for a $300,000 to $1 milliondollar investment, wealthy private interests can qualify a constitutional amendment for
the ballot. Once on the ballot, it requires only a simple majority to amend Oregon's
Constitution with little possibility of having it repealed. Ballot Measure 5 from 1990
and Measure 47 from 1996 offer examples of tax-related constitutional amendments
that have had profound influence in Oregon yet barely secured a majority of votes in
their respective races.
Measure 5, which emerged victorious in a 574,833 to 522,022 election
(Oregon Secretary of State, 2009A, p. 306) is often compared to California's
Proposition 13 from 1978 as part of a so-called tax revolt. Similar to Proposition 13,
Oregon's Measure 5 concerned property tax, was championed by a visible and vocal
chief petitioner, and had far-reaching consequences for the entire system of taxation
and services in the state. In brief, Measure 5 amended Oregon's Constitution (Article
XI, Section 11) and established limits on property taxes and real estate (Oregon
Secretary of State, 2008). Property taxes were capped at $15 per $1,000 of assessed
annual value per year, and were gradually lowered to $5 for the same amount and time
frame. Perhaps most significantly, the initiative shifted school funding from local
property taxes as the primary source to the state's general fund. The measure is widely
viewed as having not only significantly cut education funding at all levels, but also
reducing general fund resources available for other public sector programs and
services (Sokolow, 1998; Oregon, 2003).
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Subsequent to Ballot Measure 5, Sizemore's OTU introduced and successfully
passed Measure 47 in the 1996 election. Known as the "cut and cap" measure, it
further reduced property taxes and instituted a double majority requirement for
subsequent changes to Oregon's tax structure. In reaction to its unintended
consequences and its vulnerability to legal challenges, the state legislature
subsequently referred a legislative fix to the Measure 5 and Measure 47 structure in
the form of Measure 50 in 1997 (Ballotpedia, 2008). The cut and cap property tax and
double majority constitutional amendment passed with 704,554 in support and
642,613 opposed (Oregon Blue Book, 2009A, p. 308). Of note, the 2007-2008
legislatively-created Revenue Restructuring Task Force — which was created to take a
big-picture view of Oregon's entire system of taxation and revenue generation — has
identified the complexity and financial impacts of property tax limitation (Measure 5),
cut and cap (Measure 47), and property tax referral (Measure 50), as primary obstacles
to a more efficient and well-functioning system of revenue and taxation (Oregon
Legislative Revenue, 2008). In brief, in the cases of the property tax limitation (5) and
cut and cap (47), wealthy private interests (see previous discussion of Sizemore, OTU
and TAO) financed tax changes substantially reducing revenue for public sector
programs and services. Equally important, the tax changes are now enshrined in
Oregon's Constitution thus politically very difficult to change.
To place a referendum on the ballot in Oregon, a petitioner must successfully
collect valid signatures from 4 percent of the total of votes cast in the most recent
governor's race. Petitioners must initiate a referendum within 90 days of the end of
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the legislative session in which the law was enacted. The period in which a
referendum petitioner can obtain signatures is limited to 90 days. Also, Oregon is one
of 14 states with a single subject rule, indicating that initiatives contain only one issue
or subject.21 Finally, the Oregon legislature can repeal and amend initiative statutes
with a simple majority.
Case Studies: Oregon Ballot Measures 48 and 41 in the 2006 General Election
and Measures 98 and 92 in the 2000 General Election
In this section I analyze four Oregon ballot measure campaigns — two that took
place during the 2000 general election period, and two from Oregon's general election
in 2006. This section includes an analysis of the democratic implications of powerful
organized and elite neoliberal interests financing ballot access and direct legislation
campaigns. I chronicle and then discuss the efforts of out-of-state corporate interests
and wealthy individuals using local front groups to force union and public sector
advocates to expend significant financial and human resources in their defense. This
study argues that private organized neoliberal interests exploit I&R's populist origins
and the continued mythology that identifies them as a citizen-inspired means to
confront elites to advance their political agenda. I describe some of the political
maneuvering that takes place out of the purview of the voting public regarding the
language in the ballot title and explanatory statements included in the voter's
pamphlet. This section includes an argument that these early battles over language not
only illustrate the importance of financial resources to compensate election attorneys,
consultants, and pollsters, but that such activity demonstrates the ambiguity inherent to
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ballot measures thereby increasing the importance of the political marketing efforts
and the role of political consultants.
Following this, I detail the highly sophisticated political marketing operation
that served as the opposition campaign to the state spending limit (48) and federal tax
deduction (41) in 2006. This campaign activity is analyzed through the application of
the concepts of productive surveillance, technification, and informaticization. The
analysis contextualizes union and public sector groups' use of significant financial
resources, political consultants, and the latest information and communication
technologies and marketing techniques in their resistance to anti-union corporatefunded initiatives. While the cases in this study illustrate the effectiveness of
opposition resistance to measures funded primarily by neoliberal and elite interests,
the means utilized in these campaigns, as well as the entire campaign process and
exercise itself, reflect the triumph of the core functional and ideological principles of
neoliberalism, and the co-optation and virtual capture of the system of direct
legislation by moneyed interests. Accordingly, this chapter will present an analysis of
campaign processes that identifies the embeddedness of an industrialized, marketcentered ideology and functionality in direct legislation campaigns. In like manner, I
consider the ramifications of I&R campaigns approaching voters not as citizens, but as
consumers in the manner of exchange relations. In addition, based primarily on the
presentation of information detailed in the opposition's campaign plan, I call into
question the claims of Tolbert and Smith (2004) regarding I&R's secondary effects on
political knowledge, civic engagement, and civic participation. I argue that capital149
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intensive direct legislation campaigns essentially compel union and public sector
advocates to electioneer in a manner that undermines approaches that might foster the
elements of strong democracy as defined by Barber (1984) and discussed in Chapter
Two of this study.
This section also describes and details the campaigns regarding a measure
barring the use of public resources to collect political funds (98) and a measure
prohibiting payroll deductions for political purposes absent written authorization (92).
Both measures are from Oregon's 2000 general election. I also briefly discuss the
significance of Bill Sizemore's enterprise, and how focusing on Sizemore the person
prevents a political economic structural analysis that locates Sizemore within the
larger framework of the industrialization of direct democracy. Although Sizemore is a
prominent figure in Oregon due to his prolific initiative activity, his financiers
represent more enduring interests that will readily find others willing to act in a similar
capacity should Sizemore or other similarly situated Oregon political entrepreneurs
vacate their respective positions. A structural analysis will examine the funders
supporting the likes of Sizemore and Russ Walker of Oregon FreedomWorks, as well
as the conditions, institutional arrangements, ideology, and infrastructure that serve to
advance the interests of private organized groups. And finally, I refute the
professionalization thesis regarding I&R campaign consultants by offering a
counterthesis from a political economic perspective that considers direct legislation
campaigns as conforming to the dominant principles of neoliberalism. Key neoliberal
principles include the belief that privatization is always preferable to government or
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the public sector in the management of social relations. It embraces market forces,
consumer choice, and personal responsibility (caveat emptor). And neoliberalism
rejects government regulation (interference) of the flow of money.
The case studies that follow exhibit characteristics prominent in the
increasingly capital-intensive ballot measure campaigns in Oregon in the first decade
of the twenty-first century. First and foremost, they illustrate the continued
significance of the legitimation power conferred by elections. Even with neoliberal
principles ascendant in the U.S. and much of the globe, moneyed organized interests
feel compelled to expend substantial resources in attempts to manage public opinion
and to garner electoral victories. Ballot measures have become valuable to the public
relations efforts of powerful organized efforts to legitimate the continuation of their
privileged position in the U.S. and global political economy.
The Empirical Set
In this study, both statutory and constitutional measures are represented, as
both have become somewhat regular features of initiative campaigns in Oregon.
Proponents of tax measures have been particularly fond of constitutional amendments
in an effort to protect them from the vicissitudes of legislative activity. Equally
important to the present study, the four measures involve interests supportive of
neoliberal capitalist principles against their political, ideological, and workplace
adversaries. Oregon Measure 48 (spending limit) and 41 (federal tax deduction) in the
2006 election, and Measures 98 (public resources) and 92 (payroll deduction
limitation) from 2000, pit neoliberal capitalist and elite interests that self-identify as
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anti-tax and anti-govemment, against unions and allied groups supporting government
programs and services. Additionally, the initiative campaigns discussed below
involve very substantial resource expenditures. In short, these are high stakes
measures, as evidenced by the contributions and expenditures, the ideological
antagonists involved, their political and financial content, and the degree of media
attention that they generated. And while the opposition's expenditures are
significantly greater in all four measures, the resources deployed to qualify these
measures for the ballot, the signature-gathering phase, were significant.
Moreover, the sources of the expenditures for these ballot measures raise
questions about the populist nature of the system and the degree to which it embodies
its populist and progressive origins. Equally important, to varying degrees the
campaigns for the measures under examination were financed with out-of-state
money. While acceptable under the law, it raises concerns as to the grassroots nature
of direct democracy. Finally, all four initiatives typify what has been called the
"initiative-industrial complex." These initiative campaigns show evidence of the
degree to which direct legislation campaigns have increasingly become capitalintensive, technologically mediated, industrialized endeavors. In short, these four high
stakes initiatives capture a good empirical set for the central research question in this
study.
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The TABOR Spending Limit (48) and the Federal Tax Deduction (41) Measures
in Oregon's 2006 General Election
Ballot Measure 48, which sought to tie the growth in state government to
increases in population and inflation, was submitted by self-identified anti-tax activists
Don Mclntire, Jason Williams, and Greg Howe, and financed primarily by New York
developer Howard Rich (Hammond, 2006). The certified ballot title for Measure 48
read: "Amends constitution: limits biennial percentage increase in state spending to
percentage increase in state population, plus inflation" (Oregon Secretary of State,
2008). Known to proponents as TABOR (taxpayer bill of rights) and successful in
Colorado in 1992, the measure pits a broad coalition of public employee unions, and
public advocacy groups, against anti-tax activists and interest groups based both in and
out of state.
Private interests financing the measure maintained that the aim of Measure 48
was to constrain out-of-control government spending. Colorado, the only state to
enact TABOR, faired reasonably well during the favorable economic circumstances of
much of the 1990s, however following the recessionary period in the early 2000s,
Colorado's spending for higher education fell to 47th in the nation, and the state
dropped to 48th in citizens' access to prenatal care. The effects of the TABOR formula
were so damaging that Coloradans voted to suspend the measure's spending restriction
in a 2005 election ("Colorado's," 2005, p. B5).
Since the spending limit based on population and inflation would permit state
expenditures to rise approximately four percent per year, much higher costs for
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corrections, senior services, and healthcare would mean large cuts in government
programs and services. The proponents of the spending limit (48) claimed the formula
would force greater discipline on public sector spending. However, from the
standpoint of its opponents, passage would result in devastating cuts to education,
human services, and public safety, the three areas which account for approximately 94
percent of state spending in Oregon (McGee & Carbone, 2009, p. 2). It is important to
note that it would also result in cuts to a union-heavy public sector workforce, as many
Oregon state government workers are members of either SEIU or AFSCME, two of
the largest public employee unions in the state. Additionally, in comparison to an
increasingly non-unionized private sector workforce, unionized teachers, nurses, and
public safety professionals would also suffer job losses and layoffs with the projected
reduction of revenue in the hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars (Oregonian,
2006). Opponents argued that the primary objective of the several-state TABOR
strategy of neoliberal private interests was to force significant cuts to the public sector,
compel unions to expend substantial financial and human resources, and to dominate
public discourse during the campaign (Wagner, personal communication, 2009; Allen,
personal communication, 2008).
The TABOR measures introduced in several states represented a continuation
of the efforts by conservative, libertarian, and corporate interests to defund and
defame government and the public sector. The measure is superficially attractive and
logical as it focuses on percentage increases in state population and inflation.
However, opponents accurately point out that with healthcare costs increasing at
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double-digit rates, and an increasing number of seniors as a percentage of the
population, the formula inevitably underfunds state government and establishes a low
baseline that becomes a liability in future years. Most noticeable in the rhetoric of
former president, Ronald Reagan, and articulated by conservative activist Grover
Norquist (who pledged to shrink government so much as to be able to drown it in the
bathtub), the several-decade project views I&R as a productive instrument for its
agenda. With laws permitting unlimited contributions and expenditures, an
inconsistent campaign finance reporting system, and a populist branding of the
instrument of direct legislation, moneyed interests participate with several compelling
advantages.
Core principles of neoliberalism include the reduction or elimination of
obstacles to the flow of capital, and the penetration of markets into spaces previously
restricted or unimaginable. From the perspective of private financiers, the twenty-first
century I&R need not emanate from a citizen or organization within the state's
borders. Just as global financial flows, goods, and services penetrate local economies
and spaces previously considered off-limits, the "grassroots" Oregon initiative is often
germinated and nurtured in Washington, DC. Accordingly, what follows is a
discussion of the organized interests financing the spending limit (48) and federal tax
deduction (41) initiatives and the subsequent campaigns.
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Money in Initiatives I: The TABOR Spending Limit (Measure 48) in Oregon's
2006 General Election
Chief petitioners for Measure 48, Jason Williams and Don Mclntire, were
listed as the founding members of the Taxpayers Association of Oregon (TAO), which
advertises itself as a watchdog for Oregon taxpayers (Taxpayer Association of Oregon
Web site, 2009). The organization has been involved in several initiative campaigns
in Oregon and was actively involved in the successful opposition campaign to Ballot
Measure 30 in 2004. Measure 30 sought to increase taxes on corporations and
individuals to prevent cuts to state services and was defeated by over 200,000 votes in
a February 2004 special election (see information below on FreedomWorks and
Measure 30) (Ballotpedia, 2009).
According to their web site, the TAO creates and distributes reports on
purported government waste, sends Oregon elected officials a "no new taxes" pledge
to sign, and maintains a web site, Oregon Watchdog, that serves as an information
clearinghouse and recruiting tool for the organization. Although the self-identified
founders of TAO were the official chief petitioners of the spending limit (48) during
the successful signature-gathering stage, an out-of-state group, Americans for Limited
Government (ALG), was responsible for 94 percent of the funding for that effort with
contributions totaling $943,077. In addition, ALG provided $730,672 or 52.2 percent
of the total financing for the subsequent campaign in support of Ballot Measure 48.
Another national anti-tax group based in Washington D.C., Americans for Tax Reform
(ATF), provided 4 percent of the funding with approximately $40,000 in
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contributions, while TAO contributed less than 1 percent, with $2,194 (Money in
Politics Research Action Project, 2006).
The Taxpayer Association of Oregon is one of a growing number of front
organizations financed by national corporate, conservative, and libertarian ideological
interests. The National Taxpayer's Union, Americans for Tax Reform,
FreedomWorks and other similar national groups create and preserve these state
affiliates to foster the perception that state and local political activities have a
community-based, grassroots imprimatur. With state voters generally suspicious and
even resentful of out-of-state groups and/or individuals funding efforts for local
change, a public relations effort to counter this perception is a rational strategy.
Although corporate public relations efforts to build the facade of localism have a
lengthy history, with the expansion of globalization, transnational corporate interests
have become especially attuned to the need to foster the perception of communitybased, local embeddedness. Therefore, corporate and neoliberal interests with the
experience and resources to present their ambitions and activities as local, arguably
maintain a structural advantage within a system of direct legislation that is generally
perceived as a citizen-inspired, local enterprise. With this in mind, next I describe the
key national groups financing the spending limit (48) in Oregon's 2006 general
election.
Americans for Limited Government (ALG) is a national libertarian political
advocacy group headquartered in Virginia and lists a plethora of "free market" causes
as its focus (Americans for Limited Government, 2008). In 2006, ALG contributed
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significantly to efforts to get TABOR on the ballot in states including: Maine,
Nebraska, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Oklahoma. ALG's efforts to
qualify petitions for the 2006 ballot were ultimately only successful in Oregon, Maine,
and Nebraska. Despite the successful TABOR campaign in Colorado in 1992, it was
defeated in all three states in 2006 (Ballotpedia, 2008). Nevertheless, electoral defeat
does not signify failure for interests employing I&R with multiple strategic objectives.
Thus, both the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) forced union and
public sector actors to expend significant financial and human resources throughout
the campaign process. This not only drains union coffers for these particular
campaigns, it exacts a tremendous opportunity cost as candidate campaigns and
affirmative ballot measure efforts go wanting and/or fall by the wayside. Moreover,
the campaigns provide for repetition of neoliberal principles concerning the
superiority of market forces, privatization, and the demonization of government,
unions, and the public sector. I&R campaigns represent opportunities and spaces for
private and corporate interests to promulgate neoliberal polemics and policy
prescriptions.
The Center for Public Integrity (a nonprofit investigative journalism
organization funded by foundations and individuals) wrote that in 2005, 99 percent of
the $5.4 million in contributions to ALG, a self-identified grassroots group came from
only three prominent donors (Hogan, 2006). Howard Rich, the chairman of ALG, is a
board member of the libertarian think tank the Cato institute, the Club for Growth (a
so-called free market advocacy group), head of the Club for Growth State Action
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PAC, and founder of U.S. Term Limits. Rich has also been a key financier of several
land use measures including Oregon's Ballot Measure 3722 in 2004 which was the
most prominent and successful attack on Oregon's storied 30 year-old land use system
since its inception (Moyers, 2006). In the 2006 election cycle, of the $7.2 million
raised to support Measure 37-like land use measures in Arizona, California, Idaho and
Washington, $5.7 million or 79 percent of the total came from tax-exempt
organizations and entities connected to Howard Rich (Gibson, 2006).
As a 501(c)(4) nonprofit advocacy organization Americans for Limited
Government is not required to publicly disclose the identities of its donors. This is in
stark contrast to the laws concerning political action committees and those regulating
political candidates. ALG justifies its nondisclosure policy on its web site explaining
that "legislatures routinely find ways to jab at those who stand for more limited,
accountable government, it is common — even traditional — for individuals to
contribute privately to such causes" (Gibson, 2006). In their article describing what
they refer to as "veiled political actors," Smith and Garrett compare such front groups
to "Russian matryoshka dolls, where each layer is removed only to find another layer
obscuring the real source of money" (Garrett & Smith, 2005).
Gibson argues that as Congress has moved to limit unlimited so-called "soft
money" contributions (i.e. contributions to organizations and advocacy groups),
bankrolling ballot initiatives has been on the increase. States seeking to regulate
political advocacy by organizations with nonprofit status face First Amendment
challenges. In 2000, the nonprofit group California Pro-Life Council sued the state of
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California claiming that the state could not force campaign contribution and
expenditure disclosure for initiative campaigns. However, reflecting the importance
of the identification of financiers of ballot measure campaigns, the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the organization's claim citing the significance of the issues
before voters in I&R elections, the large amounts of money spent, and the need for
voters to have information about the funders of measures. Included in the court's
decision was the argument that: "Given the complexity of the issues and the
unwillingness of much of the electorate to independently study the propriety of
individual ballot measures, we think being able to evaluate who is doing the talking is
of great importance" (Gibson, 2006).
As mentioned earlier in this study, efforts by interests involved in ballot
measure campaigns to conceal their identities have been present since the first
elections in the early twentieth century. And it was not until the 1920s, well after one
of the most historically active I&R periods, that some states began requiring initiative
committees to file contribution and expenditure reports (Ellis, 2002; Garrett & Smith,
2005). In the wake of post-Watergate reforms that sought to enhance disclosure of
campaign funders at all levels, two strategies emerged in I&R campaigns. One was to
delay disclosure so that significant contribution and expenditure information was not
revealed until after the election (Smith, 1998; Garrett & Smith, 2005). The second has
been to invent populist sounding or euphemistic committee names.
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Figure 4, Contributions to Measure 48, 2006 Election
Out of state money on Measure 48, for the largest PAC on either side:
Sources of Rainy Day Amendment Committee money to pass Measure 48:
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The Illinois money came from Americans for Limited Government and Club for Growth,
both quasi-libertarian PACs that support Republicans seeking to limit the scope of the
government.
Sources of Defend Oregon money to fail Measure 48:
•
•
•

In State
Out of State
Unknown

$2,883,649(81.6%)!
$648,894 (18.4%)
$0 (0.0%) |
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All but about $30,000 of the $648,000 from outside Oregon are from Washington, D.C.,
mostly from AARP and SEIU
Source: Wetherson, 2006.

A 501(c)(4) such as Americans for Limited Government is "used as a conduit
through which financial contributions can flow undetected to the issue committees
officially registered with a state's campaign finance disclosure agency" (Garrett &
Smith, 2005, p. 309). A 501(c)(4) corporation can engage in unlimited lobbying,
which includes efforts relating to ballot measures, as well as in electioneering
activities. The only restriction for electioneering activities is that it cannot be the
corporation's primary activity.

161

Case Studies
The use of front groups, or veiled political actors, runs counter to the claims
that I&R campaigns increase political knowledge, and it calls into doubt the quality of
increased political discussion. As Garrett & Smith argue, since the courts have
consistently held that restrictions on contributions and expenditures run afoul of
protected speech, states (and voters) rely on disclosure as the primary means of
discovering the source(s) of ballot measures and their funders. For this reason, to the
extent that front groups obscure the identity of financial sources, voters are left
without an important cue to assess initiatives. This is significant as the scholarly
literature on decision-making in ballot measures demonstrates that since voters do not
have party affiliation and other information available in candidate-campaigns, they are
most likely to use third-party endorsements and information for their decisions
(Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Lupia, 2001). It also fosters a false public debate as the
actual interests financing the measures and campaign activities go unidentified.
A 501(c)(3) corporation is generally a tax-deductible organization and the
federal tax code forbids tax-exempt 501(c)(3) groups from engaging in political
activities either in support of or in opposition to a candidate vying for a local, state, or
federal office. However, this type of organization can participate directly in ballot
campaigns. The legal rationale is that advocacy in an I&R campaign is considered
lobbying rather than electioneering since participation in a ballot campaign influences
legislation. The result is that many organized interests have both 501(c)(3) and
501(c)(4) corporations that are affiliated. This arrangement permits groups to actively
participate in political elections, yet makes it difficult for voters and members of the
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media to identify the financiers of such organizations. Therefore, the legal regime
structuring the system of direct legislation facilitates a more or less seamless flow of
capital from corporate-funded foundations, think tanks, and exceptionally wealthy
individuals to campaigns, the consultants managing them, and the local front groups
ostensibly representing the will of the people in the targeted state(s). Since I&R
campaigns are defined as an extension of lobbying and not electioneering, interests
and entities adept at raising vast sums of money to influence federal lawmakers in
Washington, DC, maintain a significant advantage in their efforts to influence
campaign discourse and policy at the state level (Richter, Samphantharak, Timmons,
2008). Figure 5 below is a snapshot of the capital flow among various entities
affiliated with Americans for Limited Government and its chief benefactor, New York
developer Howard Rich. Apart from the obvious variety and complexity of the
financial flows, the significance of I&R front groups should not be underestimated.
With often-weak campaign finance disclosure enforcement, even the most
civic-minded I&R voter is vulnerable to manipulation by interests seeking to hide the
sources of their activities. As both commodity advertisers and public relations firms
have increased in number and in their use of front groups, "astroturfing" (the practice
of creating the impression of a grassroots, organic, spontaneous movement or activity)
and stealth marketing (where attempts are made to conceal the fact that people are
subject to a marketing effort), make corporate interests particularly well positioned to
participate in direct legislation campaigns and elections where such tactics are
increasingly common. Moreover, with corporate media operations expending fewer
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and fewer resources toward coverage of local and state politics and investigative
journalism, the burgeoning propaganda industries become increasingly powerful.
Figure 5, Groups Funded by Howard Rich/Americans for Limited Government
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Grover Norquist and Americans for Tax Reform
Americans for Tax Reform (ATR), a Washington D.C.-based 501(c)(4)
lobbying organization headed by Republican power broker Grover Norquist provided
four percent or $40,000 of the funding for signature-gathering efforts for the spending
limit (48). Norquist is an important figure in the nexus among corporate interests,
initiative financing, and the neoliberal movement to weaken unions, reduce or
eliminate business regulation. Norquist has been a lobbyist for Microsoft and
American Express, an economist for and chief speechwriter for the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, and worked with the conservative Heritage Foundation and Newt Gingrich
in the drafting of the 1994 Congressional Republican's platform known as the
Contract with America. Norquist's Americans for Tax Reform was used by lobbyist
and former Christian Coalition leader Ralph Reed to hide campaign contributions
totaling over one million dollars from disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramhoff on behalf of
his client, the Choctaw Indians (Sourcewatch, 2009A). An in-depth piece on Norquist
published in the Nation explained, "Norquist has built a solid working alliance with
the Fortune 500 corporate elite and its K Street lobbyists" (Dreyfuss, 2001). As early
as 1999, Americans for Tax Reform had an annual budget over $7 million, with
approximately a third coming from forty corporations including: Microsoft, Pfizer,
AOL Time-Warner, and UPS. Norquist also served on the ten-person council of the
Tax Relief Coalition, which was constructed by the National Association of Wholesale
Distributors, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Association of
Independent Businesses, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to push for tax policies
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favorable for its corporate financial-backers. Financing the signature-gathering effort
for the spending limit (48) in Oregon exemplifies the work of ATR's approximately
800 anti-tax state-based organizations throughout the country (Dreyfus, 2001), and
demonstrates the direct link between neoliberal corporate interests and the financing of
anti-union, anti-public sector ballot initiatives.
ATF was not a significant contributor to the spending limit (48) campaign
following the successful signature-gathering effort. Although ATR was not a major
contributor to the Measure 48 effort, the organization has played a key role in
pioneering what Garrett and Smith (2005) refer to as "veiled political actors."
Norquist boasted to fellow Republicans of the effectiveness of his organization in the
early-1990s saying "I believe the wave of initiative elections in 1992 and 1994 paved
the way for Republican electoral victories this year [1996]." The contention was
based on his belief that initiatives in several states regarding term limits, cutting taxes,
and anti-crime measures brought socially conservative Republicans to the polls.
Whether or not it was accurate, soon thereafter, the Republican National Committee
contributed $4.6 million in soft money to ATR to promote national candidates and to
broadcast issue ads (so-called issue ads avoid certain campaign finance disclosure
rules by not explicitly telling viewers to vote for a particular candidate) (Garrett &
Smith, 2005, p. 311).
In Oregon's 1996 election, ATR funneled money through Sizemore's Oregon
Taxpayers United to finance Measure 47. Measure 47 was a successful constitutional
amendment that cut property taxes and limited annual property tax increases. In
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testimony from Sizemore's 2002 racketeering trial, a one-time aide to Sizemore,
Becky Miller, explained that Oregon Taxpayers United would bundle the checks it had
solicited in the name of Americans for Tax Reform, send them to Norquist's nonprofit,
and then ATR would transfer money in a single check back to Oregon Taxpayers
United. As explained by Garrett and Smith, "The process effectively cleansed the
identities of the donors to Sizemore's issue committee" (Garrett & Smith, 2005, p.
312). This type of Enron-like shell game has become an increasingly common feature
in global corporate capitalism as sophisticated tax schemes are used to mask profits
and reduce or eliminate tax burdens (see especially Cay Johnston, 2005). Experience
with such financial activity benefits corporate interests with the wherewithal and legal
regimes necessary to manage the financing of campaigns. The absence of financial
contribution and spending limits along with weak disclosure regimes in many states,
make the system of direct legislation vulnerable to the shrouding and even
concealment of I&R funders.
Another national out-of-state entity, the Club for Growth State Action PAC,
was the second leading financier of the spending limit initiative (48) campaign in
2006. The Club for Growth State Action PAC provided $300,000 for the campaign, or
21.4 percent of the total funding for the measure (Money in Politics Research Action
Project, 2006). The Club for Growth State Action PAC is a 501(c)(4) and is allied
with the national Club for Growth organization and the Club for Growth PAC which,
according to the group's web site, advocates for "free market policy reforms" (Club
for Growth, 2008). The group was founded in 1999 by Stephen Moore, who currently
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sits on the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, which consistently advocates for
neoliberal principles (Evans, 2008).
Restore Oregon's Term Limits PAC, which contributed $133,780, or 9.6
percent of the total funding for the Measure 48 campaign, was headed up by Paul
Farago. Farago is a licensed acupuncturist, long-time political activist, and financier
of the Club for Growth PAC. In addition to sitting on the board of U.S. and Oregon's
Term Limits, he also sits on the board of Americans for Limited Government
(Ballotpedia, 2009A) Restore Oregon's Term Limits received the bulk of its funding
from the Illinois-based group, U.S. Term Limits, whose top donor is Howard Rich —
the primary financier and chairman of Americans for Limited Government (Moore,
2006). U.S. Term Limits, a 501(c)(3) that lobbies for term limits nationally and has
financed ballot measure campaigns in several states in the U.S., contributed $1.24
million of the $1.25 million for ballot measure 45 in Oregon's 2006 election. Measure
45 sought to reinstate term limits in Oregon after the Oregon Supreme Court's 2002
ruling that the 1992 initiative establishing term limits in the state was unconstitutional
(Ballotpedia, 2009).
The National Taxpayer's Union (NTU), a 501(c)(3), which contributed the
fourth highest sum to the spending limit (48) campaign with $103,642 or 7.4 percent
of the total, is based in Alexandria, Virginia. NTU was founded in 1969 by James
Dale Davidson, and advocates for a national flat tax, elimination of the "death tax,"23
and a constitutional balanced budget amendment. Grover Norquist of Americans for
Tax Reform, served as NTU's Executive Director in the early 1980s (Ballotpedia,
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2009). In addition to advocating at the national level and publishing scorecards for
members of Congress on tax issues, the NTU works with local and state anti-tax
organizations on ballot measures and policy issues. Listed on the NTU web site as
allied taxpayer groups in Oregon include: The Cascade Policy Institute;24 Oregon
Taxpayers Union; Oregon Taxpayers United; Oregonians in Action;25 and the
Taxpayer Association of Oregon (National Taxpayers Union, 2009). NTU is funded
primarily by the Olin, Scaife, and Bradley Foundations (Media Transparency, 2009).
Although ALG, U.S. Term Limits, Club for Growth, and National Taxpayers
Union are distinct legal entities, the interlocking directorates and interests that
dominate these groups represent powerful moneyed interests that share a neoliberal
ideology and agenda. These entities active in the Oregon initiative process work to
reduce the regulatory power of both state and federal government, enact tax cuts for
corporations and wealthy individuals, and shift resources and power to the private
sector. The Club for Growth, for example, has "more than 9,000 members yet is
dominated by Wall Street financiers and executives" (People for the American Way,
2008). Working in their rational self-interest, powerful private interests have
constructed an exceptionally well-funded infrastructure pressing a corporate,
conservative, neoliberal philosophy and ruling framework (Media Transparency,
2009A). The use of front groups and PACs active in state I&R campaigns effectively
camouflages the sources financing these efforts, and often results in campaigns
appropriating populist rhetorical appeals.
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As described earlier in this study, corporate, elite-interest-funded think tanks
provide another layer of cover for the primary sources of funding for political
activities that include ballot measures. Although both the local media and the wellfunded opposition campaign to the spending limit initiative (48) exposed Howard
Rich's financing of ALG and therefore the signature-gathering effort behind the
measure, there was no mention of the critical role foundations and think tanks play in
these efforts, let alone the corporate interests and wealthy individuals funding these
influential organizations. Moreover, both the media coverage and the opposition
campaign's focus was on Howard Rich the man, with virtually no discussion of the
structural features undergirding these activities. Still, considering the respective
missions of local newspapers and political campaign literature, there should be no
expectation that such a structural analysis would or should take place. However, the
consequence is that voters are left with little context lurching from election to election
and ballot measure to ballot measure, with superficial knowledge of the underlying
forces at work.
Domination of public discourse by market fundamentalism compels opposition
groups, such as the unions and public sector supporters active in the campaigns
discussed here, to defend a status quo that has been under attack for approximately
four decades (Rich, 2004; Boggs, 2000). As articulated most famously by Gramsci,
even in a diverse society, the norms of the dominant sector of society become
naturalized as institutions commanding the greatest influence reflect the interests of
the ruling class (Hoare & Nowell-Smith, 1983). To the extent that public discourse is
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dominated by neoliberal principles promoting privatization and the superiority of the
market, public sector interests are placed on the defensive. From the perspective of
interests financing efforts to weaken unions and the public sector, I&R's reputation as
a populist mechanism representing a counterbalance to powerful, entrenched interests
makes it an ideal instrument to advance such a message.
The Taxpayers Association of Oregon PAC was the fifth largest contributor to
the spending limit Measure (48) in Oregon's 2006 general election (Money in Politics
Research Action Project, 2006). As mentioned previously, 94 percent of the
Taxpayers Association of Oregon's PAC funding came from Americans for Limited
Government (ALG). The TAO PAC contributed $90,773, or 6.5 percent of the
funding to the campaign effort for TABOR (48) (Money in Politics Research Action
Project, 2006). Thus, fully 97.1 percent of the total contributions to the spending limit
initiative emanated from the aforementioned five, primarily out-of-state, tax-exempt
lobbying groups with heavy financial investments from Howard Rich.
Arguments from the 2006 Oregon Voter's Pamphlet supporting TABOR (48)
demonstrate the attractiveness of I&R as a means for private organized interests to
couch its neoliberal agenda in populist rhetoric. Jason Williams of the largely ALGfunded Taxpayer Association of Oregon asserts, "Measure 48 hands Citizens the
Power to Stop Overspending." And he further claims "It returns power to the people"
(Oregon Secretary of State, 2006). During the course of the 2006 campaign, media
accounts and editorials, as well as significant campaign expenditures by opposition
groups, did reveal that Howard Rich was a key financial backer of TABOR (48) and
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the federal tax deduction initiative (41), as well as Measure 45 seeking to establish
term limits. Moreover, in elections during the past decade, no doubt many Oregon
voters are well aware of Bill Sizemore's activities, and to a much lesser degree,
Grover Norquist. Still, these individuals come and go, while the more enduring
private interests that they work for and represent play a more or less permanent role in
U.S. politics and elections. Yet it is these more enduring interests, as evidenced by the
abundance of largely corporate-funded foundations and think tanks that are essentially
invisible to I&R voters. Oregon I&R voters may be aware of Sizemore, Rich, and
Norquist, but they would be hard-pressed to detail the political activities and financing
emanating from the Scaife, Olin, and Bradley Foundations. And for this reason, they
would be even less likely to be aware of the corporate financing of these foundations
and think tanks.
The state's largest paper the Oregonian editorialized about the spending limit
(48) on September 17, 2006 arguing:
Measure 48 is on the ballot only because New York millionaire, Howard Rich,
and his anti-tax, anti-government group are using Oregon's open initiative
system to press their conservative beliefs about slashing public spending. Rich
and his group have put up more than one million dollars to change Oregon
Law {Oregonian, 2006).

Newspaper editorials opposing the spending limit (48) in part attest to the
ability of having a well-funded opposition campaign, and in this particular instance the
wherewithal to target newspaper editorial boards throughout the state. As documented
below, the union-based Defend Oregon Coalition opposing TABOR (48) and the
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federal tax deduction Measure (41) had newspaper editorial boards as a specific
element of their overall communications plan. Displaying the utility of campaign
experience, and more importantly sufficient financial resources, the campaign had
specific hired positions for those in charge of producing and disseminating literature
for editorial boards (known as press packets) and creating and maintaining
relationships with members of the media. One would be hard pressed to find amateur,
purely citizen-based groups with the savvy and resources for similarly effective
advocacy.
Nevertheless, despite the successful tactics of the union coalition and its ability
to raise significant funds for their opposition campaign, the union and public sector
coalition's campaign activities represents more of a triumph of the very hegemonic
political, ideological, and economic principles the coalition and other public sector
groups seek to counter. Those principles consist of the penetration of the market,
commercialism, technification, deregulation, entreprenuership, consumer choice and
personal responsibility. As described earlier in Chapter Two of this study in reference
to the works of Habermas, Chomsky, and especially Gramsci in his discussion of
hegemony, participation in the processes that reproduce hegemonic ideology
constitutes a form of ideological control. For Gramsci and Habermas, the elaborate
structure of liberal democracy that includes courts, parliaments (the legislative
branch), and elections, creates a facade of freedom and popular control by "educating"
the citizens in the legitimacy of the existing set of social relations (Femia, 1987;
Habermas, 1975). Union and public sector interests are now firmly ensconced in the
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political spectacle (Edelman, 1988) that is the twenty-first century I&R. The result
has been the creation of a more or less permanent fundraising and campaign entity —
Our Oregon — extensive use of information and communication technologies of
political control (Sussman, 2005), a political marketing infrastructure consisting of
consultants and vendors specializing in the entire array of campaign activities and
functions, expertise in psuedo-events, soundbite communication, evocative messaging,
ongoing relationships with corporate media enterprises, and the ability to fashion a
successful campaign that addresses citizens in the manner of exchange relations
focused on short-term electoral victory. The very principles and ideology of an
increasingly privatized, market-centered, individualistic political economy are
essentially embedded in and reproduced by I&R electioneering activities of public
sector interests.
Technological Determinism
The dominant discourse concerning information and communication
technologies used in political campaigns is that they are neutral tools. As neutral tools
available for an I&R campaign, it is firmly up to the user(s) to either use technologies
wisely or poorly, effectively or ineffectively, for good or for ill. A corollary to this is
the belief that technological change and advancement is inevitable, overwhelmingly
positive, and that it is usually the result of sometimes random and often unexpected
discoveries by lone scientists or hobbyists in a lab or garage. Apart from ignoring the
historical, political, and cultural contexts within which all technologies are envisioned,
incentivized, manufactured, conceived, and ultimately used, these predominant beliefs
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typically reinforce a third largely unexamined perspective concerning technology that
is technological determinism.
Technological determinism refers to the notion that the driving force for social
and historical change is technological change, and that technology is typically the
determinative force in a cause and effect relationship. Technological deterministic
beliefs and explanations dominate our public discourse. "The internet is killing the
newspaper industry." "The cellphone caused the car accident." Despite appearing to
contradict the principle that technologies are neutral tools, the controlling discourse
regarding cause and effect often favors a technological deterministic narrative.
The prevailing dominant theory of information and communication
technologies views the extensive use of sophisticated technologies in the campaign to
oppose the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) measures as a
demonstration of not only the successful use of the latest in campaign-related
instruments and techniques, but the level playing field that is the initiative campaign.
Moreover, it would lead to the conclusion that the victory of public sector and union
interests exhibits the triumph of the Defend Oregon and Our Oregon project. Yet such
a view ignores the larger political economic forces constituting these information and
communication technologies and their utilization in I&R campaigns.
The dial-tester, database technology, GIS mapping, and other instruments and
techniques have been envisioned, researched, manufactured, and shaped and honed by
corporate, commodity-producing and retailing entities primarily for sales and
marketing applications in the commercial sector. Such techniques and technologies
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construct voters/citizens as targets/consumers by approaching them in the manner of
private exchange relations. The technologically-mediated campaign demonstrates that
elections and politics have increasingly become exercises in public relations and
"spin" focused primarily on the production of language manipulation, evocative
imagery, and the targeting of segmented groups with discrete understandings of the
measures. In contrast to the grassroots politicking and neighborhood, small-group,
and even one-on-one engagement that is foundational to building a strong democracy
as defined by Barber (1984), and emblematic of I&R, the very public sector and union
groups potentially benefiting the most from such democracy-building activities, have
adopted the methodologies of the very interests they seek to resist.
The federal tax deduction initiative, Ballot Measure 41 in Oregon's 2006
election, was another high-profile, high stakes initiative provoking an intense struggle
between rivals with several heated campaigns under their respective belts. Below I
chronicle key contribution and expenditure data for the chief proponents and
opponents of the federal tax deduction Measure (41) as well as provide relevant
information concerning the sources of those funds.
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Table 3, Notable Expenditures in the 2006 Ballot Measure Election
Notable Expenditures in the 2006 Ballot Measure Election
Data is grouped by PAC, not by PAC and measure, so while only groups that worked on
Measures 41 and 48 are included, the followin g figures represent all their work, not just their
work on Measure 41 or 48.
Rainy Day Amendment Committee

$386,788.00
$382,788.00
$150,000.00
$39,309.77
$18,513.20
$16,085.00
$826.00
$524.00

10/05/06
PATRICK MEDIA
10/16/06
PATRICK MEDIA
10/20/06
PATRICK MEDIA
10/27/06
PATRICK MEDIA
10/11/06
ART40RM
10/03/06
ART40RM
08/21/06
ART40RM
10/10/06
ART40RM
Total spent on media and political consulting: about $950,000

Source: Oregon Secretary of State, 2009.

Money in Initiatives II: Measure 41 in Oregon's 2006 General Election
The ballot title for the federal tax deduction (41) in Oregon's 2006 general
election read: "Allows income tax deduction equal to federal exemptions deduction to
substitute for state exemption credit" (Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, 2006). The chief
petitioners for the federal tax deduction Measure (41) were Russ Walker, who was at
the time of the election director of the Oregon chapter of Citizens for a Sound
Economy (now FreedomWorks) and Carol and Abner Bobo, residents of Oregon City,
Oregon. The Bobos have been longtime allies of Sizemore and sponsors of
conservative ballot measures that his operation has placed on the ballot. The federal
tax deduction (41) would have changed how the state of Oregon calculates income
taxes. Measure 41 sought to permit filers to take a tax deduction equal to the amount
deducted on federal taxes. The voter's pamphlet explanatory statement clarified that
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passage of the measure would result in a loss of money to the state's general fund, and
that the shortfall would increase in subsequent years. Opponents repeated the claim
that the retroactive measure would mean an approximate loss of $150 million dollars
to the state's general fund annually (Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, 2006). Reflecting the
neoliberal principles of the corporate-funded front groups, and similar to the Measure
48 spending limit, the revenue loss from the federal tax deduction would force
reductions in the public employee union workforce, and would further weaken
Oregon's public sector programs and services. Proponents of the measure portrayed
the federal tax deduction as a means to allow taxpayers to keep more of their hardearned money, and argued that the government should not confiscate any more money
than is necessary. The theme of the government as essentially an expropriator of
taxpayer money is oft-repeated theme of the neoliberal rhetorical arsenal.
For the federal tax deduction (41) "yes" campaign, FreedomWorks (see below)
contributed $18,951 or 90.3 percent of the total contributions. The Taxpayer Defense
Fund contributed $1,525 or 7.3 percent. And Oregon Citizens for a Sound Economy
contributed $500 or 2.4 percent (Money in Politics Research Action Project, 2008).
Although contribution records indicate separate umbrella PACs (political action
committees that are used to collect and distribute money for more than one initiative
campaign) for the federal tax deduction (41) (FreedomWorks PAC) and the spending
limit (48) (RainyDay Amendment Committee), interviewees explained that money
traveled back and forth among the various PACs for the federal tax deduction (41) and
spending limit (48) therefore making it difficult to identify precise figures (Thompson,
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personal communication, 2008; Black, personal communication, 2008; Wimmer,
personal communication, 2008).
As reported in a newspaper interview with one of the chief petitioners for the
federal tax deduction (41), the purported reason such a relatively small amount of
money was spent for a campaign in support of the measure was because
FreedomWorks wanted to focus its resources in Oregon on Ballot Measure 40 which
sought to change how judges are elected. Opponents claimed that the paltry
expenditure for the federal tax deduction measure (41) is evidence that the primary
goal of the measure was to force unions to expend resources seeking its defeat
(Associated Press, 2006A). Another common reason that proponents of a ballot
measure ultimately decide not to mount a vigorous campaign is polling results
indicating the unlikelihood of an electoral victory (Wagner, personal communication,
2009). Regardless of the most compelling reason(s) for a limited electoral campaign,
the federal tax deduction measure advanced the neoliberal agenda by placing unions
on the defensive, and promulgating the argument that government is the enemy of the
people, and that defunding it is at the heart of any populist project.
FreedomWorks is a 501(c)(4) national organization headed by former House
Majority Leader Republican Dick Armey of Texas, which advocates for lower taxes
and less government (FreedomWorks, 2008). The organization has affiliates in
several states in the U.S. including a chapter in Oregon. Originally founded as
Citizens for a Sound Economy, it merged with Empower America, an organization
headed by 1996 Republican vice presidential candidate and former congressman Jack
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Kemp, to form what is now know as FreedomWorks. Magazine magnate and former
Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes is the most prominent member of its
Board of Directors (Sourcewatch, 2008).
FreedomWorks (acting at that time under its former name, Citizens for a Sound
Economy (CSE)) was instrumental in the signature-gathering drive and subsequent
successful campaign for Oregon's Measure 30 in 2004. Measure 30 was a referendum
that overturned a $ 1.1 billion tax package that had been passed by the Oregon
Legislature. A national organization, CSE had a local affiliate, Oregon Citizens for a
Sound Economy (OCSE). In the 2004 Measure 30 campaign, Washington, DC-based
CSE sent its Oregon chapter over $105,000, which constituted approximately 25
percent of total contributions raised by OCSE. CSE's total contributions for the
OCSE Measure 30 campaign amounted to about 10 percent of the total spent for the
campaign. Because of CSE's nonprofit status, Oregon voters would have had little to
no idea who had contributed to this organization that was a major player in the
campaign. Ultimately, documents leaked to the Washington Post in the late 1990s
showed that the millions of dollars in contributions to CSE that had ostensibly come
from its quarter of a million members had actually flowed from large corporate
interests such as Exxon, U.S. Sugar, Qwest, Microsoft, and Philip Morris, as well as
the Scaife, Lynde and Harry Bradley, Olin, and Koch Family Foundations (Garrett &
Smith, 2005, pp. 313, 314).
Another organization that was active in supporting the federal tax deduction
(41) was the Center for Union Facts, a Washington D.C.-based front group created by
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Berman & Co., a public relations firm responsible for a host of such front groups
representing corporate interests. The Center spent over $1 million for radio,
television, and print advertisements in Oregon, Michigan, Montana, and Nevada
during the 2006 election cycle. The aforementioned states all had advertisements that
were widely viewed as anti-labor since they criticized the level of taxpayer-support of
public employee pensions, wages, and benefits. The executive director of the Center,
lobbyist Richard Berman, explained that the group's decision to place advertisements
in Oregon and other states during the 2006 election period was influenced by the
initiatives on the ballot. In an article on the subject, Berman stated that the ballot
measures "were a factor but not a controlling factor" in the decision to place
advertisements in Oregon and other states with anti-public employee union measures.
However, in a separate article Berman explained that the group's anti-union
advertisements would only run in states with an initiative process. In Oregon, the
advertisements, which targeted public school teachers, appeared in the cities of
Eugene, Portland, Medford and Klamath Falls. Don Mclntire, one of the chief
petitioners for the spending limit (48), explained that although his campaign was not
connected to Berman's group, he was delighted that Center for Union Facts
advertisements were airing in Oregon (Hogan, 2006, August 25; Wright, 2006, August
22).
Financial support for the Center for Union Facts is difficult to identify,
although executive director Berman explained that approximately $2.5 million of their
support had come from private companies, trade organizations and individuals
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(Chapman, 2006, February 14). Berman & Co. is responsible for creating a host of
front groups and web sites ostensibly representing grassroots, issue-oriented
enterprises that simply represent anti-union corporate interests primarily from the
restaurant, hotel, and tobacco industries. Among a myriad of other "astroturf' groups
they run, Berman & Co. created the Employment Policies Institute (EPI) complete
with web site, press releases, and full-page advertisements in publications such as the
New York Times, and disseminate an anti-labor message for its corporate clients. The
name of the front group and its acronym closely resembles those of the progressive,
well-established Economic Policy Institute (also EPI). Berman's EPI also owns the
web site domain names "minimumwage.com" and "livingwage.com" used to discredit
the politics of labor (O'Donnell, 2006; Sourcewatch, 2009). In addition to the Center
for Union Facts and the Employment Policies Institute, Berman & Co. is also
responsible for the Center for Consumer Freedom (formerly GuestChoice Network)
funded by the likes of Coca-Cola, Monsanto, and Tyson Foods. The Center's web site
explains that its mission is "devoted to promoting personal responsibility and
protecting consumer choices" (Sourcewatch, 2009; Center for Consumer Freedom,
2009).
With unlimited contributions permitted for initiatives, and political action
committees often adopting euphemistic and/or creative names, knowledge of the
identity of measure financiers is often incumbent upon investigative reporting or an
initiative's opponents illuminating the sources of the funding to the voters in their
campaign communication. Thus in Oregon, voters examining contribution and
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expenditure records may have come across initiative PACs with names such as these
taken from Oregon elections, "We pay for all of ours, we pay for all of yours, it is too
much... — yes," and "Let's shine a little light on 'em and see them scamper"
(Buttermore & Thompson, 2008, p. 25). Moreover, contributions, regardless of their
size, that come late in a measure campaign often are not available to voters until after
the election.
The federal tax deduction measure (41) is another example of an initiative that
is ostensibly the work of an independent, Oregon-based group, yet in reality is largely
the consequence of financing from a national corporate-funded entity. As mentioned
in Chapter One of this study, groups that present themselves as independent,
grassroots entities have been labeled astroturf groups with a metaphorical nod to the
synthetic material used on athletic fields that substitutes for natural grass. The state
director of Oregon FreedomWorks is Russ Walker. Walker also serves as the vicechair of the Oregon Republican Party. Additionally, Walker was a spokesperson for
the Taxpayer Defense Fund in the federal tax deduction (41) campaign (Oregon
Voter's Pamphlet, 2006).
FreedomWorks' astrorurfing activity made national news in 2004 during the
Bush Administration's effort to privatize social security. The New York Times
reported that a FreedomWorks employee, Sandra Jacques, was introduced by the
White House Budget Director Joshua Bolten as a single mom from Iowa who
supported social security privatization because she wanted to be certain that her
daughter would be able to retire with security. However, it was ultimately revealed
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that Sandra Jacques was an employee of FreedomWorks, and the state director of "For
Our Grandchildren," a front group for social security privatization.
More recently, FreedomWorks, including the Oregon chapter, was a driving
force behind the tax day tea parties that took place at many state capitals and other
locations throughout the U.S. on April 15, 2009. Hoping to evoke the revolutionary
nature of the iconic Boston Tea Party, FreedomWorks and two other corporate, eliteinterest-funded groups organized and helped to fund these pseudo-events (Good,
2009). Experience with public relations activities such as the creation of front groups,
manufacturing pseudo-events, and working to create the perception of communitybased, grassroots support of one's cause, all provide relevant experience for ballot
measure campaigns. In essence, this reinforces the utility of having in place an
infrastructure of financiers and organizations with the resources to mount signature
gathering and other I&R campaign activities.
Contributions and Expenditures in Opposition to Measures 48 and 41
In contrast to the contributions for the proponents of the spending limit (48)
and federal tax deduction (41), the majority of union contributions for the opposition
campaign are more difficult to tease out since the union-heavy coalition formed an
umbrella PAC, Defend Oregon, primarily to oppose both Measures 48 and 41. While
the contribution total for proponents of TABOR (48) was $1,400,895, records indicate
that Defend Oregon contributions in opposing both Measures 48 and 41, total
$3,523,849 (Money in Politics Research Action Project, 2006). Although records do
not provide the contribution breakdown by measure, it is highly likely, and confirmed
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in interviews, that the opposition attracted and spent considerably more money than
did the proponents for both the spending limit (48) and the federal tax deduction (41)
(Grove, personal communication, 2008; Wimmer, personal communication, 2008).
Approximately 70 percent of the contributions for the spending limit (48) and
federal tax deduction (41) opposition campaigns came from public employee unions
(Money in Politics Research Action Project, 2006). The Oregon Education
Association was the top contributor with $814,031 or 23.1 percent of the total. The
national chapter of the American Association of Retired Persons, the AARP,
contributed $399,712 or 11.3 percent of the total. The remaining seven unions
contributing included:
Service Employees International Union Local 295 with $295,230 or 8.4 percent;
American Federation of Teacher's Issue PAC at $275,000 or 7.8 percent; AARP
Oregon at $230,683 or 6.5 percent; Oregon American Federation of State County
Municipal Employees Council 75 at $204,513 or 5.8 percent; Oregon School
Employees Association with $201,000, or 5.7 percent; SEIU National with $152,763
or 4.3 percent; Oregon AFL-CIO at $90,880 or 2.6 percent (Money in Politics
Research Action Project, 2006). It should be acknowledged that in contrast to the
sometimes very small number of contributors to the proponents of the spending limit
(48) and the federal tax deduction (41), the union and public sector interests consist of
tens of thousands of individual members.
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Behind the Scenes Maneuvering: Measure 41
As has become a typical pattern for initiatives in Oregon involving anti-tax
activists and public employee unions, the battle was officially joined during the
comment period for certification of the ballot title. In response to the proposed ballot
title for Measure 41, chief petitioner Don Mclntire submitted a five-page comment
seeking alterations in the language in the title, the ramifications of a "yes" or "no"
vote, as well as the summary of the proposed constitutional amendment. Likewise,
attorneys Steve Novick (candidate in the Democratic primary for the U.S. senate in
2008) and Margaret Olney each submitted three and five-page comments on the
proposed battle title, the significance of "yes" or "no" votes, as well as on the
proposed summary for the voter's pamphlet on behalf of opponents such as the
Oregon Education Association. Battles over the proposed language for the voter's
pamphlet demonstrate several things regarding the initiative process.
First, as explained in an interview with one of the chief opponents of the
measure, ballot titles are a valuable political asset, "the coin of the realm" in the words
of this experienced politico (Nesbitt, personal communication, 2008). Ballot titles are
a valuable commodity because they permit chief petitioners to raise money from
interest groups and individuals in addition to permitting the signature-gathering
process to begin in earnest. Petitioners and their fundraising consultants can leverage
a promising ballot title into large contributions — especially if they have benchmark
polling illustrating initially favorable public opinion. Second, absent a sophisticated
understanding of current statutory and/or constitutional law, or more likely, the
186

Case Studies
inability to pay for the assistance of an election attorney, a citizen without prior
initiative campaign experience would be hard-pressed to withstand challenges from
opponents with access to such resources. Also, this jockeying for language takes place
with virtually no recognition on the part of the voters. While media stories might
cover the fact that a battle over language took place, more than likely such stories
never make the front page or become known by the public. Moreover, the substance
of such battles, although now available on the secretary of state's web site, are not
likely to be seen by anyone beyond those directly involved in debate.
Finally, the time and resources spent during this period demonstrate the
significance of the ballot title and the language in the voter's pamphlet. While this is
certainly no surprise to both advocates and political professionals with experience in
initiative campaigns, the voting public is largely ignorant that such pitched battles
have even taken place. Although this may have no influence on voting behavior, it is
another element of the initiative process where organized interests jockey for
advantage and flex their financial muscles essentially beyond the gaze of a citizenry
ostensibly controlling the process.
The federal tax deduction (41) in the 2006 general election, which pit the state
chapter of a national anti-tax organization against public employee unions, also
witnessed a battle over the proposed ballot title and the descriptions of the results of a
"yes or "no" vote (Oregon Secretary of State, 2006). Following submission of the
proposed language for the aforementioned elements of the petition signature sheets
and voter's pamphlet, an attorney representing the AFL-CIO and Oregon AFSCME
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filed a two-page comment seeking changes in the proposed language. Ultimately, the
arguments presented by the unions' lawyers were successful in making the case that
the title should clarify that the proposed measure would authorize taxpayers to replace
their personal tax exemption credit with the federal deduction.
The Campaigns to Oppose Measures 48 and 41 in Oregon's 2006 Election
As detailed below, for strategic purposes, the federal tax deduction (41) was
linked by its opponents to the spending limit (48) in the successful campaign to defeat
both measures. The federal tax deduction (41) would have permitted taxpayers to use
the same personal exemption they receive on federal taxes on their state income tax
returns. The projected loss of revenue to the state's general fund per biennium
(Oregon is one of a handful of states that has biennial legislative sessions) from the
federal tax deduction (41) was estimated at $400 million (Oregonian, 2006, p. C5).
The federal tax deduction would have restricted the amount of money state
government could raise through the income tax, and therefore would have resulted in
the loss of public sector unionized jobs in addition to cutting programs and services.
The campaign expenditures and activities described below exhibit both the
high stakes of these I&R for the groups involved, as well as the intricacy of the
political marketing employed especially by the opponents of the spending limit (48)
and the federal tax deduction (41). The capital-intensive initiative campaign
operations detailed here illustrate the degree of sophistication and
"professionalization" of this ostensibly grassroots, amateur process. The advanced
political marketing strategies and techniques along with the incorporation of the
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highly-developed information and communication technologies employed in these
campaigns demonstrate the degree to which many initiative campaigns resemble the
cycle of commodity production. There is in initiative campaigns an increasingly
routine use of focus groups, advertising/branding strategies and techniques, media
saturation, and a focus on voter (consumer) gratifications. The scientific management
of public opinion, or to use Habermas's term, the "scientificization" of politics,
includes mass customization, productive surveillance, voter segmentation, and a host
of market-oriented sales regimes (Mancini & Swanson, 1996). This broader use of
instrumental means to control the process of information, voter behavior, and political
outcomes constructs citizens/voters as consumers/targets "addressing them within the
set of social relations that have been created for other purposes" (Garnham, 1990, p.
I l l ; Sussman& Galizio, 2003).
The scholarly literature concerning the increasing use of political consultants
in I&R campaigns — "professionalization" of direct democracy — essentially
naturalizes the market-oriented, technologically-mediated I&R campaigns run by
political campaign operatives. The instrumental logic that views these changes as
simply the result of modernization of technology ignores the larger changes taking
place through neoliberalism in the economic sphere and deregulation in civil society
and the public sphere (Sussman & Galizio, 2003). The professionalization thesis
extant in the literature on political consultants in direct legislation compels a
counterthesis that rejects the notion that the privatization and colonization of the
public sphere by organized interests represents the natural order of things.
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Furthermore, such a focus shifts the attention away from the neoliberal capitalist
interests that have largely captured a process created to fight entrenched economic and
political power. The campaign case studies reflect the escalating pace of the
commodification of public life, and the increasing informaticization of the relationship
between political activists and campaigners, and its effects on a progressively more
depoliticized and alienated public.
Interviews with labor and public sector advocates consistently expressed their
belief that they were compelled to spend large amounts of money and hire political
consultants in order to defeat the measures because of the severe political damage that
the initiatives would do to the public sector and their union members (Black, personal
communication, 2009; Nesbitt, personal communication, 2009). Attractive and/or
simplistic ballot titles, in combination with four decades of anti-government, antiunion propaganda from corporate interests necessitates union and public sector leaders
to mount an aggressive response. And with I&R campaigns more and more about
effective public relations activities and techniques, political operatives are used by
labor to manage the resistance efforts.
Yet the scholarly focus on the political consultants themselves and the
ostensible professionalization of the campaign process shifts the gaze from the
enlarged industrial context within which the formal political process operates. Absent
a consideration of the industrial characteristics of electioneering, the focus on
professionalization appears a natural phenomenon based solely on progress and the
advancement of technology (Sussman, 2005, p. 58). It ignores the penetration of
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market-fundamentalism and technification of everyday life. I&R political campaigns,
with the assistance of political consultants (a.k.a "spin doctors"), are becoming
virtually indistinguishable from corporate public relations and commodity advertising.
Yet for these reasons even the targets of corporate propaganda efforts feel compelled
to respond by employing the same mind managers and using the same persuasion and
marketing technologies and techniques. It also places public sector advocates and
unions in a position where they must concentrate their efforts and resources on
fundraising. This inevitably places already-weakened unions and a vilified public
sector in the position of appealing to its often financially insecure union employees for
monetary support. Union and public sector leaders describe a membership that is
often fatigued and suffers from low morale as the biennial campaign cycle reproduces
hard-hitting anti-union rhetoric, and seemingly unceasing requests for contributions
from leaders to oppose another round of potentially damaging ballot measures
(Wagner, personal communication, 2009; Allen, personal communication, 2009).
According to internal campaign documents for the coalition in opposition to
the spending limit (48) and the federal tax deduction (41), approximately $100,000
was spent for a June focus group, a benchmark poll, tracking polls, dial testing
analysis, and so-called "robocalls" (robocalls refer to automated phone calls using a
computerized autodialer and computer-delivered recorded message). Robocalls
(automated, computer-generated phone calls) represent one of several communication
technology-applications that have been adopted by political campaigns) and telephone
banks (Defend Oregon, 2006). An expenditure for paid staff to run the campaigns
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totaling approximately $91,000 included payment for the following positions:
outreach director, education and business community organizer, civic organizer,
deputy campaign manager, communications director, and fundraising assistant.
Finally, advertising and communications costs totaling approximately $1.85 million
included: $1.46 million for television advertising, $203,500 for television production,
$106,000 for direct mail, $38,000 for community event mailings, and $34,500 for
television advertisements in response to the proponent's efforts (Defend Oregon,
2006).
The level of campaign specialization and the division of labor suggests an
industrial model wherein campaign workers perform discrete tasks and somewhat
standardized functions following a model perfected over several election cycles. Still,
the overwhelming majority of the campaign expenditures are reserved for mediated
discourse consisting primarily of 30-second broadcast advertisements.
Interviews with advocates and consultants active in I&R campaigns discussed
in the present study revealed that a post-campaign debriefing involving the
consultants, financiers, and advocates active in the campaigns had become standard
practice. With repeat measures on the ballot typically involving the same dueling
combatants, the post-election debriefing has become a valuable means to discuss
successful and unsuccessful campaign tactics and strategies (Wimmer, personal
communication, 2008; Allen, personal communication, 2009; Wagner, personal
communication, 2009). To provide some insight into the inner-workings of a well-
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funded opposition initiative campaign, what follows is a summary of the campaign
plan debriefing of November 15, 2006.
For the November 2006 election, the first polling conducted by the opposition
to the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) occurred in the first week of
August 2006. The results of the polling "helped craft our message," according to the
campaign director Phil Donovan, who explained that:
To be seen as a credible source of information, we know that three things are
necessary: a broad-based coalition, local spokespeople that represent a variety
of livelihoods and political affiliations, and funding from sources other than
labor unions (Donovan, personal communication, 2008).
The August polling informed the opposition that shoring up the base of Democrats and
independents in the most liberal counties in the state, Multnomah and Lane, was an
initial priority. In discussing the ultimate objectives of the campaign, in addition to
successfully linking the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) and
ensuring their defeat, the campaign manager identified a second priority to "Win
convincingly in order to send a message to out-of-state interests that Oregon is not a
place where they can expect to advance their right wing agenda" (Donovan, personal
communication, 2008).
A view widely circulated among public sector political campaign veterans in
Oregon is that I&R has become an effective means by which private corporate and
neoliberal interests strategically fund initiative campaigns in states such as Oregon.
Even if a majority of multi-state initiative efforts fail at the ballot box, the payoff in
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discovering another issue such as the successfully constructed property tax revolt that
begin with California's Proposition 13 in 1978, is enormous.
The outreach plan included a concerted effort to get endorsing organizations to
direct their members to the Defend Oregon Web site to sign on as "Defenders of
Oregon" so that the campaign could use those individuals' names in newspaper
advertisements to illustrate the support of local members of the community. Equally
important for the campaign was obtaining the email addresses of supporters for future
communication as well as for the solicitation of campaign contributions. The effort
included identifying people who would sign their names to letters to the editor that
would be written by the campaign's consultants.
Such efforts reflect the presence of a more or less permanent infrastructure for
I&R campaigns. After several election cycles fighting repeat measures threatening the
public sector and its union members, the Defend Oregon Coalition fully anticipates
reconstituting itself in the next election cycle and therefore incorporates fundraising
activities into every available campaign activity. Furthermore, similar to techniques
employed by commodity advertisers, invitations to "participate" in an activity often
disguise what Andrejivic refers to as productive surveillance. Here a campaign
supporter may willingly reveal a name and an email address to exhibit local support,
yet for the campaign the greater value lies in the contact information for future
financial solicitations.
Another campaign tactic was the organization of six events that would take
place between September and October outside of the heavily populated Portland and
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Eugene areas. In order to drum up support for the events, targeted households
received robocalls and direct mail invitations. Individuals attending these meetings
viewed a slickly produced DVD advocating opposition to both measures. In the postelection wrap up, the campaign manager suggested that for future campaigns the
location of these constructed local events should be based on "media markets more
than anything else" to maximize their impact. In addition to communicating with
voters attending the event, an additional function was to obtain media coverage to
demonstrate local support for the campaign.
Grove Insight, a polling and communications firm in Portland, Oregon,
conducted the public opinion research for the campaign. A focus group in June 2006
was convened which was used "primarily to help us determine how to talk about
Measure 41" (Defend Oregon, 2006). Additionally, Grove Insight conducted an
August Benchmark poll, dial tests for television advertisements, and three tracking
polls in the final weeks of the campaign (Defend Oregon, 2006). Costs for each were
listed as: $12,400 for the June Focus Groups; $34,650 for the August Benchmark Poll;
$16,000 for the dial test regarding paid media; $13,460 for the October 9 to 11
tracking poll; $7,425 for the October 21 to 23 tracking poll; and $11,425 for the
November tracking poll (Defend Oregon, 2006). Fundraising as of November 13,
2006 was listed as $461,209, or 20.4 percent of the total from businesses and
individuals. And the remaining 79.6 percent, or $1,797,255 from labor unions, for a
total of $2,258,465 for the "No" campaign (Defend Oregon, 2006).
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In a summary entitled "strategies" at the conclusion of the post-election
analysis, it was noted that the campaign was successful at reaching out to "umbrella
groups" and gaining their support. The groups mentioned included business
associations, industry trade groups, institutions of higher education, and other
education foundations.
Neither in the report, nor in subsequent interviews with the campaign
managers and staff, was there any mention of attempts to mobilize new voters or to
involve individuals in the campaign who were not members of interest groups already
part of the coalition. Consistent with the thesis put forth by Schier (2000) and
mentioned earlier in this study, the campaign focused on activating likely voters and
citizens from groups already participating in part of the campaign, rather than
attempting to mobilize groups and individuals not already involved in the political
process. The evidence from the campaigns against the spending limit (48) and federal
tax deduction (41) demonstrate political consultants' preference for command and
control of every aspect of the effort. Volunteers are relegated to either minor roles or
more commonly merely symbolic participation in what is claimed to be the most
grassroots, citizen-inspired electoral system. The evidence from these campaigns
reinforces Putnam's argument that the recent rise in ballot measures is more likely the
result of special interests rather than civic engagement (Putnam, 2000).
Analysis from the polling indicated that despite an almost identical measure on
the ballot in Oregon's 2000 general election (Measure 91) from the same chief
petitioner, voters surveyed had virtually no recognition of this fact. According to the
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pollster, "we have a lot of empty heads to fill" (Defend Oregon, 2006, p. 67).
Similarly, in discussing the need to employ a multi-pronged communications strategy,
the pollster concluded: "Like we have seen with past initiatives at this point in the
cycle, few beyond the chattering class are paying attention to these proposals. It's
time to wake up the base" (Defend Oregon, 2006, p. 68).
In his work on public opinion polling, Justin Lewis explains that despite the
popular belief that pollsters merely report results using methodologically objective
means, it is more accurate to identify their work as constructing public opinion.
Public opinion polling must be seen within the framework of public relations where its
use is ubiquitous. Polling, as in the case of the ballot measure campaigns under
consideration here, is generally influenced greatly by the interests commissioning the
poll. Thus, rather than decontextualized, open-ended questions, participants are
typically used by groups seeking the most efficacious language, arguments, and
symbols that they can use to persuade their target audience(s). Polling is more about
opinion management than opinion discovery. In the case of ballot measures, polling
may result in the identification of themes and arguments that have little to do with the
substantive policies on the ballot. In this way, rather than facilitating a constructive
debate on issues confronting voters, polling is just as likely to result in highly emotive
campaigns using the most provocative and sensational themes and symbols. This in
turn informs the critique of I&R as enhancing political knowledge and education.
Political knowledge and educative effects would logically include a degree of
understanding of the policy question(s) at the center of elections.
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In a discussion of "persuadable targets," the campaign's chief pollster outlined
the segmentation and targeting of groups of likely voters with the objective of
matching message to demographic group. In one example, the general opposition
message to both the federal tax deduction (41) and spending limit (48) concerning the
potential loss of state services is further narrowed by type of service and how a loss of
such services might be experienced by particular groups. Thus, "divorced, union
households, high school or less, post graduates, ages 18-29, Democrats, Multnomah
County Residents, Bend, Medford Residents with some college, and young women"
are targeted to receive the message that Measures 41 and 48 would prevent state
government from keeping low-income children on the Oregon Health Plan and out of
emergency rooms. In contrast, "women, parents, singles, union households, renters,
college+, younger voters, and Tri-county Independents" were to receive
communication that the measures would reduce the number of parole officers to
supervise released sex offenders. Furthermore, focus groups and dial-tested message
construction resulted in a list of "hot language" for the coalition to consider. It
included, "flawed," "hidden fees," "retroactive," "too many unintended
consequences," and "if outside interests want this so badly, it can't be good for you"
(Defend Oregon, 2006, pp. 79, 80). Segmentation and targeting based on extensive
data mining and analysis (taken from commodity advertising) is referred to by Gandy
as the panoptic sort (Gandy, 1993) and is discussed in greater detail in the analysis of
Measures 98 and 92. In brief, although useful to campaigns seeking to focus their
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communication, its effects on campaign discourse, voter knowledge, and the public
sphere are concerning.
Under the heading, "With So Many Voters in Our Persuadable Universe, This
is a Made for TV Campaign," the pollster concluded that 38 percent of the electorate
is a "Measure 41 target and 32 percent of the electorate is a Measure 48 target."
Furthermore, the pollster surmised that while the data illustrated that coupling the
measures and their attacks would work to the coalition's advantage, there remained
targets "Exclusive to Measure 48 — divorced Oregonians and renters," and targets
"Exclusive to Measure 41 —married women and Eugene Democrats" (Defend
Oregon, 2006, pp. 86, 88).
A section toward the end of the polling brief entitled, "Voters Pamphlet
Checklist," lists 12 different groups and suggested messaging for each to include in
the pamphlet that is mailed out to all households in Oregon. Examples of the polling
briefs direction on what to have in the voter's pamphlet includes: "Credible
Coloradan: To discuss the stats about 44 in nation for fixing roads, 47 in education
funding, 48th in high school graduation rates, and dead last in on-time vaccination
rates for children." And another suggestion is for a "Rural healthcare provider or
advocacy group: Discuss the impact on rural Oregon, specifically as it relates to
healthcare for seniors and Oregon Project Independence" (Defend Oregon, 2006, p.
88).
The communications plan for the coalition in opposition to the federal tax
deduction (41) and the spending limit (48) contained detailed bullet points and lists of
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activities and goals for generalized categories that included: message development,
voter's pamphlet statements, earned media, web and internet based tools, speaker's
bureau, newsletters and other publications, and packet materials such as issue specific
white papers (Defend Oregon, 2006, pp. 3, 4). In the earned media category, the press
packet — a small package of materials for distribution to print and broadcast media —
was to include: a fact sheet, newspaper clips from Colorado and Maine, testimonials,
financial projects/graphics, and a TABOR DVD (Defend Oregon, 2006, p. 1).
Additionally, the plan included instruction to coalition members in the following
areas: the content and timing of press releases and media advisories; how to pitch
stories to the press and suggestions for specific outlets and types of stories most likely
to be picked up, instructions for cultivating relationships with newspaper columnists,
and the recommended composition of groups to meet with newspaper editorial boards.
The campaign consultants insisted that the group should include "a business leader
and/or Republican, an education advocate/parent, a senior advocate, a health care
advocate and a numbers person." Under the category of "television" the campaign
plan document speaks to the need to develop "B-role" (video footage favorable to the
campaign for television stations), emailable graphics, and to develop "short, pithy
sound bites to communicate complicated messages and answers to expected
questions." The communication director's plan for a speaker's bureau advises "All
persons who the campaign looks to recruit and send out to speak on behalf of the
campaign, in any capacity, shall go through some form of speaker's bureau training."
The plan includes a day-by-day calendar of events and goals that begin August 29
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with a PTA press release, and ends with a November 4 get-out-the-vote and earned
th

media in Portland focus. The communications plan includes over 20 pages of "talking
points" and examples of several sample letters to the editor (Defend Oregon, 2006, pp.
2,3,4).
The Defend Oregon campaign plan to oppose the spending limit (48) and
federal tax deduction (41) in Oregon's 2006 general election reveals an exceptionally
well-funded, sophisticated political marketing operation. The campaign reveals the
degree to which the extension of industrial principles has penetrated what has been
considered a grassroots, volunteer-heavy, and small "d" democratic activity. Instead,
the evidence displays, among other industrial principles, a political marketing
organization practicing market segmentation based on multivariate analysis of
increasingly complex and varied information about the electorate. It includes an
almost Tayloristic division of labor and standardization of campaign tasks with
activities and desired outcomes mapped out months in advance. Furthermore, the
campaign demonstrates specialization among a political consulting corps with
everything from fundraising to earned media as a discrete category of responsibilities.
The consultant-heavy operation includes a communications plan based on an
extensively focus-grouped, dial and poll-tested set of themes, language, images, and
talking points. With nothing left to chance, the undertaking appears to resemble a
theatre production as much as a ballot measure campaign.
Still, despite the remarkable political campaign operation and ability of labor
to compete with corporate interests in particular campaigns, the structure of the system
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of direct legislation forces unions and citizen and public sector groups to struggle
within a set of conditions constituted by a political economy based on market
fundamentalism. The I&R necessitates raising vast sums of money to finance a
campaign that employs political operatives whose techniques and approach are
virtually indistinguishable from these of the corporate public relations practitioners
their clients seek to resist. The campaigns themselves compel public sector advocates
to confront not only the immediate campaign rhetoric from supporters of the measures
at hand, in effect they must respond to a rhetorical environment permeated by
neoliberal ideological hegemony. Over three decades of neoliberal capitalist
propaganda emanating from scores of corporate-funded think tanks, lobbying
enterprises, some national and state political campaigns, and a corporate-supported
media, means that public sector defenders face a formidable set of exigencies in each
successive campaign.
Regardless of the long-term causal factors, from the perspective of the
advocates and the consultants, the primary concern remains emerging victorious in
each particular election. In the 2006 campaign, the effectiveness of the Defend
Oregon campaign in linking the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) was
illustrated in an editorial by the Oregonian, where the paper argued that the measures
should be spoken about together because they were "A referendum on the future of
higher education and the Oregon Economy." Even more important for the opposition
coalition was the repetition of campaign themes in the editorial from the state's largest
newspaper: "Measures 48 and 41 are on the ballot because wealthy anti-tax activists
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who live out of state and use Oregon as a political playground spent several million
dollars to push and promote them" (Oregonian Editorial, 2006).
Ultimately, voters rejected both the spending limit (48) and federal tax
deduction (41) in the November election. The spending limit (48) garnered 379,971
affirmative votes, and 923,629 negative votes (Ballotpedia, 2009). The federal tax
deduction (41) also failed by a large margin, with 483,443 Oregonians in support, and
818,452 opposed. The results indicate the effectiveness of the opposition in creating a
broad coalition of groups delivering consistent general messaging about the measures,
while targeting specific messages to the coalition groups' different members and
constituencies. Thus, the larger message about the negative financial effects of both
measures, in combination with the demonization of Howard Rich and "out-of-state
interests" proved effective. Also, the near universal condemnation of the measures in
the mainstream media further solidified the opposition's position. Nevertheless, the
Pyrrhic victory for labor at the ballot box ignores the massive resource expenditures,
the opportunity cost, the rhetorical body blows that have immeasurable long-term
effects, and the participation in a political marketing spectacle that have little benefit
to the longer-term project of engaging citizens in a meaningful way that strengthens
the public sector and union movement.
Measures 98 and 92 in the 2000 General Election
In the 2000 General Election, voters in Oregon faced a massive election ballot
with 18 initiatives, 4 legislative referrals, as well as national, state, and local
candidates. Among the initiatives on the ballot were Measures 98 (public resources)
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and 92 (payroll deduction). Both measures were constitutional amendments and both
were heavily contested in the media, which framed the campaign as one that pit wellfunded initiative industrialist Bill Sizemore against public employee unions. Framing
the election in this manner provided a familiar, easily accessible perspective for
Oregonians following recent initiative politics. Nevertheless, it serves to shift the
focus from some of the key issues concerning the measures to the easily identifiable
players involved.
The ballot title for Measure 98 read: "Amends constitution: prohibits using
public resources for political purposes; limits payroll deductions" (Oregon Voter's
Pamphlet, 2000). Measure 92 in 2000 was also a constitutional amendment that read:
"Amends constitution: prohibits payroll deductions for political purposes without
specific authorization" (Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, 2000). It is worth noting here that
the central concept behind both initiatives would be reprised in 2008 with Ballot
Measure 64, and that Measure 92 in 2000 is virtually the same initiative as Measure 59
in 1998. (Such repeat measures have some in Oregon calling for a prohibition on
substantially similar measures within a certain time period). Sizemore was also the
chief petitioner for another payroll deduction limitation (Measure 59), which failed by
only 22,000 votes with 48.99 percent in support and 51.01 percent opposed. Finally,
an attempt using Sizemore's operation to get a similarly worded petition on the 2002
ballot failed to qualify (Oregon Secretary of State, 2009).
Viewed from a broader perspective, both measures fit within the ongoing
larger neoliberal program of substantively and rhetorically assailing labor unions and
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the public sector (i.e. government). As is documented below, the individuals and
groups funding the public resources (98) and payroll deducation (92) campaigns
consistently employ the discourse and financially support the goals of neoliberalism
that include union demonization, democracy as synonymous with free markets, and
the privatization of government programs and services. One explicit aim of these
ballot measures was to circumscribe the means by which public employee labor
unions participate in the political and electoral processes, and to advance the
neoliberal political and economic agenda.
In essence, public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) would both affect
the ability of public employee unions to raise money from their members to be used
for political campaigns. The payroll deduction (92) would have barred payroll
deductions for political uses without employees' written consent. It would have added
a section in the Oregon Constitution prohibiting payroll deductions if any of the
money went for political purposes without annual express written authorization by the
employee. The public resources measure (98) would have forbidden using public
resources to collect union dues for political purposes. Public resources would include
equipment, buildings, time on the job, supplies, etc.
Similar to the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction (41) measures
from the 2006 election, payroll deduction (92) and public resources (98) would have
had significant negative impacts on the public sector and union movement. However,
the focus of these measures was directly on prohibiting unions from collecting and
using financial resources for campaigning and lobbying efforts. As one union member
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explained, "this would have basically forced us to pass a hat around to collect
contributions to pay for political campaigns and lobbying efforts" (Black, personal
communication, 2009). Since unions collect money from its members using the
payroll deduction, as well as using resources defined as "public" under the Measure 98
definition, unions would have been severely damaged by passage of these measures.
The ballot measure on public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) in
Oregon's 2000 election provide evidence for the claim that initiatives are placed on
the ballot not merely for purposes of changing public policy. Both public resources
(98) and payroll deduction (92) fit under the category of "crypto-initiatives" as they
appear to have been placed on the ballot by wealthy and corporate interests to force
public employee unions to expend resources (Kousser & McCubbins, 2005). The
PAC receiving contributions for the payroll deduction (92) was the "Committee to
Restore Freedom in the Workplace." A first glance at the secretary of state campaign
finance records would indicate Sizemore's Oregon Taxpayers United PAC provided
100 percent of the funding for the signature-gathering effort to place the measure on
the ballot (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008). However, OTU acted as a front group for
wealthy interests financing the efforts.
Although $90,295 was spent to qualify payroll deduction (92) for the ballot, no
funds were expended for the subsequent "campaign." Similarly, the public resources
(98) PAC, "No More Political Fundraising at Taxpayer Expense," that was created to
qualify the initiative for the ballot, had no expenditures during the post-qualification
stage of the 2000 campaign. Public resources (98) also received the majority of its
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support from Sizemore's Oregon Taxpayers United PAC. Essentially, the top
contributors to the payroll deduction (92) and public resources (98) campaigns were
the top contributors to Sizemore's OTU PAC for the 2000 election cycle. They
included multi-millionaire and top lifetime financier of Sizemore measures Loren
Parks with $176,500 or 26.6 percent of the total. Wes Lematta, also a prolific lifetime
contributor to Sizemore and founder and CEO of Columbia Helicopters at $100,000 or
15.1 percent. Rounding out the top five contributions to the signature-gathering
efforts for these measures were Sizemore's Oregon Taxpayers United Education
Foundation with $30,450 or 4.6 percent, and Seneca Jones Timber Co., and financier
Carl Lindner with contributions of $25,000 each or 3.8 percent of the total raised
(Thompson & Wetherson, 2008).
Although often dismissed as merely a collection of wealthy individuals with
conservative political agendas, the primary funders of these measures should be
viewed within the larger neoliberal program for which they have exhibited consistent
and substantial financial support. It is important to understand that the discourse and
policies representing neoliberal principles do not emanate from a small group in a
smoke-filled room, but rather from the enduring corporate ideology that has been
predominant in the past three and one-half decades in the U.S. and increasingly
globally.
It is worthwhile to note here that signature-gathering and financing activity for
public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) from the 2000 election were
ultimately key evidentiary pieces in the lawsuit and subsequent conviction of
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Sizemore for racketeering and forgery in 2002. The jury in the case filed by the
Oregon Education Association found that signatures qualifying both measures had
been forged, and that campaign finance reports and tax returns had been fraudulent
(Thompson & Wetherson, 2008). Until the trial and conviction of Sizemore and some
of his associates in 2002, the public was largely unaware of anything except assertions
primarily from public employee unions that criminal activity had taken place. For
purposes of the present study, this post-election conviction appears to have no material
effect on the opposition campaign conducted by the large labor coalition which spent
approximately $4.7 million dollars opposing the public resources (98) and payroll
deduction (92) measures (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008). Colonization of a
plebiscitary mechanism originated by socialists, anti-monopolists, and exploited
populist groups for the purpose of countering the power of wealthy interests and
captured politicians, by moneyed organized interests has become so axiomatic that
public employee unions and public sector groups have created Our Oregon — an
ongoing organizational structure reflecting a more or less permanent campaign.
One direct result of Sizemore's operation for placing initiatives on the ballot
has been the creation and cohesion of a core group of public employee unions and
allied interests to oppose measures that he sponsors. From unions for nurses and
teachers, to AARP and environmental groups, a coalition with similar concerns
reconstitutes itself every election cycle to fight "The Initiative King" as local
journalists had dubbed Sizemore (Walsh, 2008).
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The Opposition to No Public Resources for Political Purposes (98) and Payroll
Deduction Limitation (92)
In the 2000 election, the opposition group's political action committee (PAC)
was the Coalition Against Unnecessary and Unfair Constitutional Amendments. The
Coalition organized as one measure committee or PAC. The groups formed a steering
committee comprised of AFL-CIO and independent unions. In addition, a campaign
coordinating team was created that included: a general consultant, media consultant,
pollster, direct mail consultant, outreach consultant, paid phones consultant, speaker's
bureau consultant, campaign manager, communications director, earned media
director, logistics and outreach director, and field director (Coalition Against
Unnecessary and Unfair Constitutional Amendments [CAUUCA], 2000).
In preparation for the Fall campaign, the Coalition sponsored a benchmark
survey early in the year, tracking polls in the summer months, and focus groups in all
of the major media markets in the state. The information gathered resulted in a 39page internal campaign document describing the electoral environment, important
findings from the polls and focus groups, and the campaign plan overview.
The analysis of the 2000 general election campaign in Oregon detailed in the
report highlighted the anticipated volume and clutter from an extraordinary election
year. In addition to a presidential election, and a slew of state and local candidate
races, voters in Oregon's 2000 election faced over 20 I&R. From the perspective of
the pollster and general consultants, competing with the cacophony of messages meant
that their particular opposition messages "must stand above the clutter of nearly $20
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million dollars of campaign advertising on other election matters" (CAUUCA, 2000,
p. 29). Another important consideration for all political professionals and their
clients' campaigns in Oregon is the fact that it is an entirely vote-by-mail state. This
meant, according to the campaign plan, that campaign messages would have to "stay
up" for at least five weeks. Thus, campaigns seek to have their paid media efforts and
other communication with voters especially active during the week prior to ballots
being mailed out (approximately the second week in October), and during the entire
period that ballots are in voters' homes. Equally important, it was stressed that voters
needed to hear the campaign's message early to prevent the opposition from defining
the terms of the debate. This is a similar refrain in virtually all political campaigns,
and it fuels the race for "early money" so that campaigns can "control the definitions"
and the framing of the issues.
For the Coalition opposing public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92),
part of that early definition included a command to advocates involved in the
campaign to "refer to both ballot measures as 'constitutional amendments' in all
contexts in order to appeal to voters' dislike of constitutional amendments"
(CAUUCA, 2000, p. 5). This focus on the potential impact to Oregon's Constitution
was also employed very successfully in the 2007 special election defeat of Measure
50, a legislative referral that would have increased tobacco taxes in Oregon. Polling
and focus groups revealed that initial public opinion was more favorably disposed to
supporting Measure 92 — the ban on payroll deductions — than it was toward Measure
98 — the prohibition on using public money to collect union dues. Polling and focus
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groups also led opponents to conclude that Republicans and voters under 50 were the
groups most likely to support Measure 98, while Democrats and older voters were
most likely to oppose its passage. Through further segmentation of the electorate
based on education, gender, geography, age, and party registration, the polling and
focus group analysis found that supporters of Measure 98 were also more likely to be
"younger and male independent voters, college graduates and those living outside the
state's five biggest counties." Those identified as more reliable allies, or "no" votes
on Measure 98 included: college graduates, individuals living in Eugene, those in
union households, Democrats, and independent voters over the age of 50. Undecided
voters tended to be Oregonians without college degrees and older Democrats
(CAUUCA, 2000, p. 5).
Segmentation of the electorate not only facilitates targeted messaging that
typically results in voters receiving different communications from the same
campaign, it also serves to inform the campaign's operatives which potential voters
will be receiving any campaign communication at all. In this way, as noted by Schier
(2000), activation of citizens already involved in the process tends to be the result.
Just as advertisers expend the majority of their resources chasing consumers with
sufficient disposable income and a record of consumption, so do technologicallymediated I&R campaigns focus their efforts and resources on citizens with a record of
electoral participation. This is a logical approach, yet one that further marginalizes
individuals and groups historically outside the process. It also serves as evidence in
refutation to Tolbert and Smith's claims about beneficial secondary effects of I&R.
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The analysis of polling and focus groups on payroll deduction (92) presented a
much greater degree of uncertainty and concern for the Coalition. Early support for
the measure was very broad and fairly strong. There were no statistically significant
differences in levels of support by gender or age, and there were small distinctions
based on educational attainment and geography. The only group identified that started
the campaign as a "no" vote for the Coalition was Democratic men over 50 living in
the Portland media market. In terms of subsequent strategic recommendations for the
Measure 92 campaign following the early polling and focus groups, one notable
conclusion articulated in the Coalition's campaign plan was the following:
There is no question that the fewer voters know about this measure, the better.
Our campaign should spend no time defining this measure in educational terms
our goal is to persuade, persuade, persuade. To this end, efforts should be
made at the county level to request that only the ballot title appear on the
ballot. Opposition to the measure is considerably higher both overall and
among key voting blocs when only the ballot title is provided (CAUUCA,
2000, p. 9).

This statement from a campaign operative is remarkable not so much for the
view that it expresses, but rather for its honesty. It captures a very rational calculation
and sentiment considering that the controlling objective of a private political campaign
consultant is to emerge victorious on election day to maintain current clients and as to
use victories as evidence for the solicitation of new clients —both political and
corporate. Still, such a comment represents the antithesis of the claim that I&R serves
an educative function and that direct legislation embodies the elements of strong
democracy (Barber, 1984). Rather than engaging with voters in direct conversations
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about the substance of the positions, the immediate imperative of electoral victory
rationalizes argument by mystification as a strategic approach to the campaign effort.
As is the case in commodity-advertising, so-called public opinion polling in
I&R campaigns is primarily about extracting data to construct marketing efforts that
target the very consumers providing the information. The Coalition consultants used
focus groups and polling not only to locate how voters might react to particular issues
and the specific ballot title, they were also used to mine data from participants on their
respective responses to potential arguments both for and against the measures.
Arguments tested by the campaign's pollster and media consultants might be used in a
variety of formats, including the language ultimately chosen for the voter's pamphlet.
Moreover, since a fair percentage of voters in Oregon consistently report that they use
the voter's pamphlet to render their decisions on I&R, advocates use polling and focus
groups with the content, placement, and authorship of such statements in mind. As
described in an interview with a prominent pollster and consultant, one of the favored
voter surveillance techniques is the creation of a mock Oregon voter's pamphlet from
which focus group participants generate data (Grove, personal communication, 2008).
Participants are provided with pens to mark up the faux-voter's pamphlet (which is
created to be as similar to the actual pamphlets as possible) and are asked to comment
on the perceived merit and credibility of the arguments and their authors. The pollster
explained that with repeat measures such as public resources (98) and payroll
deduction (92) they take voter pamphlet arguments from their opponents from
previous election cycles to test their respective merits. They also attempt to anticipate
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any new arguments that may emanate from their opponents' campaign. Such a
strategy is only available to very well-funded campaigns.
One strategic dilemma discussed in the campaign plan concerns the "limited
resources" of the Coalition, and the potential linkage of the opposition campaigns to
public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92). Although distinct measures from the
perspective of voters, and in their controlling legal language, polling and focus group
work on the measures tested the effects of priming respondents by introducing
information about one of the measures before discussing the other. Participants
reacted much more negatively to Measure 92 after they had heard arguments against
Measure 98. According to the lead pollster, "Despite differences in ballot language
between the two measures, women in particular were inclined to assume that
amendment #92 [Measure 92] was 'more of the same' after having the discussions on
amendment #98" [Measure 98] (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 10). Ultimately, the Coalition's
direct mail and broadcast media consistently linked the measures as unfairly singling
out certain individuals and groups, and that such restrictions had no place in the
Oregon Constitution.
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Table 4, Notable Expenditures in the 2000 Ballot Measure Election
Notable Expenditures in the 2000 Ballot Measure Election
Data is grouped by PAC, not by PAC and measure, so while only groups that worked on
Measures 92 and 98 are included, the following figures represent all their work, not just their
work on Measure 92 or 98.
Coalition Against Unfair and Unnecessary Constitutional Amendments
$1,000,000.00
$246,000.00
$191,000.00
$121,452.00
$193,539.00
$210,692.85
$217,498.69

09/14/00
MEDIA STRATEGIES
09/20/00
MEDIA STRATEGIES
09/28/00
MEDIA STRATEGIES
GROUNDSWELL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
09/25/00
10/11/00
MEDIA STRATEGIES
10/17/00
M&R STRATEGIC SERVICES
MASTERPRINT
10/10/00
Total Spent on Media and Political Consulting: S2.9M

Source: Oregon Secretary of State, 2009

Thus the Coalition spent millions of dollars delivering consistent messages
linking two ballot measures that may or may not have had truly similar substantive
policy implications. With both measures going down to defeat, this turned out to be a
rhetorically effective campaign strategy. Although the general claim concerning
discrimination against particular individuals and groups was accurate, substantive
policy differences in the two bills did exist. This calls into question the claims by
Tolbert and Smith regarding the educational impact of ballot measure campaigns, and
remains a fruitful area for continued research. If education is defined simply as
persuasion, the thesis holds. However, if the definition of education includes the
process of differentiating between substantive arguments relevant to the policy
question and red herring arguments employed for purposes of winning an election, it
leads to a very different conclusion about the influence of I&R.
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Illustrating the command and control modus operandi of the contemporary
industrialized initiative campaign, the anti-Measure 98 and 92 campaigns'
communication plan continually emphasizing consistency, discipline, and
coordination. Repeatedly, the terms "on message," "consistent," and "targeted" were
used in the internal campaign plan to emphasize the desired communication strategy
and execution of the plan. As described in Schier's description of the contemporary
campaign primarily employing activation rather than mobilization strategies, there was
even a comprehensive and detailed plan for communicating internally with members
of the groups that form the Coalition. Because the polling showed that to emerge
victorious in November it was critical to activate union households and core
supporting constituencies, there was a heavy focus on getting the messages to the
respective memberships of the allied groups financing the campaign, in addition to an
extensive get-out-the-vote (GOTV) (sometimes referred to in Oregon as mail-in-thevote [MITV]) effort.
The campaign conducted a statewide survey of 800 likely voters,
approximately 15 to 18 minutes in length, during the week of August 7, 2000. The
survey's purpose was to help the campaign decide the sequencing of its focus groupgenerated arguments and how public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) would
be linked in their messaging. Additionally, an important purpose of the survey was to
test the message concepts and language created by the campaign's media consultants.
Following this, on August 16, two focus groups were convened specifically to test
voter pamphlet statements. As stated directly in the campaign plan, "The goal is to
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make sure that the messages from the poll are translated into language that would be
considered compelling...." Consultants working for the Coalition created mock voter
pamphlets to which the focus group participants would react (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 23).
Beginning in October, tracking polls of 500 likely registered voters were
placed in the field on a weekly basis. The desired outcome of the polling was to
assess the extent to which the advertising plan was meeting the strategic plan as
outlined and "moving both our base voters and our targets." The exact timing of the
polling would be based on the number of gross rating points (GRP26) the campaign
had purchased for each of the measures. The goal was to make future strategic
decisions based on the results of these tracking polls (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 25).
Continuous monitoring of the electorate and analysis of the efficacy of a
political marketing program mirrors techniques used by private sector retailers
working with public relations firms. Through the use of advanced information and
communication technologies, including the myriad panoptic surveillance instruments
now available, the capital-intensive initiative campaign can apply market-oriented
strategies and techniques from the private sector to better manage the targeted
consumers of their well-tested messages.
Polling and focus group results were provided to the media consultants to
create advertising spots to be dial-test ready by late July, early August. As detailed in
the campaign plan, dial-testing of the advertisements would take place on August 24.
The dial-test panels are groups of 50 to 60 people assembled to test the advertising that
had been developed by the media consultants "in the closest approximation to their
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final form." In an editorial comment in the campaign plan, the next sentence reads,
"In other words, we intend to leave little to voters' imaginations." "Dummy"
opposition ads were also tested in this particular session. In describing the plan for the
dial-testing the pollster states that:
The first two hours of the dial test session will be dedicated to testing the ads
and direct mail concepts using the dials. Individual opinions will be collected
in writing. Each TV ad will be tested twice for overall persuasiveness and for
believability (CAUUCA, 2000, pp. 24, 5).
Following the two-hour dial-testing session, 20 to 30 respondents were to be sent
home, with the remaining voters dividing into two smaller, hour-long focus groups.
The pollster explained that the full analysis of the dialed responses, written answers
and focus group discussion would be provided to the campaign by August 29
(CAUUCA, 2000, p. 25).
Following the results of the dial-testing groups, tracking polls were placed in
the field on a weekly basis to monitor the progress of the campaign's messaging. As
stated in the campaign document, the goal of the tracking polls was to provide data for
timely strategic decisions for the advertising buys. The tracking surveys were
conducted among groups of 500 likely registered voters, begun on October 2, and
concluded the week of October 30, 2000. The tracking poll program was priced at
$55,000, or $11,000 per week (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 25).
Campaigns benefit from a contemporary cultural and historical period wherein
citizens of advanced industrialized countries have become increasingly conditioned to
accept, and even desire, surveillance technologies, mediated communication, and what
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Andrejevic calls the "promise of interactivity and productive surveillance"
(Andrejevic, 2004, p. 2). Andrejevic explains that promoters of e-commerce hype the
"mass customization" economy that is based on "more precise forms of consumer
surveillance that allow for individualized marketing and production" (Andrejevic,
2004, p. 2). With the ubiquitous and increasing penetration of the market into spaces
formerly viewed as private or off limits, and the construction of information and
communication technologies facilitating for-profit enterprises in their quest to improve
their ability to monitor, understand, and predict consumer behavior, productive
surveillance for political campaigns becomes much easier. With an electorate perhaps
not willing to read through a 10-page description of a tax measure on the ballot, but
one that will gladly participate in a focus group that promises participatory
interactivity (the ability to have one's political opinions and beliefs heard by campaign
decision makers and fellow citizen/voters), political consultants have exceptional
access to the information they ultimately commodify and sell to their initiative clients.
According to the primary pollster for the coalition, it would be easier to
persuade voters to oppose public resources (98) than it would payroll deduction (92).
Moreover, the research indicated that priming voters with opposition to public
resources (98) helped to persuade voters to reject payroll deduction (92). The
campaign's lead pollster then indicated that the next step of research would be to test
the current advertising concepts as well as to test new messages. Finally, another goal
of the subsequent dial-testing would be to consider the sequencing that would go into
the campaign. In other words, in what order would campaign communication roll out
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to the public? Furthermore, the pollster's analysis of the two proposed paid media
budgets, either $1.7 million or $3.5 million, resulted in the conclusion that "only the
higher budget gives our message the reach and frequency required to defeat both
measures." The amount of $200,000 was budgeted for production of both pro and con
advertisements for both public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) to be used in
the August 24 dial-testing session (CAUUCA, pp. 26, 27).
The paid media campaign for the Coalition Against Unnecessary and Unfair
Constitutional Amendments was grouped into five phases to begin immediately after
Labor Day. The first phase, from September 5 to the 15, sought to create the
foundation for opposition to public resources (98). There is recognition that the
campaign would be competing for audience share with the Olympic Games that was
being broadcast on NBC. The pollster and media consultants decided to begin with
the attack on public resources (98) as limiting the voice of one group of Oregonians
and its general unfairness. The "media buy" would be statewide, would focus on news
programs, prime time, daytime, and target "people who are more concerned about
politics and public affairs, older voters, and women." Phase two of the paid media
campaign, September 18 to October 1, recognized the inevitable dominance of the
coverage of the Olympic Games. Accordingly, advertising time on NBC would be
significantly more expensive than it would typically be, and the chances would be
high that other networks would have far fewer viewers. Therefore, the pollster and
media consultants suggested reinforcing the initial buy and focusing on news and
daytime television. In addition to beginning the radio advertising during this phase,
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the plan was to buy time on cable television networks with programs oriented toward
women. Nevertheless, it was anticipated that the second phase would be when the
opposition's advertising would attack Measure 92 as well, "with a message that
dovetails with our anti-Measure 98 approach" (CAUUCA, 2000, pp. 28, 29).
With the imperative of winning the primary goal, consultants trained in the
techniques and strategies of public relations and advertising use the arguments they
believe will sell the product. In the case of the opposition campaign to payroll
deduction (92) and public resources (98), the commodity is a "no vote" on these
measures. And based on the data mining and surveillance techniques, the most
efficacious argument concerned the potential harm to charitable deductions. Although
the measures as written did lead to legitimate concerns about the unanticipated
prohibition on charitable deductions, the fundamental substantive arguments and
positions that were actually in play were completely ignored in this strategic approach.
Rather than voters confronting the primary issues surrounding unions, their lobbying
and campaign spending efforts, and the political tension between capital and labor,
and the public and private sectors, millions of dollars of broadcast and print
advertising focused on the charitable deduction.
Phase three of the paid advertising campaign took place from October 1 to
October 15. The first week focused on payroll deduction (92), with the second week
linking public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92). Here it is suggested, based
on its resonance in focus groups, on the negative impacts the constitutional
amendments would have on charitable organizations. Another argument that was
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highlighted in the paid media spots concerned the potential cost to taxpayers because
of the all of the necessary bureaucracy for implementation of payroll deduction (92).
The support for including this particular argument as explained in the campaign plan
was "that it was particularly persuasive to older and more conservative voters whom
we assume may be among the earliest mail voters in the fight against amendment #92"
(CAUUCA, 2000, p. 29). Furthermore, in anticipation of radio advertisements to be
run by the proponents of payroll deduction (92), the plan calls for radio advertisements
targeting moderate Republicans in rural areas with the goal of cutting into proponent's
support, especially among women. The focus of the ads would be on the potential
harm done to charities if payroll deduction (92) were to pass.
Phase four of the opponents' campaign against public resources (98) payroll
deduction (92) was scheduled for October 16 to 29. The plan document observes that
voters will have received their ballots at this juncture of the campaign (typically
around October 20) and in recognition of the cluttered airwaves of the 2000 election it
was reiterated that "it is necessary to raise the emotional stakes on these two
amendments to persuade voters" (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 30). Based on historical voting
trends, the lead consultants stated that media buys will focus strongly on primetime
and non-news programming targeting late-deciding voters who are disproportionately
younger and female.
The final phase of the paid media campaign covered the October 30 to
November 6 period. Based on the experience of the 2000 primary campaign, the
consultants anticipated more than one-third of the ballots to be returned in the final
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two days of voting. This is where the tracking polls are used to inform the specific
messaging that will be highlighted since, "It is possible that late voters may respond to
different messages than those who have already voted..."(CAUUCA, p. 31).
According to the consulting team constructing the campaign plan, the
$800,000-plus direct mail campaign to oppose payroll deduction (92) and public
resources (98) serves a very important supplementary role to the over $3 million paid
broadcast media plan. Oregon's vote-by-mail environment permits campaigns to get
literature into voter's hands in the very physical spaces in which they will likely cast
their ballots. Obviously, the ideal for a campaign is for voters to have their direct mail
pieces and messaging in hand when they are physically filling out their ballot. In the
campaign plan document, the consultants reiterated the fact that while public resources
(98) and payroll deduction (92) require distinct messaging, the campaign will be
"artfully linking" them "for strategic reasons" since polling indicates that doing so
increases the likelihood that voter's will oppose payroll deduction (92) which is the
harder sell (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 31). Polling is used to help generate demographic
data and to identify undecided voters who would be targeted with persuasion mail.
Coordination with other friendly campaigns would generate "targets of opportunity"
that would receive persuasion mail as the campaign progresses. The lead consultants
explain that the timing of the direct mail campaign is distinct from that of the
electronic media program, since television and radio is used to frame the issues, while
mail needs to be in the hands of voters when they are filling out their ballots.
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Moreover, it is reiterated in the plan that direct mail will be used to persuade by
delivering more highly targeted messages based on the voter identification program.
An extensive paid phone program was also part of the overall campaign plan to
oppose public resources (98) and payroll deduction (92) as well. Both live and
automated phone calls were made by a contracted vendor. According to the vendor,
234,799 calls were made over the course of one week in mid-October (CAUUCA,
2000, p. 2). A percentage of the calls sought to activate members of the Coalition's
unions and allied groups funding the campaign. With over 20 measures on the ballot,
the Coalition wanted to reduce the number of "friendly" voters skipping the targeted
ballot measures.
Every sophisticated campaign plan includes an earned media plan. Earned
media refers to favorable press coverage that has not been purchased. In addition to
overt attempts to garner press coverage such as press conferences and meetings with
editorial boards, campaigns often concoct what Boorstin labeled, pseudo-events
(Boorstin, 1992). The primary goal of a pseudo-event is favorable press coverage, yet
the hope is that it will be conveyed to the public as if the event were organic rather
than staged. In an effort to supplement the significant resources spent on creating and
delivering the poll and focus group-tested messages through paid advertising,
campaigns spend considerable time and effort to attract media coverage in a variety of
different ways. Expenditures for the Coalition opposing public resources (98) and
payroll deduction (92) included a paid earned media director to coordinate and execute
the plan (CAUUCA, 2000, p. 17).
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A week-by-week schedule of editorial board visits, press conferences and other
staged events were supplemented with letters-to-the-editor and opinion-editorial (OpEd) pieces crafted by the communication consultants for submission by strategically
chosen spokespeople on the campaign's behalf. The focus of the field campaign was
to train spokespeople who could articulate the message in local community forums. In
addition, a primary goal of the field campaign was to "assist the earned media team by
monitoring local papers and news outlets and serving as individuals to write letters to
the editor, etc." Moreover, it was stated that the field team should "provide names of
people to assist the earned media team in letters-to-the-editor, editorial board visits
and earned media events where bodies will be needed, like rallies, etc." Although
letters-to-the-editor, opinion pieces submitted to newspapers, and posts on political
blogs are not pseudo-events, they do often represent efforts by campaigns to cloak the
true sources of the communication (CAUUCA, 2000, pp. 21, 22, 23).
The campaign plan described the goals of the earned media efforts as well as
the means by which they would be achieved. "Educating the media" is done by
developing relationships with members of the media so the campaign has as much
control of the message as possible. Message development is the second part of the
earned media plan and it indicates, "polling data will produce clear, persuasive
messages for the campaign." Finally, the campaign sought to produce "6-7
spokespeople in each media outlet, meaning a total of 24-28 individuals" that would
deliver the poll-generated and focus group-tested talking points throughout the
campaign. To facilitate message discipline among its spokespersons, training sessions
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were set-up in the cities of Salem, Redmond, Medford, Eugene, Portland, and
Pendleton (CAUUCA, 2000, pp. 18, 19).
Message delivery also included the creation and dissemination of so-called
"background packets" to members of the media. Consisting of "message sheets,
talking points, descriptions of the legal impact on charities, endorsers, etc." the goal of
this "background" material is to influence how the media frame the campaign debate.
For the opposition on Measures 98 and 92 campaign, packets were sent to: The
Oregonian, Willamette Week, Statesman-Journal, Register-Guard, Medford MailTribune, Bend Bulletin, Albany Democrat-Herald, Daily Astorian, and the East
Oregonian newspapers, as well as the following broadcast media outlets: KOPB,
KEX, KXL, KATU-TV, KOIN-TV, KGW-TV, KPTV, and KPDX. The timing of
earned media events was set-up to coincide with the delivery of messages in the paid
media effort. A week-by-week schedule of earned media events included the
following:
Announce coalition - Week of August 21 st
Show that the coalition opposed to these two measures is larger than just the
usual suspects. We'll highlight the charities, small businesses, and
Republicans.
Paid media roll out - Week of September 4
Give a sneak preview of the first paid media spots. Also, this is Labor Day
weekend and we might want to piggyback on any Labor Day rallies, etc.
Real people care - Week of September 11
Use media training backdrop to produce letters-to-the-editor.
Opt out week - Week of September 18
Press conference highlighting people who have opted out of PAC contributions
but continue to support the unions.
Media blitz - Week of September 25th
Conduct statewide media blitz w/staff and spokespeople
Charitable organization week - Week of October 2
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The paid media plan has the roll out of the Measure 92 spots highlighting the
charitable organizations angle. We will have an event that reinforces the
effects of advocates.
Second media blitz - Week of October 16th
All-out blitz to weeklies, rural radio and campus newspapers (CAUUCA,
2000, pp. 19,20,21).
Election Results for Measures 98 and 92 in Oregon's 2000 General Election
Both payroll deduction (92) and public resources (98) were defeated in the
2000 Oregon General Election. Payroll deduction (92) earned 656,250 votes in favor
and 815,338 opposed. Measure 92 was defeated with 678,024 in support, and 776,489
opposed. Still, while the particular results may not appear surprising or noteworthy,
the financing of the campaign, the sophisticated methods employed to move voters,
and the entire set of processes involved in the four ballot measures discussed have
important implications for understanding direct legislation in Oregon and states with
an initiative system.
The goal of the discussion and analysis of Measures 48 and 41 in 2006, and 98
and 92 in 2000, has been to help address the central question: what are the democratic
implications of the increased professionalization of Oregon's initiative process? And
it has been animated by questions concerning the distribution and/or consolidation of
power, the role of citizens and organized interests in I&R, and the increasingly visible
role of political consultants. The aforementioned measures, while not representative
of all measures that Oregon voters have faced from 2000 to 2008, do represent the
increasing prevalence of capital and consultant-intensive initiatives in Oregon and
several other states with an active system of direct legislation.
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Although several studies have illustrated that spending more money in a ballot
measure campaign does not necessarily equate to victory for its proponents, it remains
a critically important advantage for organized interests seeking to influence the
political process. Moreover, the scholarly literature is clear that greater financial
expenditures by opposition campaigns does in fact equate with a higher success rate in
direct legislation campaigns. Equally important is the power to set the agenda not
only for public discourse, but to force opposition groups to expend finite resources.
Victory at the ballot box is certainly one goal of organized interests using the
initiative process. Still, the ability to frame the debate and control public discourse
constitutes an exceptionally powerful tool in a democratic nation. Evidence of the
import of the agenda-setting power is the billions of dollars spent annually by
moneyed interests for public relations and propaganda and the scientific management
of public opinion. Thus, due to the efforts of often out-of-state groups largely
financed by a single wealthy individual or a small group, Oregon's Measures 48, 41,
98, and 92 campaigns meant that opposition groups were forced to spend large sums
of money in opposition, and that at least some of the public discourse was framed by
those with the means to influence debate in Oregon as well as several other states in
the country. Moreover, the groups and individuals financing these campaign
communication efforts are often either unknown or unfamiliar to its intended
audience. And as was described above, the current legal regime controlling I&R
financing, in combination with often inadequate state oversight and disclosure, has
contributed to the use and abuse of what Smith and Garrett (2005) have referred to as
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veiled political actors. These veiled political actors further shroud in secrecy the
sources of often large contributions to ballot measure campaigns.
As has been seen in the initiative campaigns considered in the present study,
wealthy organized interests also have the ability not only to finance campaigns, but to
instigate events and public discourse by financing a successful paid signaturegathering effort; and in Oregon that would cost between $250,000 to $1 million
according to a recent report by Portland City Club (City Club of Portland, 2008, p.
33). As with most issues surrounding the system of direct legislation, concern about
the ability of moneyed interests to buy their way onto ballot is not a new one. For
several decades, the practice of paid signature gathering was banned.
In terms of political power and the ability to affect the agenda for public
discourse as well as for policymaking, the capacity of wealthy interests and
individuals to finance a successful paid signature-gathering effort certainly has
significant democratic implications. As described by Ellis, although Oregon Taxpayer
United's Bill Sizemore was defeated handily by incumbent governor John Kitzhaber
by better than a two-to-one margin in the 1998 gubernatorial race, Sizemore's
initiative operation permitted him and his financiers to force their political opponents
to shift their considerable financial resources to defending the status quo. Moreover in
2000, despite his trouncing in the governor's race, Sizemore received more media
attention in the state's leading newspaper than Oregon's federal House members, the
secretary of state, and every member of the state legislature. Equally important,
despite his considerable initiative activity throughout the 1990s, it was not until
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Sizemore ran for governor that media outlets scrutinized the background of the state's
most prolific initiative chief petitioner (Ellis, 2002, p. 93).
Still, to focus solely on personalities such as Sizemore is to miss the larger
structural features and political economic context within which the system of direct
legislation exists. The campaigns under consideration reflect the larger forces
affecting Oregon's I&R in the early twenty-first century. In a system created to
counter corporate and wealthy organized interests from fostering monopoly capitalism
through control of captured legislatures, privileged private interests have now
essentially colonized direct democracy, forcing labor and less privileged groups to
expend valuable, limited resources in defense of their weakening position.
These case studies illustrate that although unions have learned to compete, they
must do so on the opponents "home court." In a campaign and electoral regime
ensconced in a neoliberal political economy, money, and the means and ability to
employ sophisticated public relations and propaganda — including the use of astroturf
front groups — means that labor and less privileged interests can only play defense.
Using tools and techniques conceived largely with the interests and activities of capital
and exchange relations as animating principles, the inheritors of the system birthed by
socialists, reformers, and antimonopolists, is now firmly ensconced in the system of
private exchange relations. Thus, rather than a means to counteract powerful
organized interests, direct democracy is another environment co-opted by moneyed
groups and elite interests using the facade of populism to dominate the public sphere,
force opponents to defend their declining power, and expend their dwindling
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resources. It is my hope that these case studies served to illuminate the larger
structural analysis and theoretical underpinnings of a critical approach to direct
democracy.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research
In the final chapter, I summarize the historical, theoretical, and critical
approach grounding my analysis of Oregon's I&R during the 2000 to 2008 election
period. I then discuss my findings and conclusions based on examination of the
evidence gathered and critically analyzed during the course of my research. Finally,
throughout the discussion I present limitations of the present study, as well as
suggestions for future research.
The system of direct legislation has, and continues to have, a powerful
influence on the political landscape of Oregon and the 23 states that provide for its
use. With a few notable exceptions, scholarship pertaining to this important
phenomenon had been rather late in recognizing its enormous significance. Although
to a lesser extent, something analogous could have been said about academic inquiry
into the nature of political campaigns and the importance of political consultants as
well. However, in both areas, the output of scholarly literature has begun to reflect
their political import.
Despite this, examination of the use of political consultants in direct legislation
is incommensurate with its political significance in Oregon and nationally. The
present study is based in part on the aforementioned premises, and therefore one of the
goals of this dissertation has been to consider the democratic implications of the
increased use of political consultants in the initiative process in Oregon. I wanted to
contextualize "professionalization" in direct legislation by locating it within the
broader political and economic transformations of our era; and to challenge the
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analysis that civic engagement and political knowledge are enhanced by direct
democracy. A concomitant purpose has been to develop theory regarding our
understanding of the democratic implications of the increasing use of political
consultants in the initiative process. In addition, the study sought to examine the use
of I&R as a form of legitimation as defined most notably by Gramsci. Finally, the
central question guiding the study concerns the democratic implications of the
increasing professionalization of direct democracy.
Related questions animating this study have included: how does the system of
direct legislation help to consolidate or distribute power among organized interests and
the citizenry? Which organized interests or citizens participate in direct legislation
campaigns and elections? Do initiative campaigns and elections possess distinct
features increasing or diminishing their utility for organized interests seeking to
possess or maintain political power? And finally, does the system of direct democracy
empower the citizenry to overcome, or at least mitigate, entrenched interests in state
capitals in the 24 states with a system of I&R?
Central to the research design and approach of this study is the belief that
process matters. While it is important to analyze the particular policies advocated by
individuals and groups, in addition to the outcomes of direct legislation elections, it is
equally important and productive to examine the procedural elements of I&R.
Political campaigns and elections play an essential role in the legitimation of
state power. In the United States, that includes the massive infusion of corporate
capital during the election cycle —to the extent a "cycle" exists in the era of the
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permanent campaign — and prime access to elected officials by way of a perpetual
lobbying infrastructure in both the nation's capital as well as in the 50 state capitals in
the union. Close scrutiny of four ballot measure campaigns along with examination of
the 2000 to 2008 election period finds that on balance the system of direct democracy
does play a useful role in legitimation of the prevailing distribution of power.
Analyses of direct legislation focusing merely on the success or failure of
particular measures and the aggregate dollar amounts spent on the campaigns would
support a pluralist view that I&R represents another arena for competing interests to
mobilize resources in defense of its controlling agenda. In the specific case of the four
initiatives investigated here, viewing campaigns strictly from the won/loss perspective,
as well as the amount of resources expended during the campaigns, might even result
in the belief that organized labor and public sector advocates maintain superior
political and ideological power in Oregon.
However, the current study's critical approach examined direct democracy, the
four initiatives, and the 2000 to 2008 election period, by contextualizing the
campaigns and elections within the larger political economic conditions and by
exploring the processes, activities, technologies, techniques, and public and intracampaign discourse. The results lead to the conclusion that qualification for the ballot,
regardless of how relatively easy it is in Oregon compared to other states with direct
legislation, is still largely viewed as indicative of a basic level of public support.
Although newspaper editorials criticized the involvement of Howard Rich and Loren
Parks for bankrolling measures that qualified, the campaign discourse focused just as
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much on issues concerning the content of the measures themselves. This discourse
included repeated attacks on the competence of and legitimacy of public employees, as
well as the corruption of labor unions (Oregon Voters Pamphlet, 2000 & 2006).
Within the dominant ideological framework that private, market-based
approaches are superior to government public sector operations, attacks on labor and
public employees serve a useful function for moneyed organized interests seeking to
maintain a position of supremacy. Despite the fact that some of the sheen has come
off I&R as voters have become aware of the bankrolling of initiatives often by out-ofstate interests and wealthy individuals, the power of direct democracy as a means of
legitimation is also evidenced by the dominant belief and rhetoric that it ultimately
represents the will of the people. Both qualification for the ballot and electoral
outcomes are generally accepted as reflecting public opinion. Although this does not
mean that I&R election results are not vulnerable to claims that election outcomes
were manipulated by large financial expenditures. Still, more often than not elected
officials and public actors cite I&R election results as controlling and valid.
In fact, I&R election results in the four campaigns in this study — wherein
labor and public sector advocates defeated corporate, elite-interest funded measures —
are framed by corporate-funded front groups as evidence of the power and dominance
of the labor unions and government bureaucrats. This rhetorical strategy is
strengthened significantly by its authentic historical origins as a means of resistance to
capital's dominance and its late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries' capture of
corrupt legislatures. And in this way, because direct democracy is still viewed as the
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embodiment of a counterveiling means of resistance to the prevailing powers, elite,
neoliberal capitalist interests will continue to use it as a means of fostering legitimacy
for its political and economic dominance.
Examination of the various components of the direct legislation process with a
focus on four particular ballot measures also revealed highly sophisticated, capitalintensive, and technologically-mediated campaign operations, as well as tactics and
strategies that give pause to the notion that direct legislation in Oregon in the first part
of the twenty-first century is a populist, grassroots enterprise. Furthermore, analysis
of the direct legislation processes and campaigns involving payroll deduction (92) and
public resources (98) in 2000, and the spending limit (48) and federal tax deduction
measure (41) in 2006, calls into question claims that the initiative process enhances
civic engagement, political knowledge, and has beneficial secondary effects.
The present study exhibits that despite repeated research demonstrating that
money is no guarantee of success at I&R ballot box, it still is, in the often-cited words
of former California Treasurer Jesse Unruh, "the mother's milk of politics." Or in a
bit more contemporary terms and specific to ballot measures, "In political campaigns,
you'd always rather be the Goliath" (Hogan, D., 2002).
Analysis of four specific ballot measure campaigns from the 2000 and 2006
elections, which best illustrated the matter of money in politics, in addition to an
examination of all of the initiatives confronting Oregonians from 2000 to 2008,
reveals that powerful organized interests and wealthy individuals wield considerable
substantive power through their use of the system of direct legislation in Oregon. In
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their 2008 report on Oregon's I&R, the City Club of Portland heard testimony from
dozens of advocates, consultants, and individuals involved in or familiar with initiative
campaigns in Oregon. Testimony from both proponents and critics of direct
legislation confirmed a $250,000 to $1 million cost range for groups and/or
individuals seeking to qualify a petition for the ballot in Oregon (City Club of
Portland, 2008, p. 33).
Campaign finance records plus interviews with participants and consultants
show that qualification for the ballot itself, even with a minimal expenditure for a
subsequent campaign, can be sufficient to force political rivals to expend substantial
resources in response. Thus, although from 1994 to 2006 Oregon Taxpayer United's
Bill Sizemore watched 9 of the 13 measures he had sponsored lose on election day;
and 2 of the 4 that were successful ultimately declared unconstitutional, his
organization's political opponents, Oregon's public employee unions, raised over $26
million to oppose his flinders' measures (Thompson & Wetherson, 2008, p. 2). The
practice of using the initiative process for this and other non-policy purposes has
become so common as to add the term "crypto-initiative" to the direct legislation
vernacular to identify just such initiatives (Kousser & McCubbins, 2005).
The evidence further demonstrates that wealthy organized interests can deploy
crypto-initiatives repeatedly over several election cycles. Thus in Oregon, just in the
past two decades, moneyed interests financing Oregon Taxpayers United and allied
groups placed several repeat initiatives on the Oregon ballot. In the 2008 general
election, Measure 64, which sought to deny public employee unions from using
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payroll deductions for political purposes, was essentially the same as Measure 59 in
1998, and Measures 92 and 98 in 2000. Similarly, Measure 59 in 2008, which would
have permitted Oregon taxpayers to fully deduct federal taxes on state income tax
forms, had confronted voters in 2006 as Measure 41, and in 2000 as Measure 91.
Also, Measure 93 in the 2000 general election campaign would have required voter
approval of taxes and/or fees before going into effect. Essentially the same measure
was generated via OTU's enterprise in 1994 as Measure 5. Finally, Measure 60 from
2008, a proposal for teacher merit pay, had been placed on the ballot in 2000. In
addition to the fact that these repeat measures, by definition, have been unsuccessful,
one would be hard-pressed to locate evidence of a public outcry demanding that these
issues be placed on the ballot.
Although the aforementioned repeat ballot measures failed to earn the required
votes to pass, they not only forced their political enemies to expend vast resources to
ensure their defeat, but they also influenced the public discourse over several election
cycles. More specifically, in the 2000 campaign, a great deal of media coverage
focused on OTU measures and their opponent's efforts to defeat them. To the degree
that Oregon voters and the mainstream media were debating whether or not public
employees were being manipulated by their union bosses, whether teachers should
continue to be paid based on experience and degrees earned, and whether or not state
government and its employees had grown too much, Americans for Limited
Government, Americans for Tax Reform, and its allied groups and individuals were
achieving important public relations victories.
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A related benefit, and one that was repeated in interviews with advocates
involved in the opposition campaigns against out-of-state corporate interests, concerns
the tremendous opportunity cost when forced to combat what are perceived as
potentially damaging measures. With the Oregon State Legislature setting budgets for
public education, human services, and public safety, as well as passing the majority of
legislation regulating and affecting interest groups and their members, advocates
explained that resources deployed for initiative battles would have gone to candidate
races. Thus, millions of dollars of campaign contributions that would have been
targeted to state races including governor, statewide offices, and members of the
Oregon legislature, instead were used to finance opposition initiative campaigns
(Baessler, personal communication, 2008; Allen, personal communication, 2009;
Wagner, personal communication, 2009; Albers, personal communication, 2008;
Black, personal communication, 2008).
Also borne out by the evidence is the fact that ballot measure campaigns are
sometimes constructed, financed, and shopped by national interests employing a
multistate I&R strategy. A prime example is the so-called taxpayer bill of rights
(TABOR) or spending limit initiative that came in the form of Measure 48 in Oregon's
2006 election. The measure made its successful national debut in Colorado in 1992 as
Amendment 1. However, not long after its passage, Coloradans watched its support
for higher education and other vital programs and services drop to some of the lowest
per capita levels in the U.S. In 2006, along with an attempt to pass the spending limit
in Oregon, Americans for Limited Government, the anti-tax group largely financed by
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New York real estate developer Howard Rich, made similar efforts in: Maine,
Nebraska, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Oklahoma.
Similarly, in elections from 2004 to 2008, so-called regulatory takings
measures financed largely by national property rights groups landed in: Oregon
(Measure 37 in 2004), Arizona (Proposition 37, 2006), California (Propositions 90 in
2006 and 98 in 2008), Idaho (Proposition 2 in 2006), Washington (Initiative 933 in
2006), Montana (Initiative 154), Nevada (Ballot Question 2, 2006 and 2008),
Colorado (Initiative 86 in 2006). New York Real Estate developer and
multimillionaire self-described libertarian Howard Rich was a significant financier for
many of these "regulatory takings" measures. "Regulatory takings" refers to the idea
that government is essentially taking private property when zoning laws limit how it
can be used. Although largely funded by Rich's organizations, tax-exempt advocacy
front groups such as Idaho's "This House is My Home," and "America at its Best" are
listed as the financial sponsors of the measures (Yardley, 2006; Hoge, 2006).
This study revealed that in the four high stakes ballot measures under
consideration, Oregon's "initiative-industrial complex" was set in motion and largely
financed with out-of-state money. And with a legal regime prohibiting contribution
and expenditure limits for ballot measures, well-funded efforts were used to purchase
ballot access and/or exceptionally sophisticated political marketing operations.
Interviews during the course of the research for the present study revealed that
Oregon is perceived by some advocates and/or those familiar with the process as a
state with relatively lenient requirements for interests seeking to qualify initiatives for
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the ballot, as well as a state with very wide latitude for the content of both statutory
and constitutional initiatives. These features make Oregon attractive for out-of-state
interests seeking either to test out a ballot measure, or to include in its list for a
multistate strategy.
The significance of out-of-state or national interests funding initiative
campaigns is one that deserves further research and analysis. Certainly in Oregon
initiative campaigns, and in a cursory look at newspaper articles and campaign
literature from other states, national money for a state campaign is a popular target for
I&R campaigns. Apart from nativist tendencies on the part of all electorates, is there
something specific to ballot measures that increase expectations among voters that
financial support should emanate from within a state's borders?
A quick search of the term "grassroots" as it pertains to politics is defined as a
natural and somewhat spontaneous movement, as well as having come from a
community at the local level. Early use of the term in U.S. politics is often attributed
to an Indiana senator referring to the Progressive Party in 1912, "This party has come
from the grass roots. It has grown from the soil of the people's hard necessities"
(Fisher, D., 2006; Eigen, 2006). I would hypothesize that many voters have similar
expectations of ballot measures; that they arise somewhat spontaneously and emanate
from the community or local populace. The qualities attributed to the term grassroots
would certainly fit with the historical origins of I&R. This would appear to be an area
worthy of further research.
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As discussed in Chapter Two of the present study, the literature on political
consultants and what some refer to as the "initiative-industrial complex" primarily
focuses on one of several areas. One concerns the significance of political
professionals in what was viewed historically as a citizen-inspired, amateur process.
This is an essentially technological deterministic position that new technologies have
altered campaigns by necessitating individuals with greater expertise and familiarity
with the new tools of the trade. Another approach argues for the "spillover" effect of a
growing number of political operatives working on candidate-campaigns looking for
lucrative work. Alternatively, some focus on interest groups and their respective
observations of the effectiveness of employing political consultants in candidate
and/or initiative campaigns. And finally, some scholars claim that political
consultants themselves, with the goal of drumming up business, have begun pitching
I&R ideas to potential funders (McCuan, 2001; Donovan, Bowler & McCuan, 2001;
Magelby & Patterson, 1998; Schrag, 1998, Donovan et al., 2001).
Regardless of the distinct arguments put forth in the scholarly literature on
direct legislation and political consultants, all of them employ a variation of a
professionalization thesis. Political consultants, whether their specialty is in media,
fundraising, or direct mail, are constructed in these analyses as professionals. Such a
construction naturalizes what is essentially the capture of a political process by
powerful organized interests. Viewing the transformation of initiative elections into
extraordinarily well-financed and technologically-mediated spectacles as an inevitable
and natural progression, serves to shift attention from the larger political economic
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changes that have taken place over the last 30 to 40 years. The logic of neoliberalism
is evident in a system without campaign finance limits, and wherein moneyed interests
can purchase the most advanced political marketing tools and techniques for their
efforts. The professionalization thesis legitimizes the industrialization and increasing
privatization of what should arguably be one of the most public spaces in a
participatory democracy, campaigns and elections. Moreover, the historical origins of
I&R as a reaction to monopoly corporate power and captured, corrupt state
legislatures, renders the colonization of direct legislation a particularly potent symbol
of the conquest of the principles of neoliberalism.
The present study described in detail the advanced political marketing efforts
utilized in the Measure 48, 41, 98, and 92 campaigns. In these technologicallymediated efforts, voters were surveilled, targeted, and largely constructed as
consumers transacting a commodity purchase rather than as citizens engaged in
participatory democracy. The opposition campaigns for all four measures used
techniques and technologies from commodity advertising to extract pertinent data
about the consumer, locate the targets of opportunity, shape communication about the
nature of the product, and track the efficacy of the campaign's persuasion efforts.
Rather than efforts to democratize the political agenda, the tools and
techniques of the political marketers serve to inform the campaigns as to how to most
effectively construct their messages and sell their positions. The opposition
campaigns to Measures 48 and 41 were grouped together not because they had
substantive policy similarities, but rather to facilitate the campaign's messaging
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strategy. A similar strategy was used by the opposition to public resources (98) and
payroll deduction (92) albeit with a much easier case to be made as the measures were
both from Sizemore's operation and dealt with similar issues. Still, one of the explicit
reasons for linking the measures was to take advantage of the priming effect
discovered in focus groups when arguments opposing payroll deduction (92) had
followed those attacking public resources (98).
The panoptic technologies used in the measure campaigns analyzed for this
study served to segment voters into discrete categories to facilitate targeted,
customized messaging. Gandy and Danna have documented the increasing
informaticization of relationships in everything from retail consumption to
government and for profit services and have identified potential social costs to
individuals and society (Gandy & Danna, 2002). Such an approach, taken from
commodity advertising and commonly referred to as mass customization, arguably
exacerbates the balkanization of an electorate that more and more is confining its
public affairs information to individually chosen and/or tailored web sites and sources
(see especially Sunstein, 2001). The political marketing techniques employed in these
campaigns reflect the industrial logic and market-orientation of ballot measure politics
in the twenty-first century. The microtargeting employed in the campaigns researched
here permitted opponents of Measures 48, 41, 98 and 92 to construct and distribute
several different voter guides with messaging unique to the targeted demographic.
While the explicit purpose of political campaigns has always been persuasion
through the use of targeted messages that present one candidate or ballot measure in
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the most positive light possible, while casting doubt and providing negative
information on the opposition, the scientific management of public opinion is
informed by exponentially greater access to information available to the well-financed
political campaigns of the twenty-first century. As described in the campaign plan
documents and in interviews with advocates and political operatives involved in
initiative campaigns in Oregon, the breadth and depth of information available to
campaigns from various private and public databases is unprecedented. Moreover,
although very imperfect and only as good as the individuals and concerns supplying
and analyzing the data, so-called predictive technologies and methodologies offer the
potential for campaigns to more effectively profile and segment voters (and nonvoters)
to more productively allocate resources and to better target their messaging. Of course
it is only those interests with access to sufficient capital to purchase such information
and personnel, and/or those enterprises with in-house public relations/marketing
departments that can take advantage of this information and communication
technology.
Tolbert and Smith (2004) present evidence that initiative campaigns serve to,
among other things, increase political knowledge, discussion, and civic engagement.
Based on the historical claims and aspirations of early populists and progressives
advocating for I&R, examination of the secondary effects of ballot measures is a
fruitful subject for further research. The present study's focus on the procedural
elements of initiative campaigns including the financing, strategies, tactics, and
communication, does not provide the information necessary to make an empirically245
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driven judgment as to the level of political knowledge, discussion, or civic
engagement of Oregon voters in the measure campaigns that are the focus of this
dissertation. However, the nature of the campaigns, and the procedural elements
described and analyzed in this study, should give pause to those claiming that ballot
measure campaigns enhance and strengthen these important features of the democratic
system.
As described in Chapter Four, when the lead pollster for the opposition
campaigns, a political veteran of over two decades in Oregon, describes how voters in
focus groups and opinion surveys exhibit little, if any, familiarity with ballot measures
that have been before the voters several times before, it raises questions about the
definition and understanding of what constitutes political knowledge. Furthermore,
with information costs high, and with election ballots with upwards of 20 I&R, voters
are ripe targets of opportunity for capital-intensive campaigns with the resources and
information available to campaigns such as those documented in this dissertation.
Todd Donovan and Shawn Bowler have argued that voters in ballot measure
campaigns manage to successfully employ "soft criteria" and voting cues that result in
individuals making decisions that appear to align with their political perspective
(Donovan & Bowler, 2000). Still, the present study's description of the strategies,
tactics, and activities of capital-intensive campaigns lends credence to normative
concerns as to whether judging voter competence and political knowledge by such
criteria is sufficient. If the measurement of voter competence and political knowledge
rests on whether one's votes are consistent with past decisions and party affiliation,
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and political knowledge is based on responses to general questions about politics, then
what to make of populist and progressive claims that:
.. .when the questions go on the ballot there is general public discussion of the
arguments for and against. The newspapers devote whole columns to the
issues. The questions are discussed, pro and con, before chambers of
commerce, boards of trade, luncheon clubs, civic leagues, women's societies,
on the radio - everywhere. In this way the whole body of the voters becomes
informed on public problems (Munro, 1931, p. 576).

Without holding initiative campaigns and elections to unrealistic standards based on
aspirational statements of early advocates, nor demanding that ballot measure
campaigns have any greater or lesser degree of efficacy than candidate-campaigns, it
is necessary to view I&R within the contemporary political economic context in which
it functions.
Presently, mainstream media outlets including newspapers and broadcast
media are struggling to identify a business model that produces both profitability and
democracy-enhancing journalism (McChesney & Nichols, 2009). Because of this, the
influence of capital-intensive political campaigns both in priming media outlets for
favorable coverage, and more importantly, for direct campaign-to-voter advertising,
becomes increasingly significant. To this end, the present study's detailing of the
sophisticated means by which organized interests run initiative campaigns merits
serious consideration in any discussion as to the beneficial secondary effects of direct
legislation. Moreover, while political discussion might be greater in the 24 states with
I&R, the quality and content of such discussions require attention and examination.
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In terms of civic engagement, Oregon campaigns and elections during the 2000
to 2008 period certainly included initiatives that fostered participation, political
discussion, and increased citizens' knowledge of political issues. In 2000, State
senator Ginny Burdick of Portland was the chief petitioner for Measure 5, which
required criminal background checks at gun shows. This issue received a great deal of
media coverage and was one that most would view as not particularly complicated to
understand. On the other end of the political spectrum, Measure 36 in the 2004
election provided for a constitutional amendment defining marriage as only being
between a man and a woman. Although Measure 36 was unquestionably highly
controversial and exceptionally emotional and hurtful to many in Oregon's gay
community, it received a great deal of media coverage and generated public discourse
about the nature of marriage, government's role in personal relationships, and the
significance and purpose of state constitutions. In short, both of these measures
probably enhanced civic engagement.
At the same time, in Oregon during the same 2000 to 2008 election period,
I&R has increasingly become a means by which powerful organized interests
dominate the public sphere, force political opponents to expend significant resources,
and take advantage of a direct legislation system with no financial limits on
contributions and expenditures. Of the 52 I&R on the ballot during 2000 to 2008, 49
(94 percent) employed paid signature gatherers to gain access to the ballot (Oregon
Secretary of State, 2009). In addition, as evidenced by the case studies from 2000 and
2006 Oregon I&R campaigns, wealthy interests can not only purchase their way onto
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the ballot, but they can capitalize on the inherent ambiguity of language to facilitate
their campaign communication. As described in interviews with political consultants
in the course of this research, there is greater flexibility and maneuverability with
ballot measures in comparison to candidate campaigns. Apart from physical features,
party affiliation, and often a voting record to go along with a lengthy resume of work
and life experiences, candidates tend to have more of their product already assembled.
However, in ballot measure campaigns, where ballot titles, images, and symbols are
the subjects under examination, political marketers have more degrees of freedom to
mold and shape the commodity for sale in the marketplace.
Democratizing I&R Campaigns and Elections
What changes might be made to mitigate the colonization of direct democracy
by organized interests pushing an ideological and economic neoliberal agenda?
Absent a fundamental change in the federal and state legal regime controlling
campaign finance, organized moneyed and elite economic interests will maintain a
significant advantage in I&R campaigns and elections. Access to abundant financial
resources enables economic elites to purchase ballot qualification via for-profit
signature-gathering operations. Although this by no means guarentees electoral
victory, as has been discussed at length in this study, it affects public discourse, the
resource allocation of one's political opponents, and the ability to employ
sophisticated political marketing programs and firms. Since public financing of I&R
campaigns would constitute such a radical deparature from the status quo, it is difficult
to predict its ultimate effects. Nevertheless, to the extent that direct legislation actors
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are compelled to engage voters in face-to-face discussions to obtain both the requisite
number of signatures for ballot qualification, as well as during the subsequent
campaign, it may result in the type of enhanced civic engagement and secondary
effects articulated by Tolbert and Smith (2004) and theorized by Barber (1984).
Inflated claims about "online democracy" and the ability of the Internet to
transform I&R by increasing citizen participation, transparency of the political
process, and greater access to information, are to be expected in a culture that
essentially deifies new information and communication technologies (Mosco, 2004;
Postman, 1993; Robins & Webster, 1999). Nevertheless, states offering the motivated
voter greater access, ease and timeliness to follow the financing of initiative
campaigns from ballot qualification to election day, do offer a glimmer of hope for the
republic. Still, even with slightly lower information costs for I&R campaigns and
elections, it is unrealistic to expect that an increasingly depoliticized citizenry will
spend much time online researching the financing of ballot measures through even the
most user-friendly secretary of state election web sites.
One innovative and promising approach to the I&R is known as the citizen's
initiative review from the recently formed non-profit, Healthy Democracy Oregon.
According to Healthy Democracy Oregon Web site, initiatives are reviewed by a panel
of randomly chosen voters from across the state. Over the course of several face-toface meetings, an 18-24 member citizens review panel hears arguments from
proponents, opponents, and policy/subject area experts of measures that have qualified
for the ballot. At the conclusion of the review, the citizen panel drafts a "citizens
250

Conclusion
statement" outlining findings and conclusions on the measure under review. At the
time of the writing of this dissertation, Healthy Democracy Oregon was seeking
legislation to have these "citizen statements" published in the Oregon Voter's
Pamphlet to supplement the explanatory statements currently published by the
secretary of state (Health Democracy Web Site, 2009). Anecdotal testimony from
participants has been very positive. One obvious limitation is that while citizenparticipants in the panels are certainly better informed for having gone through the
process, the democracy-enhancing effect on non-participants is questionable. Absent
empirical data on the sought after beneficial effects of publication of the citizen's
review panels' findings and conclusions in the Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, it is simply
premature to assess the efficacy of this approach.
In sum, although attempts to implement changes and improvements to the
system of direct democracy in Oregon in other states with this option may have
varying degrees of success, absent wholesale changes in the financing of I&R
campaigns and elections, direct legislation will largely remain another process that has
been subsumed by neoliberal capitalist principles and the organized interests financing
these efforts.
The democratic implications of the so-called professionalization of the system
of direct legislation are significant and varied. My hope is that the present study's
critical approach to I&R inspires future research in this now-burgeoning area of
electoral politics.
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Appendix A: 2000-2008 Oregon I&R
2008 General Election Information

Type

#

Referral

51

Referral

52

Referral

53

Referral

54

Referral

55

Referral

56

Referral

57

Initiative

Summary
Enable crime victims to
enforce existing constitutional
rights in prosecutions,
delinquency proceedings
Enable Crime Victims To
Enforce Existing Constitutional
Rights In Prosecutions,
Delinquency Proceedings;
Authorizes Implementing
Legislation
Modify provisions governing
civil forfeitures related to
crimes; permits use of
proceeds by law enforcement
Standardizes voting eligibility
for school board elections with
other state and local elections
Change operative date of
redistricting plans to allow
affected legislators to finish
term in original district
May And November property
tax elections are to be decided
by majority of voters voting in
the relevant election (removes
supermajority requirement
established by Measure 47 in
1996.
Increases sentences for drug
trafficking, theft against
elderly, and specific repeat
property and identity theft
crimes, more.
Requires english immersion
for non-english speaking
students

58
Makes federal income taxes
fully deductible on state return

Initiative

59

Chief
Petitioners

Paid
Signatures

Grosso, Alan;
Sizemore,
Bill; Walker,
R. Russell
Sizemore,
Bill; Trickey,
Timothy;

Yes

Yes

Walker, R.
Russell

Initiative

60

Initiative

61

"Teacher compensation must
be based on classroom
performance"
"Mandatory sentences for drug
dealers, identity thieves,
burglars and car thieves"

"15% of lottery profits for crime
prevention, investigation and
prosecution"
Initiative

62

Initiative

63

Initiative

64

Initiative

65

Allows minor improvements To
property without building
permit
Prohibits using taxpayerfunded resources to collect
political funds
The "top-two" measure;
creates open primaries. All
voters would be able to vote in
all state and local partisan
elections, regardless of party
affiliation.

Sizemore,
Bill; Walker,
R. Russell
Fletchall,
Duane; Beck,
Steve;
Mannix, Kevin
L.
Fletchall,
Duane; Beck,
Steve;
Mannix, Kevin
L.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Grosso, Alan;
Sizemore, Bill

Yes

Sizemore, Bill

Yes

Keisling, Phil

Yes

Oregon voters faced 12 ballot measures for the 2008 general election, with four
legislative referrals, and eight citizen-initiatives. Only one, Measure 62, was a
constitutional amendment. All eight of the initiatives employed paid signature
gathering firms to qualify for the ballot. Four out of four of the legislative referrals
were successful. Five of the initiatives had Bill Sizemore as chief petitioner. Russ
Walker of Freedom Works was listed as a sponsor of three of the initiatives, and
attorney and former legislator and Attorney General candidate Kevin Mannix was the
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chief petitioner on two. Finally, former Oregon Secretary of State Phil Keisling was
the chief petitioner for an open primary measure.
Total ballot measure fundraising as of November 4, 2008, totaled $20.6 million
(Thompson, 2008a). The top three donors were the Oregon Education Association,
the National Education Association, and Loren Parks and his Parks Medical
Equipment Company. Of the eight non-legislative or citizen-initiatives, only Measure
65, the so-called Open Primary Initiative from former Secretary of State Phil Keisling,
didn't have its largest contributor topping the $100,000 level (Thompson, 2008a).
In the qualification stage, Loren Parks (Nevada), a frequent funder of
conservative ballot measures, contributed $1,352,500 to eight initiatives from Bill
Sizemore, Russ Walker, and Kevin Mannix (Thompson, 2008b). Parks contributed
another $224,000 for signature gathering on petitions that were either not submitted to
the Secretary of State, or withdrawn. Parks' over $1.3 million contribution eclipsed
the top donor level mark that he had held previously for the qualification stage in
2002, when the medical equipment owner now living in Nevada gave over $300,000
to three initiative campaigns (Thompson, 2008b).
Parks is the top donor for eight initiatives that sought qualification in the 2008
General Election, and is the major funder for four initiatives from Bill Sizemore.
Three of the four Sizemore initiatives had Russ Walker of the Oregon chapter of
FreedomWorks also as Chief Petitioner. All three of the Sizemore-Walker petitions
qualified for the 2008 ballot: Measure 59, which makes federal income taxes fully
deductible on state forms; Measure 58, which restricts the number of years an Oregon
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student can participate in bilingual education; and Measure 60, which prohibits the use
of seniority in teacher pay and hiring decisions (Thompson, 2008b).
Parks is also the chief financier for four initiatives where Kevin Mannix is
either the Chief petitioner, or a significant contributor. Only two of the four measures
qualified for the Ballot Measure 61, sponsored by Mannix, Steve Beck, and Duane
Fletchall, creates mandatory minimum sentences for certain non-violent crimes. Parks
contributed $122,500, or 68 percent of the total during the qualification stage, while
Kevin Mannix spent $8,639 or 5 percent of the total. Ballot Measure 62, a
Constitutional Amendment that would allocate 15 percent of Lottery proceeds to
public safety, finds Parks contributing $179,166 or 79 percent of the qualifying costs
with Mannix ponying up $8,639 or 4 percent of the total (Thompson, 2008b).
Richard Wendt, another frequent contributor to conservative causes in Oregon,
who is affiliated with Hire Calling Public Affairs, gave $325,000 or 14 percent of
contributions to initiatives seeking qualification for the 2008 ballot.
On the opposite side of the aforementioned conservative funders, public
employee unions were the top funders. Thus, for the campaigns against Measures, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, and 64, the Oregon Education Association contributed over $5.3
million, or 25.8 percent of the total opposing these measures. In contrast, Loren Parks,
through his business, Parks Medical Electronics, contributed $1,575 million, or 7.6
percent of the total in support of the same measures (Thompson, 2008b).
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2007 Special Election

Type

#

Referral

49

Referral

50

Summary

Chief
Petitioners

Paid
Signatures

Modifies Measure 37, passed
by voters in 2004.
Increase the state's tax on
cigarettes by 84.5 centers per
pack

Two referrals were on the Oregon Ballot for a Special Election in the Fall of
2007. Measure 49 was a land-use law in response to Ballot Measure 37, which passed
in the 2006 General Election. Proponents of Measure 49 argued that Measure 37,
which requires state and local governments to compensate landowners for any loss in
value for land-use regulations, had too much ambiguity, and that it had been largely
misunderstood by the voters. Opponents of Measure 49 claimed that it would
essentially gut Measure 37, and that it ignored the will of the voters and was an assault
on property rights.
Ballot Measure 50, another referral from the Legislature, was a Constitutional
Amendment that sought to raise cigarette taxes by $0.85 per pack, with the money
being dedicated to funding for children's healthcare as well as tobacco cessation
programs.
Opponents of Measure 50 spent almost $12 million seeking its defeat. This constitutes
the largest amount of money raised for a ballot measure campaign in Oregon
(Thompson & Wetherson, 2007). The $12 million raised primarily from Philip Morris
USA Inc., Reynolds American, and Altria Corporate Services, Inc., easily surpassed
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the previous contribution record of $7.1 million (in 2006 inflation-adjusted figures)
from the opposition campaign to 1992 measures seeking to close down the Trojan
nuclear reactor (Thompson & Wetherson, 2007).

2006 General Election

2006
Type

#

Summary
Prevents eminent domain in
the name of tax revenue

Initiative

39

Initiative

40

Initiative

41

Initiative

42

Initiative

43

Initiative

44

Initiative

45

Initiative

46

Requires Oregon Supreme
Court Judges and Court of
Appeals Judges to be elected
by District
Allows income tax deduction
equal to federal exemptions

Prohibits insurance
companies from using credit
score or "credit worthiness" in
calculating rates or premiums
Requires 48-hour notice to
un-emancipated minor's
parent before providing
abortion
Allows any Oregon resident
without prescription drug
coverage to participate in
Oregon Prescription Drug
Program
Limits State Legislators: 6
years as Representative, 8
years as Senator, 14 in the
Legislature
Allows laws regulating
campaign contributions

Puts restrictions on campaign
contributions

Initiative

Initiative

47

48

Limits biennial percentage
increase in state spending to
percentage increase in state

Chief
Petitioners
Day, Ross;
Hunnicutt,
David J.
Bobo, Abner
J.; Bobo,
Carol A.;
Walker, Russ
Bobo, Abner
J.; Bobo,
Carol A.;
Walker, Russ
Sizemore,
Bill;
Sizemore,
Grace I
Bautista,
Felicia;
Cochran,
Brenda

Morrisette,
Bill; Cohen,
Gerald J.

Berthelote,
Theodore F.
Delk, David E;
Robison, Jim;
Duemler,
Ruth
Nelson,
Francis G.;
Buckley,
Peter; Hazell,
Bryn
Mclntire, Don;
Williams,
Jason; Howe,

Paid
Signatures

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

279

population, plus inflation

Greg

In Oregon's 2006 general election, voters had a total of 10 initiatives on the
ballot. All 10 employed paid petition circulators to qualify for the ballot. Four of the
10 were constitutional amendments. Ultimately, two of the 10 initiatives passed. Two
initiatives concerned taxation, two related to campaign finance reform, and there was
one each concerning the following: eminent domain, electing supreme court judges,
credit reports and automobile insurance, parental notification for abortions,
prescription drugs, and term limits.
Seven of the 10 initiatives raised all of their funds from fewer than 10 donors,
and no PAC received more than 10 percent of its total from donors giving less than
$100 (MiPRAP, 11/3/06, p. 1). In the signature-gathering phase of the process, outof-state contributors provided more than 40 percent of the funds used to gather
signatures. Petitions with the lowest level of interest from donors in Oregon would
reinstate term limits, limit state spending, and prohibit insurance companies from
using "credit worthiness" as a factor in deciding calculating premiums. Out-of-state
contributors provided 90 percent or more of the money to gather signatures for these
efforts (MiPvAP, 7/27/06, p. 2).
Americans for Limited Government (Illinois - Howard Rich) gave 91 percent
of the money to fund a signature drive effort to place a limit on state spending on the
November ballot. Similarly, US Term Limits contributed 91.6 percent of the money
to gather signatures for its effort (Illinois-Howard Rich) for Measure 45. Two other
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national groups that provided funding for petition-gathering signatures for Oregon's
2006 general election include AARP - which provided 34.3 percent of the funds to
place Measure 44 (DC & CA) on the ballot, and Freedom Works (DC), which
contributed 6.1 percent of the total raised Measure 41.
In the 2006 election, Bill Sizemore qualified only one initiative to the ballot,
Measure 42. The Measure was arguably a break from typical Sizemore measures in
that it did not deal directly with taxation, nor present an attack on public employees.
Measure 42 sought to prohibit insurance companies from using a person's credit rating
when setting insurance rates. Of the $138,424 Sizemore raised to place Measure 42
on the ballot, $100,000, or 72.2 percent, came from Loren Parks (Nevada) (Thompson,
p. 65). Democracy Direct contributed $37,556 or 27.1 percent, and Sizemore himself
contributed the remaining $869, or less than 1 percent.
Measure 42 was defeated by a 65 percent "no" vote, as insurance companies
raised more than $5 million to fund the opposition campaign. In contrast, there was no
organized campaign of support for the measure.
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2004 General Election
2004
Type

#

Referendum

30

Referral

31

Referral

32

Initiative

Initiative

33

34

Initiative

35

Initiative

36

Summary
Enacts Temporary
Personal Income Tax
Surcharge; Increases,
Changes Corporate, Other
Taxes; Avoids Specific
Budget Cuts
Authorizes Law Permitting
Postponement Of Election
For Particular Public
Office When Nominee For
Office Dies
Deletes Reference To
Mobile Homes From
Provision Dealing With
Taxes And Fees On Motor
Vehicles.
Amends Medical
Marijuana Act: Requires
Marijuana Dispensaries
For Supplying
Patients/Caregivers;
Raises Patients'
Possession Limit
Requires Balancing
Timber Production,
Resource
Conservation/Preservation
In Managing State
Forests; Specifically
Addresses Two Forests
Amends Constitution:
Limits Noneconomic
Damages (Defined)
Recoverable For Patient
Injuries Caused By
Healthcare Provider's
Negligence Or
Recklessness
Amends Constitution:
Only Marriage Between
One Man And One

Chief
Petitioners

Paid
Signatures

Walker, R.
Russell;
Williams,
Jason

Yes

Brown,
Kenneth
Scott; Sajo,
John A.;
Glick,
Edward

Yes

Gest, Mari
Anne; Rees,
Robert;
McGeady,
Steven D.

Yes

Cave, Colin
R.; Wehby,
Monica C ;
Bernardo,
Peter
Walton, Kent;
Tuuri, Dennis
R.

Yes

Yes

282

Initiative

Initiative

37

38

Woman Is Valid Or
Legally Recognized As
Marriage
Governments Must Pay
Owners, Or Forgo
Enforcement, When
Certain Land Use
Restrictions Reduce
Property Value
Abolishes Saif; State Must
Reinsure, Satisfy Saif's
Obligations; Dedicates
Proceeds, Potential
Surplus To Public
Purposes

Prete,
Eugene;
Prete,
Barbara;
English,
Dorothy

Yes

Bemau, Jim;
Gauthier,
Lorinda L.

Yes

A total of seven popular initiatives were on Oregon's 2004 General Election
Ballot. Of the seven, two were constitutional amendments, and one was a referendum.
All seven initiatives used paid signature-gatherers to qualify for the ballot. Ultimately,
two out of seven were successful on election day. In addition, there were two
legislative referrals, both of which passed.
Measure 38, which essentially pit Liberty Northwest Insurance against SAIF, a
state-owned workers' compensation insurer. For the Yes on 38 side, $5,583,182, or
99.7 percent of the contributions for the measure emanated from Liberty Northwest
(MiRAP, 2004). While for the opposition, Associated General Contractors (AGC),
was responsible for 41 percent of the contributions at $1,086,654, with Associated
Loggers Inc. the next highest contributor with $387,554 or 14 percent of total
contributions. This bitterly contested campaign included specious claims by
proponents that passage of the measure would free up $500 million to fund schools
and other government programs. While opponents claimed in their advertisements
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using professional actors that should the measure pass, double-digit workers'
compensation increases would be certain.
Measure 36, a Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as between one
man and one woman had the second largest amount of total contributions with
$2,892,230 on the No side, and $2,189,481 for the Yes of 36. The successful
constitutional amendment was an intensely fought campaign which included
accusations that the proponents distorted the work of a Yale child psychiatrist who
was cited in pro-Measure 36 advertising (Graves, 2004).
Measure 35, which concerned medical malpractice lawsuits, and essentially
pitted healthcare companies against law firms, saw the third largest amount of
contributions with some $3.8 million spent by supporters and opponents. The measure
would have capped damages in civil lawsuits.
Measure 37, a land use initiative that mandated either compensation for
landowners when government regulations affect the value of property, or a withdrawal
of such provisions. Although one of the Chief Petitioners was Dorothy English, a
widow who figured prominently in the advertising for the Measure, the primer flinders
of the "Yes" campaign were timber and forest product companies. The top three
contributors for Measure 37, with 39 percent of the total given, were Seneca Jones
Timber; Swanson Group Inc., and RSG Forest Products Inc. (MiRAP, press release).
Measure 33 sought to amend Oregon's medical marijuana act by authorizing a
system of legal marijuana growers. Measure 34 was sponsored by an environmental
coalition to change the way in which the Tillamook and Clatsop state forests were to
284

be managed.
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2002 General Election

Type

#

Referral

10

Referral

11

Referral

12

Referral

13

Referral

14

Referral

15

Referral

16

Referral

17

Referral

18

Summary

Chief
Petitioners

Paid
Signatures

Amends Constitution: Permits
State To Own Stock Received
From Publicly-Created
Technology Or Invested In
Oregon Technology
Amends Constitution: Authorizes
Less Expensive General
Obligation Bond Financing For
OHSU Medical Research And
Other Capital Costs
Amends Constitution: In Certain
Circumstances, Legislature May
Appropriate Portion Of
Education-Fund Principal;
Transfers Money From Fund
Amends Constitution: Authorizes
Using Education Fund Principal
In Specified Circumstances;
Transfers $220 Million To
School Fund
Amends Constitution: Removes
Historical Racial References In
Obsolete Sections Of Oregon
Constitution, Article Vii
(Original), Article Xviii
Amends Constitution: Authorizes
State To Issue General
Obligation Bonds For Seismic
Rehabilitation Of Public
Education Buildings (Defined)
Amends Constitution: Authorizes
State To Issue General
Obligation Bonds For Seismic
Rehabilitation Of Emergency
Services Buildings (Defined)
Amends Constitution: Reduces
Minimum Age Requirement To
Serve As State Legislator From
21 Years To 18 Years
Amends Constitution: Allows
Certain Tax Districts To

286

Referral

19

Referral

20

Initiative

21

Initiative

22

Initiative

23

Initiative

24

Initiative

25

Initiative

Initiative

26

27

Establish Permanent Property
Tax Rates And Divide Into Tax
Zones
Amends Constitution: Authorizes
Using Education Stability Fund
Principal in Specified
Circumstances; Transfers $150
Million to State School Fund;
Creates School Capital Matching
Subaccount in Stability Fund
Increases Cigarette Tax; Uses
Revenue for Health Plan, Other
Programs
Amends Constitution: Revises
Procedure For Filling Judicial
Vacancies, Electing Judges;
Allows Vote For "None Of The
Above"
Amends Constitution: Requires
Oregon Supreme Court Judges
And Court Of Appeals Judges
To Be Elected By District
Creates Health Care Finance
Plan For Medically Necessary
Services; Creates Additional
Income, Payroll Taxes
Allows Licensed Denturists To
Install Partial Dentures
(Replacement Teeth);
Authorizes Cooperative DentistDenturist Business Ventures
Increases Oregon Minimum
Wage To $6.90 In 2003;
Increases For Inflation In Future
Years
Amends Constitution: Prohibits
Payment, Receipt Of Payment
Based On The Number Of
Initiative, Referendum Petition
Signatures Obtained
Requires Labeling Of
Genetically-Engineered Foods
(As Defined) Sold Or Distributed
In Or From Oregon

Mclntire, Don;
Clapper,
Gregg K.
Doell, Steve;
Ferrioli, Ted;
Smith, Bob
Duemler,
Ruth C;
Partridge,
JohnW;
Dreyer, Phil

Holden, Ken;
Davis, Jim;
Pickard, Alice
Pronovost,
Eugene P.;
Rosenbaum,
Diane;
Gardner, Dan
Nesbitt,
Timothy J.;
Davis, Robert
D.; Lowe,
Ellen C.
Harris,
Donna; Lord,
Katelyn A

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

A total of seven popular initiatives qualified for the Oregon ballot in the 2002
general election. All seven used paid signature-gatherers to qualify. Five of the seven
were statutory and two were constitutional amendments. Three of the popular
initiatives passed and four failed. Also, voters had twelve legislative referrals to sort
through; 11 of the 12 were constitutional. Ultimately, seven of the 12 referrals were
successful. Once again, Loren Parks was a dominant funding force for ballot
measures in Oregon. In addition to providing 99 percent of the contributions to get
Measures 21 and 22 on the November Ballot, Parks financed 98.4 percent of both of
the "Yes" campaigns on these Measures.
Other large expenditures for this election cycle included Crop Life
International's $3.7 million contribution, or 72.6 percent of the total dollars in
opposition to Measure 27 that sought to mandate labeling for genetically modified
foods (MiPRAP, October, 2002, p. 2). St. Louis-based Monsanto Corporation also
contributed $1.48 million, or 29 percent of the total in opposition to the same measure.
Pat McCormick, political consultant in charge of the opposition campaign was asked if
the significantly less funded proponents of Measure 27 would make an issue of the
millions of dollars from agribusiness funding the opposition campaign. His response
was that "In political campaigns, you'd always rather be the Goliath" (Hogan, D.,
2002).
Ballot Measure 25 sought to raise the state's minimum hourly wage by 40
cents with automatic yearly increases thereafter.
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Measure 26 prohibited paying initiative circulators by the signature and was
supported primarily by public employee unions; the very group of people who have
consistently spent the most money by far primarily in opposition campaigns to
initiatives sponsored by Oregon Taxpayers United.
Hospitals and health insurance companies banded together to fight Measure 23
in 2002 which would have created universal healthcare in Oregon.

289

2000 General Election
2000
Type

Initiative

Initiative

Initiative

Initiative

Initiative

#

1

Summary
Legislature Must Fund
School Quality Goals
Adequately; Report;
Establish Grants

3

Creates Process For
Requiring Legislature To
Review Administrative Rules
Requires Conviction Before
Forfeiture; Restricts
Proceeds Usage; Requires
Reporting, Penalty

4

Dedicates TobaccoSettlement Proceeds;
Earnings Fund Low-Income
Health Care

5

Requiring Background
Check Before Transfer Of
Firearm

2

Chief
Petitioners
Kitzhaber,
MD, John A.;
Bunn, Stan;
Timpe,
Ronald E.
George,
Larry;
Hunnicutt,
David;
Williams,
Jason
Heslep, Ray;
Adamson,
Sandra
Timms,
Eugene D.;
Beyer, Lee;
Patterson,
Edwin
Eugene
Burdick,
Ginny;
Kennedy,
Robert;
Noelle, Dan
Eaton,
Katherine G.;
Dellenback,
John R.;
Paulus,
Norma

Initiative

6

Initiative

7

Provides Public Funding To
Candidates Who Limit
Spending, Private
Contributions
Requires Payment to
Landowner if Government
Regulation Reduces
Property Value

Initiative

8

Limits State Appropriations
To Percentage Of State's
Prior Personal Income

Miller, Stuart
Mclntire, Don;
Foxall, Joe
W.; Sunseri,
Ron

Initiative

9

Prohibits Public School

Mabon, Lon

Paid
Signatures

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes
No
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Referral

77

Referral

78

Referral

79

Referral

80

Referral

81

Referendum

82

Referral

83

Referral

84

Referral

85

Referral

86

Referral

87

Referral

88

Instruction Encouraging,
Promoting, Sanctioning
Homosexual, Bisexual
Behaviors
Makes Certain Local Taxing
Districts' Temporary Property
Tax Authority Permanent
Lengthens Period For
Verifying Signatures On
Initiative And Referendum
Petitions
Modifies Signature
Requirements On Initiative &
Referendum
Authorizes Using Fuel Tax,
Vehicle Fees For Increasing
Highway Policing
Allows Legislature To Limit
Recovery Of Damages In
Civil Actions
Repeals Truck Weight-Mile
Tax; Establishes And
Increases Fuel Taxes
Authorizes New Standards,
Priorities For Veterans'
Loans; Expands Qualified
Recipients
State Must Continue Paying
Local Governments For
State-Mandated Programs
Modifies Population,
Minimum Area
Requirements For Formation
Of New Counties
Requires Refunding General
Fund Revenues Exceeding
State Estimates To
Taxpayers
Allows Regulation Of
Location Of Sexually
Oriented Businesses
Through Zoning
Increases Maximum
Deductible In Oregon For
Federal Income Taxes Paid

T.; Ramsdell,
Phillip Z.

Miller, Becky;
Porter, John

Yes

Referral

89

Referendum

90

Initiative

91

Initiative

92

Initiative

93

Initiative

94

Initiative

95

Initiative

Initiative

Initiative

Initiative

96

97

98

99

Dedicates Tobacco
Settlement Proceeds To
Specified Health, Housing,
Transportation Programs
Authorizes Rates Giving
Utilities Return On
Investments In Retired
Property
Makes Federal Income
Taxes Fully Deductible On
Oregon Tax Returns
Prohibits Payroll Deductions
For Political Purposes
Without Specific Written
Authorization
Voters Must Approve Most
Taxes, Fees; Requires
Certain Approval Percentage
Repeals Mandatory
Minimum Sentences For
Certain Felonies, Requires
Resentencing
Student Learning
Determines Teacher Pay;
Qualifications, Not Seniority,
Determine Retention
Prohibits Making Initiative
Process Harder, Except
Through Initiative; Applies
Retroactively
Bans Body-Gripping Animal
Traps, Some Poisons;
Restricts Fur Commerce
Prohibits Using Public
Resources For Political
Purposes; Limits Payroll
Deductions
Amends Constitution:
Creates Commission
Ensuring Quality Home Care
Services For Elderly,
Disabled

Kirk,
Maureen;
Jenks, Bob;
Marbet, Lloyd

Yes

Sizemore, Bill

Yes

Sizemore,
Bill; Miller,
Becky
Sizemore,
Bill; Miller,
Becky
Lawler, Cathi;
Heller,
Lorraine;
Bowman,
JoAnn

Miller, Stuart;
Miller, Becky
Eisenzimmer,
Frank; Miller,
Becky
Furse,
Elizabeth;
Kirkpatrick,
Jennifer

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Sizemore,
Bill; Miller,
Becky

Yes

Sauers, Ellie;
Organ,
Eugene

Yes

Oregon voters faced a total of 20 citizen-initiated measures on the 2000
general election ballot. Of those 20 measures, 12 were proposed constitutional
amendments. Two referenda also made the 2000 general election ballot. Of the 18
non-referenda that qualified, 15 employed paid signature-gatherers. Four of the 18
measures were passed by the voters (Oregon Secretary of State, 2008). Additionally,
voters faced 12 legislative referrals, five of which were successful in the election.
Finally, of note, Bill Sizemore's organization, Oregon Taxpayer's United, qualified six
measures for the ballot in 2000.
Measures 8, 91, and 93 were significant tax-related initiatives that attracted the
most media attention and campaign contributions and expenditures. All three
initiatives failed to garner sufficient votes to pass. Measure 91, a constitutional
amendment sponsored by Oregon Taxpayers United and its director, Bill Sizemore,
would have allowed full deduction of federal taxes on Oregon income tax forms.
Measure 91, although it would have resulted in an estimated $150 million tax break to
corporations, was opposed by Associated Oregon Industries, the state's largest
business lobbying association at the time. Corporate spokespersons expressed concern
that such a tax break for corporations would incentivize legislators to look to
corporations for new taxes to make-up the shortfall. When queried about the
corporate tax cut element of the measure chief petitioner Sizemore stated "Big
corporations have never been part of our network" and claimed that Oregon
Taxpayer's United had been "built on grassroots support" (Mayer, 2005) Illustrating
the effectiveness of the opposition's very well-funded campaign, polling on the
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measure conducted September 5 through 11 for the state's largest newspaper, the
Oregonian, and KATU channel 2 found that 54 percent supported Measure 91 and 41
percent were opposed. However, an estimated loss of $1 billion in state revenue
influenced the creation of a coalition of business and labor to deploy considerable
resources to assure the measure's defeat. Members of the state's growing high-tech
industry contributed upwards of $150,000 (Mayer, 2005). Demonstrating the
intensity of the battle, the Oregon Association of Broadcasters ruled that two
television advertisements supporting Measure 91 were factually inaccurate and were
ordered pulled off the air. Specifically, one campaign spot asserted that Oregon
ranked fourth in the nation in taxation, however at the time, the state was closer to
40th. The other campaign advertisement pulled off the air claimed that "The state
figures your taxes as if the feds never taxed you at all." However, the state's $3,000
deduction covers all or a sizeable majority of the federal income taxes paid by most
Oregonians ("Facing," 2000). Sizemore was also the chief petitioner for Measure 93.
Measure 93 was also a constitutional amendment and would have required votes on
most new or increased taxes and fees imposed by state and local governments.
Additionally, tax measures would have had to pass by the same percentage by which
Measure 93 passed.
Another initiative sponsored by Sizemore's Oregon Taxpayer's United was
Measure 95 which sought to tie teacher pay to student performance. Out of state
money from the National Education Association along with its Oregon affiliate, the
Oregon Education Association, spent in excess of $1 million in its successful
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opposition campaign (Hogan, D. 2000). Measure 8, from chief petitioner Don
Mclntire, also failed. Measure 8 sought to limit state spending to 15 percent of the
personal income of Oregonians in the two previous years. $2.5 million was spent by a
coalition of labor and business to defeat the measures. The measure split the largest
corporate associations as 19,000 member Associated Oregon Industries provided
financial support for the initiative while the American Electronics Association and the
Oregon Business Council helped to finance the opposition campaign (Mayer, 2000;
Mayer, 2000, p. Al 1). Measure 97, which sought to restrict the use of body-gripping
animal traps, received $230,000 from out of state interests including $115,000 from
the Ballot Issues Coalition of Vienna, Virginia, a committee financed by hunting and
trapping groups. On the other side of the measure, the International Fund for Animal
Welfare contributed $62,500 to the Measure 97 campaign. The National Rifle
Association spent $250,000 in one month seeking to defeat Measure 5. Measure 5
received $50,000 in support from Washington, D.C-based Handgun Control, a gun
control group which support this successful measure that required background checks
prior to gun sales at gun shows (Hogan, 2000). Ballot Measure 7, a constitutional
amendment requiring payment to landowners whose property values are reduced by
government regulations, passed. The measure's chief sponsor was Stuart Miller, but
the force behind the initiative was the property rights advocacy group, Oregonians in
Action. Opponents included the powerful environmental lobby, 1,000 Friends of
Oregon. According to an editorial by the Oregonian, Measure 7 was "deceptively
simple" and was "all but obscured by 25 other ballot measures" ("The one," 2000).
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Ballot Measure 9 was labeled by its supporters as the "student protection act," would
have banned schools from discussing homosexuality "in a manner which encourages,
promotes or sanctions such behaviors." The Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA) was the
interest group that promoted the measure and was responsible for the campaign. The
OCA was very active in the 1990s, but faded from the scene in the 2000s.
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Appendix B: Political Professionals & Initiative Activists Interviewed
Chuck Adams, Adams & Co.
Rachel Albers, Compass Media
Ken Allen, Oregon AFSCME, Council 75
Susan Allen, Oregon AFSCME, Council 75
Michael Arno, Arno political consulting
Joe Baessler, Oregon AFSCME, Council 75
Leonard Bergstein, Northwest Strategies, Inc.
Jetson Black, Oregon Education Association
Ted Blazack, Democracy Resources
Matthew Blevins, M & R Strategic Services
Ginny Burdick, State Senator, Oregon
Tom Chamberlain, Oregon AFL-CIO
Gary Conkling, Conkling, Fiskum, & McCormick
BethAnne Darby, Oregon Education Association
Ryan Deckert, Oregon Business Association
Jackie Dingfelder, State Senator, Oregon
Phil Donovan, Northwest Public Affairs
Roger Gray, Gray Strategies
Mitch, Greenlick, State Representative
Lisa Grove, Grove Insight, Inc.
Mark Hass, Cappelli, Miles, Spring

Tim Hibbits, Adams & Hibbits
Marie Hoeven, Fundraising Consultant
Cody Hosely, Attorney Larkins Vacura LLP
Phillip James, Democracy Resources
Liz Kaufman, political consultant
Kevin Mannix, Initiative activist and former state legislator
Evan Manvel, Lobbyist, Oregon League of Conservation Voters
Don Mclntire, Initiative activist
Andi Miller, Oregon Business Association
Frank Morse, State Senator, Oregon
Mark Nelson, Public Affairs Counsel
Tim Nesbitt, Depudy Chief of Staff, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski
Janice O'Malley, Oregon AFSCME Council 75
Jack Quigley, Compass Media
Maura Roche, Basic Rights Oregon
Hiram Sachs, SachsCommunications
Duke Shepard, AFL-CIO
Chip Shields, State Representative, Oregon
Amy Simon, Partner at Goodwin, Simon, Victoria Research
Tricia Smith, Oregon School Employees Association
Chip Terhune, Chief of Staff, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski
Janice Thompson, Democracy Reform Oregon

Arthur Towers, Oregon SEIU
Tim Trickey, Democracy Direct
Donna Victoria, Partner at Goodwin, Simon, Victoria Research
Robert Wagner, AFT-Oregon
Mark Weiner, Winning Mark
Ben Westlund, State Treasurer, Oregon
Laurie Wimmer, Oregon Education Association

ENDNOTES
Throughout this paper I will use the terms direct democracy, direct legislation, initiative process, and
ballot measure more or less interchangeably.
" In early interviews with three political consultants who have been active in ballot measure campaigns
for more than a decade, all independently identified Measure 5 from 1990 as critical to understanding
the increased initiative use, as well as the subsequent fiscal challenges facing the Oregon legislature.
3

The term initiative-industrial complex tends to be credited to journalist and author Peter Schrag, who
has written extensively on the initiative process both as a reporter and editor for the Sacramento Bee in
California, and in his 1998 book, Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future. The
initiative-industrial complex refers to the confluence of political professionals and monied interests that
constitute the perceived cooptation of a citizen-friendly system by the very powerful interests it
originally sought to counter.

4

Definitions of the term of 'political marketing' are varied and contested. Henneberg cites a definition
offered by Wring, ".. .use of opinion research and environmental analysis to produce and promote a
competitive offering which will help realise [sic] organisational [sic] aims and satisfy groups of electors
in exchange for their votes.
5

ORESTAR stands for Oregon Elections System for Tracking and Reporting. Legislation in 2005 and
2007 mandated that all political action committees and Chief Petitioner Committees in Oregon file
financial transaction electronically (Oregon Secretary of State, 2008).
The Advertising Council was created in 1942 as the War Advertising Council for the purpose of
supporting the World War II effort in the United States. The Advertising Council is a privately funded
nonprofit institution that supports the advertising industry and the business enterprise in general.
7

McCuan argues that some interest groups appear to have concluded that the benefits of seeking to
influence elected representatives might be outweighed by the costs, especially considering the
uncertainty of any legislation's final form. In contrast, the initiative process, though certainly an
expensive investment, is simply a yes/no vote that avoids the inevitable compromises and watering
down inherent to the legislative process.
8

The Political Reform Act of 1974 is an amended version of the 1971 Federal Campaign Act which
was passed in the wake of Watergate and, among other things, increased disclosure of contributions for
federal candidate campaigns. It should be noted that in lieu of subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
there are no contribution and expenditure limits on initiatives.
9

The term crypto-initiative, coined by Kousser and McCubbins, refers to initiatives that use direct
legislation as an instrument to achieve nonpolicy-related goals such as forcing political opponents to
expend resources to fight measures on the ballot.
10

Tolbert and Smith use National Election Studies data for the 1996, 1998, and 2000 election years for
their examination of political knowledge. While the specific questions employed to test respondent's
political knowledge differs with each election, the authors present the six questions from the 1998
survey as an example: "What position does Al Gore hold? What posistion does William Rehnquist
hold? What position does Boris Yeltsin hold? What position does Newt Gingrich hold? Which party
had a majority in the House before the election? Which party had a majority in the Senate before the
election?"

1

' Tolbert and Smith (2004) observe that Progressive Era reformers used the word sovereignty when
referring to political efficacy, and that reform-minded scholars of that era employed that term as well.
12

Bill Sizemore has played a central role in qualifying initiatives with similar and/or identical subject
matter in four areas. Restriction of payroll deduction for unions was the subject of M59 in 1998,
Measure's 92 and 98 in 2000, and M64 in 2008. Full deductability of federal taxes on state taxes has
been on the ballot in 2000 with M91, 2006 with M41, and 2008 with M59. Requiring voter approval of
tax and/or fee increases was on the ballot in 1994 as M5, and again in 2000 with M93. Finally, teacher
"merit pay" has been on the ballot in Oregon in 2000 as M95, and again in 2008 as M60.
13

The Farmer's Alliance flourished in the 1880s in the U.S. and was especially active in the South. The
Alliance was an organization formed by small farmers in reaction to the increasing prices of
commodities and transportation. The Alliance created cooperative stores and agitated for government
ownership of the railroads.
14
The Greenback Party existed from 1874 to 1884 in the U.S.. The name referred to paper money that
had been issued after the American Civil War. The Greenbackers opposed the shift from paper money
arguing that it would give too much control to banks and corporations. They were one of the first to
make the link between plutocrats, low wages, and lost opportunities for working Americans (Kazin,
1995, p. 32).
15

The Knights of Labor are considered one of the more important labor organizations of the 19 th
century. Their goals included ending child and convict labor, equal pay for women, and a progressive
tax. The Knights of Labor was supportive and active in the People's Party in 1890.
16

The term "panoptic sorting," or the panoptic sort, was coined by Oscar Gandy, Jr., author of The
panoptic sort: A political economy of personal information. The book uses the metaphor of the
panopticon, an "all-seeing" technology popularized by utilitarian philisopher, Jeremy Bentham. The
term is often used to invoke the haunting spectre of comprehensive surveillance.
17

Hal Malchow, lead consultant from MSHC Partners and author of Political targeting , defines
microtargeting as "...the use of data and advanced analytical tools to make more accurate predictions
about who will vote, whom voters support, and which issues each voter cares most about" (Malchow,
2008, p. 78).
18

The ballot title for Measure 64 in the 2008 general election read, "Penalizes person, entity for using
funds collected with "public resource" for "political purpose." Measure 64 was defeated with 50.56%
voting against and 49.44% in support (Oregon secretary of state web site, 2009).
19

The 2007 Democratically-controlled Oregon state legislature passed HB 2082, an omnibus initiative
reform bill that, among other changes, increased the required number of signatures from twenty-five to
1,000 to trigger the assignment of a ballot title to an initiative petition.
20

As of 2008, other states without a distribution requirement for petition signatures include: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and
Washington.
21

As of 2008, other states with a single subject rule include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wyoming.
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Ballot Measure 37 provided that property owners proving that zoning or environmental rules
decreasing their investments would have to be either compensated for their loss by the government, or
gain relief through an exemption from the regulations. The measure was successful in the November 2,
2004 election with approximately 60 percent of the voters in support (Barringer, 2004, November 26).
The term "death tax" refers to a tax on the wealthy hiers of estates that used to be referred to more
commonly as the "estate tax." While the origin of the term "death tax" is not clear, Jack Faris of the
National Federation of Independent Businesses is considered to have been influential in its initial rise to
popularity. Republican pollster Frank Luntz is often inaccurately identified as the terms progenitor
(Alvarez, L. 2001, April 27).
24

The Cascade Policy Institute is a think tank that advocates for neoliberal principles including "free
markets" and limited government. It receiveds funding from the Cato Institute, and has links to
conservative and neoliberal organizations including the Manhattan Institute, Heritage Institute,
Heartland Institute, and Reason Foundation.
25

Oregonians in Action advocates for private property rights and has played a central role in sponsoring
ballot measures including Measure 7 in 2000, and Measure 37 in 2004. Both measures mandated that
property owners had to be compensated for any loss in the value of their private property due to
government land use decisions and zoning restrictions. The organization opposes Oregon's regional
government, Metro, and most elements of the state's land use system. Timber and forest product
companies were the major funders of Measures' 7 and 37.
25

GRP or gross rating points refers to the sum of ratings earned by a particular advertisement. The
number represents the percentage of the target audience reached by a particular advertisement.
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